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In recent years, pursuit-based feedback control laws have helped realize complex
spatio-temporal behaviors of robot collectives by utilizing relative information (e.g.
optic flow) of the target with respect to the pursuer. For instance, these algorithms
can enable a team of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) perform search, rescue and
surveillance. However, such platforms are far from being completely autonomous and
frequently require human intervention to reset the goals for the mission midstream,
to be accomplished by choosing one from a pool of control laws. While this can
ensure achievement of very specific goals over a short duration, such as reaching a
search location and performing motions to cover an annular region around it, there
is a need to autonomously generate high level goals especially in the face of adverse
or unexpected events. This requires using sensory information gathered from the
environment in which the agents operate to decide the next course of action. The
broad aim of this thesis is to establish a mathematical framework to enable a collective
of robotic agents, each with a finite set of actions to choose from, arrive at a cognitive
decision that is justified by aggregated evidence. We motivate the use of models
from evolutionary game theory, particularly the replicator dynamics, to model the
evolution of the probabilities associated with choosing each action.
We take inspiration from neuroscience for realizing context-dependent decision
making by means of a three-layer cognitive hierarchy operating at multiple timescales.
We show how evolutionary game theory offers a natural framework to model this hi-
erarchy. In particular, replicator dynamics associated to fitness maps capture the
evolution of a finite number of population fractions or probabilities that grow de-
pending on the fitness or reward obtained for each population type. In the present
setting, we interpret the types as synonymous with strategies implemented by feed-
back laws and the decision of an autonomous agent as represented by probabilities
over its strategies. This formulation can be used to realize a combination of available
control laws that will enable the agent to achieve its goal. In the bottom layer are the
dynamics of an agent which responds to external stimuli from the physical environ-
ment at a fast timescale by a combination of its feedback laws. In the intermediate
layer is the replicator dynamics evolving in a comparatively slower timescale, in which
the decision making that goes behind choosing the feedback law in the lower layer is
updated using knowledge of the fitness of each strategy. In the top layer evolving at
the slowest timescale, we consider replicator control systems specified by control laws
that seek to realize context dependence (cognition) at the higher level.
The contributions of this thesis are in all three layers of the cognitive hierarchy,
explained through a top-down approach. We first consider the top layer by extending
the replicator dynamics to a replicator control system whose controls vary the fitness
of strategies in a time-dependent manner. We show a Lie algebraic structure in the
space of fitness maps. We exploit this mathematical structure in the dynamics to
modulate the fitness so that an arbitrary final set of probabilities can be attained
from an initial state. In the process, we determine the associated controllability
conditions. In the intermediate layer, we highlight an optimizing property of the
replicator dynamics by showing that it satisfies first order necessary conditions for
optimality for an appropriate cost function. In the bottom layer, we consider the
interpretations of mixed strategies in the agent’s physical world. An instance of dyadic
pursuit in which the pursuer aims to capture a target using the motion camouflage
pursuit strategy while trading off the accuracy of sensory information for the speed
of response to the stimuli is explored.
In the final part of this thesis, we consider a cognitive description of starling
flocks by treating each flock as a single decision-making entity. We use observations
made from several flocking events and formulate a data smoothing problem using
the game-theoretic formulation in this thesis to understand the temporal evolution
of fractions of the relative kinetic energy allocated to the different behavioral modes.
We propose a function, the optimal cost arising out of the solution to an underlying
optimal control problem, as a measure of cognitive effort involved in producing these
behaviors. Lastly, we conclude with a discussion on ongoing work, some challenges
and future research directions.
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In the past few decades, the advent of technology has enabled collectives of
autonomous robots to perform a myriad of tasks with increasingly little supervision.
Some examples are Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) executing a mission involving
rescue and surveillance, or warehousing robots retrieving inventory and transporting
it to a desired location. At the core of such platforms are the underlying feedback
control systems equipped with sensor modules and motion control algorithms which
enable perception of cues from the environment, and actuators that enable interaction
with it. While such control laws can ensure achievement of very specific goals over a
short period of time, high level goals that might determine the long term mission for a
robot collective often need to be specified by a remote operator. This is more so when
the collective operates in an environment comprising potentially adverse, unexpected
events. In this thesis, we consider the problem of arriving at high level decisions
justified by aggregated evidence and provide models inspired from evolutionary game
theory to determine strategies as goals for autonomous agents.
1
1.1 Motivation from biology
Problem solving behaviors observed in mammals such as bats and primates,
and insects such as dragonflies serve as motivating examples for studying cognition.
The big brown bat or Eptesicus fuscus has been known to employ different pursuit
strategies depending on the context [8,9]. While a lone bat pursuing its prey typically
uses the motion camouflage pursuit strategy to achieve prey capture, this is not the
default choice of pursuit strategy in the presence of multiple pursuers. Particularly, in
experiments comprising two bats in the presence of a single prey, the leading pursuer
is shown to follow the motion camouflage strategy, while the lagging bat employs
classical pursuit with respect to the leading bat. That is, the second bat simply
aligns its velocity in the direction of the line-of-site vector to the leader, instead of
paying attention to the prey. Impressively by doing so, the follower has been observed
to have a higher chance of prey capture than the leader.
Bats employ sonar to perform echolocation. By using information from the
reflected sonar beams, they are able to differentiate prey and conspecifics from back-
ground clutter. The characteristics of sonar beams such as directionality and the
beam width, which can be thought of as the accoustic field of view, are not station-
ary. Echolocating bats [10] have been observed to modify their attentional mechanism
that determines the sonar beam width and directionality depending on context. While
they use a narrow beam in the presence of a single prey, in the presence of multiple
preys, instead of alternating their focus from one prey to another, they have been ob-
served to increase the beam width to incorporate multiple preys within their accoustic
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field of view.
These observations suggest that bats are not only capable of implementing dif-
ferent feedback control laws using the information they have access to, but are also
capable of choosing the type of information to be used in the feedback laws by resort-
ing to sensor control. However, the sensory information on which the feedback law
is based is not available immediately. Once the reflected sonar beams are detected
by the bat, as with any biological organism, delays are incurred due to (i) sensory
motor processing involved in transmitting the signal through afferent neurons to the
brain and relaying motor commands through efferent neurons to the end effectors
such as the wings, and (ii) cognitive processing involved in computing an action to
be implemented based on the observed signal. Additionally, sensed information is
usually corrupted by noise due to randomness in the prey behavior as well as physical
limitations of the bat, affecting the perceptional accuracy. Their ability to capture
prey despite such limitations suggests a method of adaptive decision making that goes
beyond realization of a single feedback control law.
An illustration of a similar mechanism can be found in the refined architecture
for head and body steering control involved in dragonfly pursuit [11]. Dragonflies
use their proprioceptive sensing ability to achieve stabilization of the head in the
direction of the target with a delay much lesser than the sensory motor processing
delays allow. Observations from prey capture experiments uncovered the possibility
that dragonflies use internally sensed information about efferent motor commands to
their wings that affect the aerodynamics of its motion, in order to proactively adjust
the orientation of the head, thereby achieving quicker stabilization of the prey position
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in its eyes. This allows compensation for delays through active sensor control with a
predictive component involving proprioception. We will see in a later discussion on
cognitive dynamical systems that this is an important aspect of cognitive control.
Feedforward mechanisms of the primate brain have been investigated in the
past such as in [12], where a Smith predictor model inspired from frequency-domain
based approaches in process control [13] is proposed to explain ability of monkeys to
track a reference curve on a screen by controlling a joystick, despite delays imposed
in visual feedback. The ability of humans to make decisions based on information
that is limited either due to time or knowledge constraints is remarkable. Consider
for example, a player trying to intercept a ball. To do so, the player must maintain
a constant bearing of the line of sight to the ball with respect to the direction of
their motion [14]. Of all the visual information available to the player, intercept with
the ball can be achieved by only paying attention to this bearing. For this reason,
this gaze heuristic is deemed to be fast and computationally frugal [15]. A more
dramatic example of this was observed in the landing of US Airways flight 1549 on
the Hudson river after the loss of engines due to bird strike. It has been suggested
that a similar heuristic - in particular, the rising of distant landmarks with respect
to a fixed point on the windshield - was used by the pilot to conclude that he will be
unable to land at the local airports. Additionally, he improvised an arguably risky
decision to land on the Hudson river, based on the information available to him.
While the appropriate heuristics may have been learnt from past experience, the
ability to innovate unprecedented decisions in a critical time is a pinnacle of human
behavior. Enabling engineered systems to emulate such mechanisms of determining
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control actions is of pertinent interest in this thesis, and models from neuroscience
that offer insights into the workings of the human brain are a natural source of
inspiration.
1.2 Cognitive dynamical systems
Control architectures that are more sophisticated than the traditional negative
feedback based approaches have found profound applications in engineering, neces-
sitated by demanding performance objectives that include delay compensation and
offering improved robustness and efficiency in achieving the desired objective (see for
example [13]). Recently, attempts have been made to use models from neuroscience in
order to mimic cognition in dynamical systems. In the following sections, we describe
literature that serves as the basis for the notion of cognitive control explored in this
thesis.
1.2.1 The perception-action cycle
The perception-action cycle due to Uexküll [16] is an abstraction of cognition
in higher animals such as primates. The interaction of a biological organism with
its environment is captured through the schematic of this cycle, shown in figure 1.1.
The organism perceives its environment using its sensory organs and processes this
information to send appropriate motion commands to the end effectors, which then
enable interaction with the environment. It is interesting to note that information




Figure 1.1: The perception - action cycle.
red arrow shows the signals from the effectors informing the perception and hence
the information processing, suggesting a feedforward mechanism. That is, cognition
is proactive and predictive (where internal models of self-behavior and external world
have been learnt), rather than simply reflexive and prospective (where internal mod-
els are absent, but observations of the environment are extrapolated to anticipate
stimuli and formulate a suitable response). In fact, Fuster identifies perception, at-
tention, memory, intelligence and language as the main cognitive functions that help
implement these characteristics.
The perception-action cycle is a useful but limited abstraction for cognition
in that it is not obvious how the different cognitive functions (discussed in section
1.2.3) are realized. While models that offer a realization of this cycle such as the
Smith predictor have been helpful in furthering our understanding of the mammalian
brain, they suffer from dependence on parameters which may not have biological
significance, thereby limiting their interpretive power. Therefore, we suggest that
such coarse models of neural mechanisms help explain observed behaviors whereas
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they do not capture the more fine-grained viewpoint for decision making offered by
the cognit model [2], explained below.
1.2.2 The cognit model
In the past, efforts have been directed towards anatomical and mechanistic mod-
eling of the human brain (see for example [17] and references in [2]). In [2], Fuster
emphasizes the role of the prefrontal cortex as a preadaptive system. This is explained
using a hierarchical view of the brain organization, namely the cognit model which
incorporates the role of learning and experience in arriving at behaviors. According
to Fuster, cognits are hypothesized collections of neurons and the interconnections
between them, which are not limited by spatial separation. They can also be in-
terpreted as conceptualizations of memories or units of knowledge, which are highly
interconnected, sharing neurons or their assemblies. Therefore, a neuron may be a
part of many cognits. Moreover, cognits are not limited to specific functionalities of
the brain, and the same cognits or their sub-units may be involved in several cognitive
functions.
1.2.3 Fuster’s cognitive hierarchy
Fuster suggests that the major cognitive functions are perception, attention,
memory, intelligence and language, empowered by the organization of the cognits.
Activation of the cognitive functions is key to achieving desired spatio-temporal goals
for individuals engaged in interactions with the environment. The examples in the
previous sections have involved some of these cognitive functions whereas the role of
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Figure 1.2: Fuster’s cognitive hierarchy. Figure from [2].
memory and intelligence along with these other functions is emphasized in Fuster’s
cognitive hierarchy shown in figure 1.2. He suggests that cognits are organized to
represent a hierarchy of perceptual and executive memory and that this offers flex-
ibility and plasticity. The two hierarchies are interconnected at all levels as in the
perception-action cycle in figure 1.1. In this model, the brain dynamics comprises
• past information (or memories) organized in the cognits of the posterior cortex
along with emotional inputs.
• selective usage of memories of past events in order to determine actions for the
future through preadapation.
We note, as does Fuster, that this is only a schematic, and not meant to suggest
the segmentation of the brain into discrete, specialized units. The preadaptation
functionality of the brain is explained through this cognitive hierarchy of Fuster [2].
The central thesis of Fuster’s work is the role of the prefrontal cortex and its
connection to other cortical regions in enabling preadaption through anticipation of
events in the emotional and cognitive domain due to environmental stimuli. Such
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events also include internal stimuli due to self predicted changes in the organism,
such as in dragonflies’ stabilization of the head. The main insights from this model
are summarized below.
Cognitive information is stored as relational code that is dictated by the near
co-occurance of sensory or motor signals, along with emotional inputs. The orbito
frontal cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex, both of which are located in the
prefrontal cortex, are involved in proactively sensing the risks associated with errors
in predictions, as well as expected rewards, aiding minimization of perceived costs.
Thus, memory plays an important role in the realization of predictive control and in
assimilation of stimuli using Bayesian inferencing into abstractions that serve as rules
for future behavior.
Attention modulation mechanisms offer the advantage of reduced computational
complexity by providing the ability to focus only on salient features in the sensory
information resulting in fast decision making. Attention is said to be composed of
an excitation-inhibition mechanism that modulates focus, which together with the
working memory, helps in predictive decision making. It is not only directed towards
sensing the external world, but also internally focusing on selection of memories that
serve as the basis for future decisions. Working memory is also involved in anticipating
the effects of motor commands called the “preparatory set” and preparing for it in
advance. This is manifested in the electrical activity observed in the prefrontal region
of the brain called contingent negative variation or the expectancy wave. For further
discussions on the nature of cortical signals, we refer to [2].
To summarize, the cognitive hierarchy is composed of the following ingredients:
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• the role of time in determining decisions in the short term, plans in a longer
term and committing behavioral consequences to memory over a longer time
scale,
• the organization of learned information into rules for functioning, and
• adaptation to new and possibly adversarial situations by using newly acquired
information into rules after sufficient time has passed.
We briefly discuss some applications in engineering, summarized from [18] that arose
out of this cognitive model: cognitive radar and cognitive radio.
Cognitive radar
Bats’ echolocation by active control of sensors provides appropriate range, rela-
tive velocity, size, along with positional information of a chosen target. Presumably,
this is accomplished by using rules of behaviour learnt from experiences over time,
along with plasticity enabling adaptations to the surrounding environment. Cogni-
tive radar [18, 19] aims to mimic the functionality of a bat’s echolocation process
and is distinguished from traditional radar sensing by the incorporation of cognitive
functions that seek to minimize real-time computational demands and offer efficient
sensing in the presence of environmental uncertainties. The implementation of a
perception-action cycle complete with the schematic of the cognitive hierarchy as in
figure 1.2 is seen as the first step towards cognition.
In the flow of information from perception to action, the goal is to maximize
the feedback information at receiver output and to use a criterion based on a cost-
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to-go function for determining the subsequent probing wave characteristics for the
transmitter. Attempting to select the chirp rate (λ) and pulse duration (b) is a
problem of identifying the time-evolution of these parameters in a waveform library
that is a two-dimensional grid. These parameters are adaptively chosen such that a
cost-to-go function given by either the error covariance of the target’s state estimate
or a Shannon entropic measure of information content in the estimation error is
minimized. A Cubature Kalman Filter (CKF) approximating the optimal Bayesian
filter provides an estimate of the state using past measurements, with the solution of
an approximate dynamic programming problem providing a way to choose the receiver
configuration for future sensing. For the inclusion of memory in a cognitive radar,
it is proposed that perceptual, executive and working memory units are respectively
coupled to an environmental scene analyzer, an environmental scene actuator and
perceptual and executive memory. A way of including memory is to create libraries
of encountered signal noise variances in the receiver and waveform characteristics in
the transmitter as knowledge of signals and responses encountered in the past.
Cognitive radio
The aim of designing a cognitive radio [18, 19] is first and foremost to effi-
ciently use a spectrum allocated for communication. Particularly, suppose that a
band of frequencies may be assigned to a primary licensed user. A solution to effec-
tively utilizing the bandwidth available is to temporarily reallocate unutilized bands
of frequencies to a secondary cognitive radio user. Some challenges in this problem
are: identifying spectrum holes with confidence, allocating such frequency bands to
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cognitive radio users in reasonable time, and without overlaps among the secondary
users. The perception-action cycle in cognitive radio networks is perception to find
spectrum holes, learning and memory using a proposed game theoretic dynamic spec-
trum manager, attention to identify congested frequency bands, to focus attention on
those with low interference, and to build a predictive model of the spectral bands,
and intelligence to smartly integrate the above mechanisms.
Some of the challenges for cognitive radio networks are the unpredictable dy-
namics of spectrum holes, time delays associated with feedback of sensed signals from
the receiver to the transmitter, robustness against malicious interruptions, to name
a few. Cognitive radio networks can be non-cooperative where each user is greedy,
or cooperative where they try to optimize their utility by agreeing to cooperate with
each other. In such an environment comprising different users, mismanagement could
easily result in chaos. Game theory is proposed as a possible formulation to solve
this problem and compares behaviors that have positive and negative outcomes with
notions of evolutionarily stable states of John Maynard Smith in evolutionary game
theory.
We note that the implementations of cognitive radar and radio as described













Figure 1.3: Candidate pursuit strategies (courtesy of P. S. Krishnaprasad). The
pursuer and evader are denoted p and e respectively, their velocities xp,xe and the
baseline joining them r [3–7].
1.3 Towards cognitive control using evolutionary game the-
ory
We interpret the cognitive hierarchy of Fuster using models based in evolution-
ary game theory. As a first step towards the realization of cognitive control in the
context of collective behaviour of autonomous agents, we abstract the decision of an
agent as a feedback law which may be a combination of a finite number of ‘strategies’.
For example, consider a dyadic pursuit between a pursuer and a passive evader.
Depending on the constraints given by the angle of the pursuer’s velocity with respect
to the line of sight to the evader, several candidate pursuit strategies as shown in
figure 1.3 can be defined: classical pursuit (CP) in which the pursuer’s velocity is
in the direction of the evader, constant bearing (CB) pursuit in which the pursuer
aligns their velocity with a phase lead or lag with respect to the line of sight to the
evader, and motion camouflage (MC) in which the pursuer seeks to appear as if it
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were a stationary background object to the evader by nullifying its motion parallax.
Other motion control paradigms may involve cyclic constant bearing (CCB) where an
agent in a collective of arbitrary size performs constant bearing pursuit with respect
to a neighbor in order to achieve a circling or rectilinear equilibrium, or boundary
avoidance by following a Bertrand mate curve defined by the time-dependent position
of the nearest point to the agent located on the obstacle [3–7]. In all of these cases,
feedback laws that exploit the relative configuration of a passive evader with respect
to the pursuer have been shown to achieve the objective (to come within a capture
distance) by constraining their motion to a manifold defined by suitable contrast
functions in the joint state space of the agents.
1.4 Organization of the thesis
A schematic diagram for cognitive control discussed in this thesis is presented
in figure 1.4. A cognitive agent is modeled as a system capable of cognitive decision
making through a three layer architecture inspired from neuroscience. The three
layers acting at different time-scales are described as follows:
(i) Bottom layer corresponds to a physical layer through which an agent interacts
with its environment by the implementation of a combination of a finite choice
of feedback laws on a fast time scale. The combination that specifies a mixture
of the available feedback laws is dictated by a vector of frequencies summing to
unity, interpreted as a mixed strategy, in the middle layer.


















Figure 1.4: A three-layered cognitive hierarchy.
evolving on a slower, evolutionary time scale, based on the fitness of the feedback
laws. This dynamics can be understood to model the mean-field limit of a
learning process for which the fitness map (a vector of fitnesses for each feedback
law) provides a reward structure, suggesting a reinforcement learning scheme.
(iii) In the top layer the fitness maps that describe the replicator dynamics are
modulated on a slower time scale, allowing adaptations in the learning process
through a game-changing dynamics, which is a key cognitive function. The
modulation of the fitness is accomplished through time-dependent controls to
achieve a desired cognitive goal. This method provides a way to modulate fitness
based on the changing external stimuli over a long time scale, offering a way to
change preferences for strategies based on newly obtained information.
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We explore this hierarchy by adopting a top-down approach in the following
chapters. We introduce notions from evolutionary game dynamics as an extension of
non-cooperative game theory and define pure and mixed strategies, and their fitness in
chapter 2. We outline connections to Bayesian inferencing and reinforcement learning,
and provide a set of examples through a brief review of relevant literature.
The top layer of the hierarchy in figure 1.4 is discussed in chapter 3, where
we first show the universality of replicator dynamics. We then extend the notion of
replicator dynamics into a replicator control system that allows time and frequency
dependent modulation of fitness. In the process, we show Lie algebraic structures in
the dynamics with parallels in Hamiltonian mechanics. To determine the existence of
controls that steer the system to an arbitrary mixed strategy choice, we investigate
conditions for controllability, which thanks to the Lie algebraic structure of the prob-
lem, boil down to conditions on the fitness maps. We investigate optimal transfer
of the strategy from a specified initial condition to an arbitrary final condition. In
chapter 4, we discuss a set of feedback laws that make desired mixed strategies stable,
by using the Kullback-Leibler divergence measure and other functions as Lyapunov
functions. We highlight that the probability simplex in which strategies evolve is a
Riemannian manifold equipped with the Fisher-Rao-Shahshahani metric, and explore
the gradient property of certain evolutionary game dynamics.
Next, we discuss the middle layer in chapter 5, where we consider the optimizing
properties of replicator dynamics. We show that replicator dynamics are candidate
minimizers to a cost functional comprising potential and kinetic energy-like terms,
analogous to mechanics. Due to the fact that any simplex preserving dynamics can
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be written as replicator dynamics with appropriate fitness, we suggest that every
simplex preserving dynamics satisfies this principle. We write down the Hamiltonian
formulation of this problem and show through theoretical and simulation results, the
existence of periodic orbits in the phase space of one dimensional game dynamics
corresponding to two-strategy games.
Subsequently, in chapter 6, we discuss interpretations for mixed strategies in
the lower layer of the hierarchy. We show the restrictions that arise in the simple case
of dyadic pursuit in which a pursuer uses the motion camouflage feedback law but is
subjected to inaccuracies in the sensed optic flow information and delays associated
with sensing. This leads us to anticipate challenges in implementing combination
feedback laws.
In chapter 7, we consider a controlled evolutionary game as a generative model
for data smoothing of a set of points defining a time-dependent trace on the simplex.
This model allows us to consider a set of 8 starling flocking events and explain their
total kinetic energy allocations into components interpreted as strategies of a game.
The temporal evolution of the control signals is derived from an optimal control
problem formulation, where the cost penalizes control effort and deviation of the
trajectory fit from the observed data. We propose notions of cognitive cost that aim
to assess the cognitive effort involved in producing the strategy changes in all the
events.
We summarize contributions of this thesis and discuss conclusions and future




The Lotka-Volterra equations [1] models changes in the sizes of interacting
species and are a generalization of the simpler 2-dimensional predator-prey dynamics.
Taking inspiration from the dynamics of interactions between types in evolutionary
biology, population dynamics has encapsulated the idea of evolving fractions of the
species or types, whose relative frequencies depend on their reproductive rate subject
to the adverse effects of competition for food and presence of predators. This prop-
agates, but may not lead to the ultimate survival or persistence of, the fittest type.
The Darwinian notion of survival of the fittest holds true only when the fitness of the
types do not depend on the composition of the population.
Population games on the other hand consider decision making by fractions of a
population where the types adjust their choices in response to how their respective
fitness compares to the average fitness of the population, as determined by revision
protocols [20]. The idea here is that populations that have higher fitness have a greater
chance of being reproduced in the next generation, thereby subsequently diminishing
the numbers of those types with lesser-than-average fitness. These considerations are
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discussed in great detail in [20–23].
We broadly interpret the types as synonymous with strategies for the cognitive
agent implemented by feedback laws in the lower layer of the cognitive hierarchy, with
the decision of an agent represented by probabilities over a set of its strategies. This
formulation can be used to realize a combination of control laws that enable an agent
to achieve its spatio-temporal goals. In this chapter, we introduce non-cooperative
and evolutionary game theory, following [1, 24] to set the stage for a mathematical
description of cognitive control.
2.1 Non-cooperative game theory
In his influential work [25], Nash developed the notion of non-cooperative finite
N -person games in which each player has a finite choice of actions or pure strategies.
Associated with each pure strategy is a payoff function that determines the returns
that each player gets by choosing that particular strategy. The set of strategies of all
the players such that a different choice for any of the players produces the same or
lower payoff is termed as a Nash equilibrium. When such a game is played repeatedly,
each player has the option of choosing a randomization of the pure strategies given by
a convex combination of the n pure strategies called a mixed strategy. The weights
of this convex combination can be thought of as constituting a state, evolving on a
simplex of dimension one less than the available number of pure strategies, i.e., ∆n−1,
with the vertices representing pure strategies and all other points in the simplex
representing mixed strategies. For a mixed strategy, the payoff function is calculated
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as the weighted average of the payoffs for the pure strategies, with the weights given
by the state of the player on the simplex. The Nash equilibrium in this setting
is defined as the N−tuple comprising the state for each player such that no other
strategy provides a higher payoff, assuming that the other players’ choice of strategy
is fixed at the equilibrium value. Nash showed the existence of such equilibria for
an N player game, in the convex polytope comprising N copies of the simplex. In
this thesis, we are primarily interested in two player games, where N = 2. We define
these notions precisely for finite normal form games below.
Suppose that two players are engaged in a game against each other, with each
trying to maximize their gain given by payoffs. Suppose that player 1 has a choice
of n1 actions or pure strategies and player 2 has n2. Then their payoffs for each
of the n1 × n2 strategy pairs can be given by matrices A ∈ Rn1×n2 = [aij] and
B ∈ Rn2×n1 = [bji] for players 1 and 2 respectively. That is, if player 1 and 2 choose
strategies i and j respectively, their payoffs are aij and bij. Such games are called
finite games in normal form.
Definition 2.1.1 (Symmetric game). Suppose a two player game is defined by
payoff matrices A,B which satisfy B = AT . That is, the payoffs for both players are
defined by a single payoff matrix. Such a game is called a symmetric game.
Definition 2.1.2 (Doubly symmetric game). Suppose a two player game is de-
fined by payoff matrices A,B such that B = AT = A. Such a game is called a doubly
symmetric game.
Suppose the two players are indexed by i ∈ {1, 2}. We denote the set of pure
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strategies for the ith player as the discrete set Si = {1, 2, . . . , ni} and the set product
S = S1×S2 as the pure strategy space of the game. For a pair of players with a pure
strategy profile s ∈ S, the payoff to each player is equal to πi(s), i = 1, 2. Therefore,
combined pure strategy payoff function of the game π(s) = (π1(s), π2(s)) assigns to
each pure-strategy profile s, a payoff vector π(s). With these definitions, a game in
normal form can be given by the triplet G = (I, S, π).
Definition 2.1.3 (Mixed strategy). A mixed strategy for a player i is a probability
distribution x = (x1, . . . , xni) over its set Si of pure strategies.
With this definition, the pure strategies of player i are given by the stan-
dard basis vectors in Rni . The set of all such distributions is denoted by ∆i ={
x = (x1, . . . , xni) :
∑ni
j=1 xj = 1
}
, the probability simplex in Rni . The set of all dis-
tributions given as int(∆i) = {x ∈ ∆i : xj > 0 ∀j = 1, . . . , ni} with positive probabil-
ities for all pure strategies is called the interior of the simplex. The pure strategies
are the vertices of the simplex, while mixed strategies constitute the interior and
the faces of the simplex. The extension of the finite normal form games with pure
strategies to that of a mixed strategy space allows us to redefine a game in terms
of the triplet (I,Θ, u), where Θ is the mixed strategy profiles of all players, and
u(x) = (u1, (x), u2(x)) are the payoffs to each player as a function of x.
Definition 2.1.4 (Best reply [24] ). The best reply βi(x) for player i to a mixed
strategy profile of all the players x is a mixed strategy such that no other mixed strategy
provides a higher payoff to the player, while all other players’ strategy profiles are fixed.
Definition 2.1.5 (Combined best reply [24]). The combined best reply of all the
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players is the Cartesian product of all the players’ best replies. That is, β(x) =
×iβi(x).
Definition 2.1.6 (Nash equilibrium [24]). A strategy x is said to be a Nash equi-
librium if it is a best reply to itself. That is, x ∈ βi(x).
A Nash equilibrium always exists in finite normal form games. The existence of
Nash equilibria is given by the Brouwer and Kakutani fixed point theorems [23, 26],
which exploit the compactness of the probability simplex in which strategies evolve.
In the following discussions, we will assume that the underlying game is a symmetric
game. Nash also alluded to investigating the effect of empirical payoffs determined
by pairwise interactions between members of a large population on its composition
in his PhD thesis. However, this idea came to mathematical fruition in the work
of Maynard Smith and Price, and subsequently Taylor and Jonker who wrote down
discrete and continuous time equations for strategy updates that model the impact of
repeated encounters. These considerations are introduced in the following sections.
2.2 Evolutionary and population games
In their 1973 work [27], Maynard Smith and Price explored the implications
of small, non-fatal conflicts between conspecifics or members of competing species in
the evolution for the benefit of the species. As an illustration, consider the hawk-
dove game. Suppose that the payoffs to a hawk (H) and dove (D) when encountering
others in a single population of hawks or doves is given by the matrix M below,
22







The reward or cost associated with dyadic interactions between members of the pop-
ulation was modeled as follows. A hawk encountering another hawk in a conflict has
a 50% chance of winning, during which it incurs a reward of V and when defeated, it
incurs a cost of C, while on an encounter with a dove, wins with a 100% chance and
gains V in payoff. Similarly, a dove engaged in a conflict with a hawk never wins and
hence gets a zero payoff, while a dove encountering a dove incurs a payoff V
2
subject
to a time delay T . Their work suggested a formulation in which proportions of each
type or species in the population, in this case the hawks and doves, are replicated
or diminished in numbers, according to the average reward obtained as a function of
the population proportions. For this reason, the resulting continuous time dynamics
is called the natural selection equations. Maynard Smith and Price also introduced
the notion of an evolutionarily stable population state immune to small perturbations
due to introduction of new members to the population. As opposed to Nash’s game
theory, strategies here are specified by the types or species, while the mixed strategy
refers to the fractions of the types.
In 1978, Taylor and Jonker [21] provided a mathematical model for this selection
process, where the fitness of each type is a function of both an underlying payoff
matrix of a symmetric game such as in the Hawk-Dove game, as well as the current
population state, making it linear in the frequency of the types. We first discuss
the replicator dynamics, the central object studied in this thesis and relationship
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of its equilibria to notions from game theory when the fitness is given by a game
payoff matrix. Subsequently, we describe both the discrete-time probability update
equations arriving at the continuous o.d.e limit for general fitness.
2.3 The replicator dynamics [1]
Consider a single population of n types with frequencies x1, . . . , xn. Under the
assumption that the population size is large but finite, and the populations homoge-
neously interact with each other, the state x(t) = [x1(t) . . . xn(t)]
T that represents
the population fractions evolves on the n − 1 dimensional probability simplex ∆n−1
as a differentiable function in time where
∆n−1 =
{






Suppose that the logarithmic growth rate ẋi/xi is generally given in terms of the
frequency dependent fitness of the types denoted by f i(x), i = 1, . . . , n as follows:
ẋi
xi










, i = 1, . . . , n. (2.4)
The simplex is preserved under (2.4) since xi = 0 =⇒ ẋi = 0. The equilibrium
points of (2.4) are the vertices of the simplex represented by standard basis vectors
in Rn denoted ei, and all interior points in the simplex x̂ satisfying
f 1(x̂) = f 2(x̂) = . . . = fn(x̂) (2.5)
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The connections of this formulation with matrix game theory can be seen by
considering an underlying normal form game that gives rise to the fitness f(x) in the
following way due to [1]. Suppose that n mixed strategies are available to each player,
determined by points p1, . . . , pn on the N−1 dimensional simplex ∆N−1. If the payoff
matrix is given by U ∈ RN×N , then, the payoff to the pi player when encountering a
pj player is p
T
i Upj. This defines the game matrix A = aij = p
T
i Upj using which we get





i, i = 1, . . . , n (2.6)





, i = 1, . . . , n. (2.7)
This interpretation separates the competitions between n population types specified
by the A matrix from the relative effectiveness of the N strategies available to them,
specified by the matrix U .
For (2.7), a unique interior equilibrium exists if there exists a solution to (2.5).
We discuss the relationship between Nash equilibria of the underlying symmetric
game defined by A and the equilibria for the dynamics (2.4), and notions of stability.
Definition 2.3.1 (Symmetric Nash equilibrium). A point x̂ ∈ ∆n−1 is said to
be a symmetric Nash equilibrium if
x.Ax̂ ≤ x̂.Ax̂ ∀x ∈ ∆n−1 (2.8)
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Following from (2.8), x̂ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium implies
x̂.Ax ≥ x.Ax̂ ∀ x ∈ ∆n−1
⇐⇒ (x̂− x).Ax̂ ≥ 0 ∀ x ∈ ∆n−1 (2.9)
Note that (x̂−x).Ax̂ = 0 is the equation of a hyperplane passing through the simplex.
Let H denote the set of all x ∈ ∆n−1 satisfying (2.9). Since ∆n−1 is connected, any
neighbourhood of x̂ can be written as the disjoint union of non-empty intersections
with H and its complement [28], and (2.9) holds for all x in the neighbourhood of x̂,
we can conclude that (2.9) implies (x̂ − x).Ax̂ = 0. This means that there exists a
constant µ ∈ R such that (Ax̂)i = µ for all i.
In the biological context, a more useful notion is the evolutionarily stable state,
which is a population state x̂ that is a better reply to any other state x in its neigh-
borhood, than that state x is to itself.
Definition 2.3.2 (Evolutionarily stable state). A point x̂ ∈ ∆n−1 is called an
evolutionarily stable state if
x̂.Ax > x.Ax (2.10)
for all x 6= x̂ in a neighborhood of x̂.
Well known results from [1] stated below summarizes the relationship between
Nash equilibria for the symmetric game with payoff matrix A and its evolutionarily
stable states.
Theorem 2.3.1 ( [1]). (a) If x̂ ∈ ∆n−1 is a Nash equilibrium of the game described
by the payoff matrix A, then x̂ is an equilibrium point for (2.7).
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(b) If x̂ is the ω− limit of an orbit x(t) in int(∆n−1), then, x̂ is a Nash equilibrium.
(c) If x̂ is Lyapunov stable, then it is a Nash equilibrium.
(d) If x̂ is evolutionarily stable state, it is an asymptotically stable equilibrium point
for (2.7).
(e) A state x̂ is evolutionarily stable if and only if P (x) = Πni=1x
x̂i
i is a Lyapunov
function for the dynamics.
The proof of (a) follows from the definition of a Nash equilibrium. Proof of (b)
follows by contradiction, by showing that if the ω - limit x̂ is not a Nash equilibrium,
then, ẋ|x̂ 6= 0. (c) is shown using a similar argument. Proofs of (d) and (e) follow
from differentiating P (x).
Interestingly, the converse of none of the statements above are true in general.
That is, not every rest point of the replicator dynamics is a Nash equilibrium, not
every Nash equilibrium is Lyapunov stable, and not every Nash equilibrium is the
ω− limit of an interior orbit. See [1] for counterexamples.
Returning to our earlier discussion on the separation of competition between
the types whose state is x ∈ ∆n−1, from competition between strategies p1, . . . , pn, is
explained by the following interpretation. The state x ∈ ∆n−1 corresponds to a mean
population strategy p =
∑
i xipi. Depending on the frequencies, p evolves along a
time-dependent path defined by x in the strategy space ∆N−1.
Definition 2.3.3 (Strong stability). Suppose that a population strategy p̂ can be
written as a convex combination of the initial phenotypes p1, . . . , pn. Then, p̂ is
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strongly stable if the mean population strategy
∑
i xipi converges under (2.7) to p̂
for every initial value sufficiently close to p̂.
Theorem 2.3.2. The strategy p̂ is evolutionarily stable if and only if it is strongly
stable.
The foregoing discussion can be specialised to the case of individuals engaged
in games against nature, with the fitness given by a real vector in Rn. In this case,
the payoff matrix of the underlying game consists of identical columns, reflecting
indifference to strategies employed by other individuals in the population. For such
an underlying game, there are no interior equilibria, and the vertex corresponding
to the pure strategy with highest fitness is globally asymptotically stable. These
specifics are discussed in detail in chapter 4. With this introduction, we highlight
some important interpretations of the replicator dynamics that support the main
contributions of this thesis.
2.4 Evolutionary dynamics as a deterministic limiting o.d.e
The fitness in the replicator dynamics (2.4) in the previous section was con-
sidered to be linear in the frequencies. Dynamics encountered from projecting the
generalization of predator-prey dynamics, namely the Lotka-Volterra equations with
affine growth rates onto the probability simplex [1], and interactions between allele
pairs in population genetics [29, 30] naturally give rise to replicator dynamics with
linear fitness (with frequency independent fitness being a special case). In chapter
3, we show that replicator dynamics are universal, and consider replicator dynamics
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with smooth fitness components which are obtained after a transformation of other
dynamics on the simplex. We describe the replicator dynamics (2.4) as the mean-field
limit of a discrete update of the frequencies for general fitness in this section.
Consider a population of N (large but finite) players belonging to n phenotypes
playing pairwise symmetric games. Suppose that each phenotypes’ population is
represented as before by xi(t), i = 1, . . . , n such that x(t) = (x1(t), . . . , xn(t)) ∈ ∆n−1.
Let the fitness of each phenotype be given by f i(x) ∀ i as a function of the state on








i(x) denotes the average fitness of the population. According
to this formulation, by equation (2.11), any phenotype whose fitness is higher than
average will increase proportionally, and similarly, other types with lower than average
fitness will decrease at time t+1. It can be easily verified that the simplex is preserved
under this update rule since
∑
i xi = 1 ∀ t. Therefore, at each time instant, knowledge
of the fitness at the corresponding point in the simplex is sufficient to update the
population state. One can arrive at a deterministic equivalent of this dynamics by
considering the limiting ordinary differential equation as in [4]. Observe that









This scaling factor is well defined only when f̄(x) > 0 ∀ t. This is usually enforced
through constraints on the fitness, which are not restricting, as we will see in later
chapters.
The discrete formulation of the replicator dynamics was used in [4] to show
the prevalence of the motion camouflage pursuit strategy in nature over classical and
constant-bearing pursuit. This was evidenced through the discrete probability up-
dates (2.11) where the fitness of each strategy was computed as a function of the
time-to-capture as measured from simulation experiments involving games against
nature. The o.d.e version (2.13) in this work corresponded to replicator dynamics
with fitness f i(x) = ci ∀ i, which is independent of the relative frequencies of each
species. The stochastic trajectories obtained from the probability updates using pay-
offs computed through Monte Carlo simulations are seen to be qualitatively captured
by the deterministic replicator equations, resulting in the convergence of all trajec-
tories initialized in the interior of the simplex to the vertex corresponding to the
motion camouflage strategy, the one with the highest fitness. The fitness components
are calculated using the weak law of large numbers by averaging the inverse of the
times to capture over a large number of simulations. The payoffs computed in [4] did
not involve direct competitions between players of each pursuit strategy. When the
types face off against each other, the payoff matrix A producing a linear fitness can
be computed in a similar way, by averaging across multiple pair-wise encounters in
simulation to arrive at (2.7).
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2.5 Connection to Bayesian hypothesis testing
Consider an active learning algorithm that uses sequential information to iden-
tify the probability that an event was observed under one of a finite number of
hypotheses. The probabilities associated with each hypothesis is updated as new
information is observed, using Bayes rule. Let H = {h1, h2, . . . , hn} denote the set
of hypotheses, h a random variable that takes a value H at time t with probability
p(h, t). Then, the posterior probability p(h, t+ 1|e(t)) can be given as:








This expression can be interpreted as the discrete replicator dynamics with the ex-
pected fitness







obtained using the weak law of large numbers, where ek is the k
th observation of the
evidence or event at time t. Note that such a limiting argument yields a frequency
independent fitness as in [4].
This connection is also explored in [31, 32]. Specifically, the Bayesian update
equation is compared with the discrete replicator equation (2.11). The notion of
evolutionary stability is extended to replicator dynamics of arbitrary fitness and the
Kullback-Leibler divergence is used as a candidate Lyapunov function. Further, it
is highlighted that exponential distributions are candidate solutions to the replicator
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equations and makes the case for the replicator dynamics a continuous inference dy-
namics. While the geometry of the simplex and connection to the Fisher information
metric is also mentioned, we reserve this for discussion in a later chapter.
2.6 Connection to Reinforcement Learning
The work of Narendra, Shastri and Thathachar [33, 34] considers learning au-
tomata described by discrete time, discrete state Markov processes, whose probability
updates over a finite set of actions at time t+ 1 is given by
p(t+ 1) = T (p(t), α(t), x(t)) (2.16)
where p(n) = [p1(t) . . . pn(t)]
T ∈ ∆n−1 is the probability vector over the set of actions
αi(n), i = 1, . . . , N and x(n) is a binary variable representing environmental stimuli.
A reinforcement learning is given by the hybrid Linear-Reward-Inaction (LRI) scheme
of probability update that functions as follows. When x(n) = 0 and α(n) = αi, then
pj(n+ 1) = pj(n)− Fj(p(n)) ∀j 6= i




whereas when x(n) = 1 representing an environmentally triggered signal,
pj(n+ 1) = pj(n) +Gj(p(n)) ∀j 6= i




In the case when Fi = −Gi =
f i(p(n))
f̄(p(n))
pi(n) ∀i, we get the replicator dynamics. The
convergence of this algorithm to an optimal probability vector is considered for differ-
ent reward schemes F,G with assumptions guaranteeing absolute expedience given.
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In our work, we consider replicator dynamics with controls scaling the fitness, which
is a parallel to the signal x from the environment in LRI scheme. This suggests that
the controlled replicator dynamics can be viewed as a special case of a reinforcement
learning algorithm.
2.7 Literature Review and Examples
Although our focus is mainly on equations (2.4) and their extensions, we sum-
marize some applications for replicator dynamics that span across many fields from
sciences to engineering which may benefit from the analysis in this thesis.
2.7.1 Revision protocol
Revision protocols provide an alternative way of updating the frequencies of
the types, other than the proportional selection method of the replicator dynamics
(2.11).
Definition 2.7.1 (Revision protocol [35]). Consider a population game comprising
N players playing one of n strategies with payoffs given by components of a general
fitness f . A revision protocol is a map that associates to each point on the simplex
taken along with the fitness at that point, a matrix of non-negative elements:
ρ : Rn ×∆n−1 7→ Rn×n+
(f(x), x) 7→ [ρij], 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. (2.19)
The values ρij are called the conditional switch rates from i to j. The mean
dynamics of the stochastic process through which the population proportions xi evolve
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their strategies is given by the difference between the proportion of agents switching








Replicator dynamics is a special case obtained by a pairwise proportional imitation
protocol, defined below.
Proposition 2.7.1 ( [35]). The replicator dynamics is the mean field dynamics cor-
responding to the revision protocol ρij = xj [f
j(x)− f i(x)]+, where [z]+ = max {z, 0}.
Proof. Consider (2.20) with the revision protocol ρij = xj [f









































Revision protocols are seen as a unifying framework to describe replicator dynamics
as well as logit dynamics, best response dynamics, and Brown-von Neumann-Nash
dynamics in [20,35,36].
2.7.2 Imitation dynamics
An alternative view of imitation dynamics is proposed by Hofbauer and Sigmund








As in the dynamics described by revision protocols, the number of agents switching
from strategy j to i in the duration δt is given by xixjφijδt with φij denoting the
switching rate from j to i, assuming that the two i, j players are chosen independently.
If the switching rate is assumed to be a function of the payoff difference so that
φij(x) = f
i(x)− f j(x), then, (2.22) is the replicator dynamics. This is also called the
proportional imitation protocol by the authors.
2.7.3 Selection - recombination equations
Replicator dynamics guarantees that extinguished populations remain extin-
guished for all future time. However, a variation of these equations called the selection-
recombination equations allow populations with nullified fractions to be replenished
through mutations from other species. Such examples are seen in population genet-
ics such as in the work by Akin [37]. These equations are, as the name suggests,
replicator dynamics with an additive recombination term as given below:
ẋi = xi
(
f i − f̄
)
+ di (2.23)
with fitness f = Mx, where M = MT is a symmetric matrix whose entries are the
malthusian parameters determining the growth rate of the types, and
∑
i di = 0.
For these equations to preserve the simplex, di satisfy the constraint that whenever
xi = 0, di ≥ 0. For example, d = α(x)v with v = [v1 . . . vn]T such that vi takes values
in the set {−1, 0, 1} and satisfying
∑
i vi = 0 is a selection-recombination equation.
With α(x) = Πj:vj<0xj − Πj:vj>0xj, the dynamics is simplex-preserving [37].
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2.7.4 Continuous Time Finite State (CTFS) processes
Consider a counting process {ct : t ≥ 0} which is defined by an increasing se-





where I(t≥Ti) is defined by
It≥Ti(ω) =

1 t ≥ Ti(ω)
0 t < Ti(ω)

and ω ∈ Ω, the sample space. This process is determined stochastically since Ti is
a random variable ∀i. For each t ≥ 0, ct takes values in the set {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Given
t > 0, ct = n if exactly n of the Ti take values are less than or equal to t. If for ω ∈ Ω,
ct(ω) = n, then ct′(ω) ≥ n for t′ ≥ t the counter is increasing. For a fixed ω ∈ Ω the
sample space, t 7→ ct(ω) is a sample path for the counting process.
Defining the variables S1 = T1, Sk = Tk − Tk−1, k ≥ 2, with Sk ∈ (0,∞).
The joint probabilities of {Sk} is equivalently described by {Tk}, k = 1, 2, . . .. The
variables S1, §2, . . . are independent and identically distributed. We specialize by as-
suming that S1 is and exponentially distributed random variable with rate parameter
λ > 0 such that P (S1 ≤ t) = 1− e−λt. The associated counting process is denoted as
{Nt : t ≥ 0}. It is well known that Nt is a Poisson random variable with parameter
λt.
Let {pk(t)} , k ≥ 0 denote the probabilities that the random variable takes values
k at time t. Then, their evolution as a function of time is given by the following set
36









−λ 0 . . . . . .















which is a self-contained system of differential equations with a generator matrix
determining the transition of probabilities such that the columns add up to zero.
We say that a process Xt is a continuous time finite state Markov process with
the state set {s1, s2, . . . , sn} if the probability P (Xk = sk), k = 1, 2, . . . , n is governed
by ṗ = Ap where components of p are given by pk = P (Xk = sk). Such processes









i(xt) and the counter rates λi appropriately chosen [38]. In [39], a varia-
tion of this counter driven process was presented to identify optimal communication
rates for a sensor network that minimizes costs due to control effort and penalizes
communication rate. This problem has an analogues in statistical mechanics suhc
as in [40]. Suppose that a molecule can take one of n conformations. Then, pi(t)
is the probability that the molecule is in state i, then the evolution of probabilities
p1, . . . , pn is given by
ṗ = Rp (2.27)
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The generator R models the transition probability from state i to state j by Rij ≥
0, i 6= j, and Rjj = −
∑
i 6=j
Rij. That is, the columns of R sum to zero, preserving
the simplex. Suppose the transitions between the states are produced by thermal
fluctuations and the separated by energy barriers with well depths Ej and barrier
energies Bij, then under the assumption of detailed balance, Rij = ke
−β(Bij−Ej).
These equations are known as the Arrhenius equations in thermodynamics. Another
nonlinear dynamics on the simplex is the Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered
model for propagation of infectious diseases in a population discussed in [41]. This
model was used to model transmission of malware in a wireless network in [42–44].
See [36] for additional examples from engineering. We show in the next chapter that






Lie algebra structure of fitness and replica-
tor control systems
In this chapter1, in a demonstration of the significance and generality of the
replicator dynamics, we prove that every vector field in the interior of the simplex
can be viewed as a replicator vector field with appropriate fitness. We prove the
closure of replicator vector fields under the Lie bracket and show how this in turn
imposes a Lie bracket structure on the fitness that define these vector fields, and
highlight some parallels with Hamiltonian mechanics. These observations broaden the
applicability of the results presented here to general fitness which may be nonlinear
in the frequencies of the types, beyond linear and frequency dependent fitness arising
from biology.
We extend the replicator dynamics to a replicator control system and ana-
lyze evolutionary game dynamics from the point of view of geometric control theory.
The Lie algebraic structure of fitness helps understand controllability of the system
1A significant portion of this chapter is verbatim from a draft [45]
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by imposing conditions on the constituent fitness. Subsequently, we formulate sub-
Riemannian optimal control problems that consider the transfer of strategy from a
given initial condition to an arbitrary final condition. Presently, we study the geomet-
ric structures of controlled replicator dynamics, rather than the notions of stability.
We begin by introducing fitness maps and replicator vector fields.
3.1 Fitness maps
Consider the n− 1 dimensional probability simplex
∆n−1 =
{
x = [x1 x2 . . . xn]






and the interior of the simplex given by
int(∆n−1) =
{
x ∈ ∆n−1 : xi > 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
}
(3.2)
where xi denotes the frequency of type i. Let e = [1 1 · · · 1]T ∈ Rn denote the column
vector with all the entries equal to 1. We formally define fitness maps, the replicator
vector field associated with a fitness map, and some of their properties in this section.
Definition 3.1.1. A fitness map f is a smooth map that assigns to each point in
the simplex, an n dimensional vector with components given by smooth functions f i
which denote the fitness of the ith type:
f : ∆n−1 −→ Rn
x 7−→ f(x) =
[
f 1(x) f 2(x) . . . fn(x)
]T
, f i ∈ C∞(∆n−1), i = 1, . . . , n
(3.3)
where C∞(∆n−1) is the space of smooth real-valued functions on the simplex.
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Definition 3.1.2. The replicator vector field associated with a fitness map f is the
derivative operator denoted Xf , expressed in terms of the coordinates x1, . . . , xn as
follows:















i(x) is the average fitness. We denote the tangent vector at a point x




















Let Λ(x) = diag(x1, x2, . . . , xn) be the diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements






where xTf = f̄ , the average fitness. According to definitions 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, the
replicator equations (2.4) can be written as:





Equations (2.4) are nonlinear and simplex preserving. This can be verified by observ-
ing that
∑
i ẋi = 0 and xi = 0 =⇒ ẋi = 0. Due to the latter property, it is also
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sub-simplex preserving. That is, any type that is extinguished remains extinguished
for all future time. We denote by X (∆n−1), the set of all vector fields on the simplex,
and by XR(∆n−1), the family of replicator vector fields.
Remark 3.1.1. The Lie derivative of a function φ ∈ C∞(∆n−1) along a replicator








Remark 3.1.2. If f is component-wise uniform, i.e., f = α(x)e where α is a scalar
function, then f̂ = 0.
Remark 3.1.3. If f̂ = 0 for x ∈ int(∆n−1), ∃ α, a scalar function such that f 1 =
f 2 = . . . = fn = α(x).
Proposition 3.1.1. The assignment f → Xf has an infinite dimensional kernel.
Proof. Let α(x) be a polynomial in x. Consider f(x) = α(x)e. Then, f i(x) = α(x)














= α(x) = f i(x)
=⇒ X if (x) = xi(f i(x)− f̄(x)) = 0 ∀ i (3.7)
Hence, for any polynomial α(x), the fitness map defined by f(x) = α(x)e belongs to
the kernel. Since the space of polynomials is infinite dimensional, so is the kernel.
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Definition 3.1.3. The elements of the kernel of the assignment f → Xf are termed
indifference maps.
While it is clear how one can find the replicator vector field for a given fitness
map by definition 3.1.2, the following corollary states how this assignment from fitness
maps to replicator vector fields is not invertible, due to the existence of the non-trivial
kernel.






, the fitness map
that generates this vector field is non-unique.
Proof. Following from proposition 3.1.1, we can infer that the fitness map g(x) =
f(x)+η(x), obtained by adding to f , η(x) = α(x)e which is an element of the kernel,
is given by:




f + η − f̄e− η̄e
)
= f̂ + η̂
= f̂ (∵ η̂ = 0 by proposition 3.1.1)
Therefore, for any fitness map in the set G = {g(x) = f(x) + η(x), η(x) = α(x)e} for
some element α(x) which is a smooth function satisfies Xg = Xf . Clearly, there are
infinitely many such fitness maps.
We explore the effect of multiplying a replicator vector field by a polynomial in
x in the following two propositions.
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Proposition 3.1.2. Let f be a fitness map. For a polynomial β(x) with no zeros on
the simplex, the replicator dynamics corresponding to the fitness function β(x)f(x) is
the inhomogeneously time-scaled version of the replicator dynamics corresponding to
f(x).






Since the ith component of the vector field satisfies the following:

































. Observe that for each x ∈ ∆n−1, Xf
and Xβf are linearly dependent vector fields.
Theorem 3.1.1. Every smooth, simplex-preserving dynamics can be transformed into
replicator dynamics with smooth fitness in the interior of the simplex.
Proof. Consider the dynamics on the simplex given by:
ẋi = Φi(x), i = 1, . . . , n (3.9)
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i Φi(x) = 0. In int(∆
n−1), this condition can be used to write



















Φ − f̄Φ) (3.10)














= 0, which is a replicator dynamics
associated with smooth fitness fΦ.
Theorem 3.1.1 can be applied to obtain the fitness map for several examples.
We list some examples here.
3.1.1 Examples
1. Revision protocol: Consider a population of agents updating their strategies























ρij(f(x), x), with average payoff f̄ = 0.
2. The generator equation: Consider a continuous time finite state (CTFS)
process whose state takes values in a discrete set of cardinality n, with the
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probability that it takes the ith value equal to xi. The generator equation that
describes the evolution of the probability vector x = [x1 x2 . . . xn]
T is given as
in (2.27) by:
ẋ = Ax (3.12)






so that the fitness map is given by fA = Λ











3. Modeling dynamics of infectious diseases in a population [41]: The
evolution of communicable diseases can be modeled by specifying fractions of a
population that belong in one of four classes: Susceptibles (S = x1) who could
contract the disease, Exposed (E = x2) who have been infected but cannot
transmit to others yet, Infected (I = x3) who can transmit the disease and
Recovered (R = x4) who have recovered from the disease and have developed
immunity against the disease. The equations governing the four fractions are
given as:
ẋ1 = µ− β(t)x1 − µx1 , ẋ2 = β(t)x1x3 − (µ+ α)x2
ẋ3 = αx2 − (µ+ γ)x3 , ẋ4 = − (ẋ1 + ẋ2 + ẋ3) (3.13)
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is the mean infectious period after which an infected person re-
covers and β(t) is a time dependent parameter that affects the conversion of
those susceptible to exposed. A further assumption made is that a recovered
individual remains immune to the disease for all future time. Due to the sea-
sonal nature of some infectious diseases, period-doubling bifurcations have been












For the remainder of this work, we deal with fitness maps which are not restrictive
in their dependence on x, and are assumed more generally to be smooth in x.
3.1.2 Transformation of Lotka-Volterra equations to replicator dynamics
The Lotka-Volterra equations on the (n−1)− dimensional positive orthant Rn−1+
describe the evolution of populations of n−1 interacting species [1]. Here, we provide
an overview of the Lotka-Volterra equations and quote a result on a transformation
enabling the Lotka-Volterra equations to be viewed as a replicator dynamics on the
simplex.
Let yi denote the population size of type i, i = 1, · · · , n−1. Then, the evolution
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, i = 1, · · · , n− 1 (3.14)





for each type is the sum of two terms: a constant
term which reflects the change in population in the absence of other species, and
a linear term with positive or negative coefficients in the remaining populations’
size, which models the effects of the presence of agents of the same or other species.
These effects may be adverse, such as the presence of predators who might reduce
the population or conspecifics who might compete for food. Presence of prey will
however play a role in increasing the population of the predator species.
Theorem 3.1.2. [1]There exists a differentiable, invertible map from the interior of
the simplex ∆n−1 onto Rn−1+ mapping the orbits of the replicator equation
ẋi = xi
(
(Ax)i − x · Ax
)
, i = 1, · · · , n (3.15)
onto the orbits of the Lotka-Volterra equation (3.14), where ri = ain − ann and a′ij =
aij − anj.
A sketch of the proof can be seen by defining yn = 1 and considering the
transformation xi = yi/
n∑
j=1
yj, i = 1, · · · , n. Then, the inverse can be calculated to be
yi = xi/xn. Differentiating yi yields the desired relationship.
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3.1.3 Projection of growth vector fields from the positive orthant onto
the simplex
Consider a population consisting of n species with the population size of type
i given by ξi ≥ 0. Suppose that each population evolves according to the following
growth dynamics:
ξ̇i = f
i(ξ1, . . . , ξn)ξi i = 1, . . . , n. (3.16)




which is well defined if ξ 6= 0. Then, x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ ∆n−1 and the derivatives of


















































f i − f̄
)
(3.17)
Suppose that f i, i = 1, . . . , n satisfies the scale invariance property:
f i(ξ1, . . . , ξn) = f
i(λξ1, . . . , λξn) i = 1, . . . , n (3.18)
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for λ > 0. That is, f i is homogeneous of degree zero. Then,
f i(ξ1, . . . , ξn) = f
i(λξ1, . . . , λξn) = f
i(x1, . . . , xn) i = 1, . . . , n (3.19)
We can see that the right hand side of (3.17) is now entirely expressed in terms
of x ∈ ∆n−1. Thus, the growth dynamics on the positive orthant projects to the
replicator dynamics on the simplex.






to be projectable if











are two growth vector fields on
the positive orthant with the components defined by smooth growth rates of degree
zero:
F i = ξif
i, Gi = ξig
i, i = 1, . . . , n. (3.20)









































where hi = Fg
i−Gf i, where F and G here denote the first order derivative operators
associated with the growth vector fields defined earlier.
Theorem 3.1.3 (Euler’s theorem for homogeneous functions of degree k). Suppose
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that φ : Rn → R is a real homogeneous function of degree k, that is, φ satisfies
φ(λξ1, λξ2, . . . , λξn) = λ
kφ(ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξn) (3.22)




dφ(ξ1, . . . , ξn)
dξr
= kφ(ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξn) (3.23)
Proof. Let φr denote the partial derivative of φ with respect to the r
th argument.
Then,






From the right hand side of (3.22), we get
dφ(λξ1, . . . , λξn)
dλ
= kλk−1φ(ξ1, . . . , ξn) (3.25)
For λ = 1, we get (3.23).
Using this result, we can directly see that scale-invariant functions which are










∂φ(x1, . . . , xn)
∂xr
= 0 (3.26)
where xi = ξi/(
∑
j ξj). We now state without proof a corollary of Euler’s theorem:
Corollary 3.1.2. If φ is a homogeneous function of degree k, then φr, the partial
with respect to the rth argument is a homogeneous function of degree k − 1. That is,
φr(λξ1, . . . , λξn) = λ
k−1φr(ξ1, . . . , ξn) (3.27)
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vector fields with the growth factors f i, gi ∀ i scale-invariant. Then, hi = Fgi −Gf i
is scale invariant.
Proof. To prove this result, we use the conclusions of the corollary to Euler’s theorem
on homogeneous functions. Recall that f i, gi ∀ i are scale-invariant. Then, applying
(3.27) to f i, gi with k = 0, we see that:











































= hi(ξ). (by (3.27))
This implies that hi is homogeneous of degree zero, and hence, projectable onto the
















































3.2 Lie algebra structure of replicator vector fields
In this section, we show that the replicator vector fields are closed under the
Lie bracket. We observe that the result of Lie bracket operation can be written in
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terms of the fitness of the two vector fields whose bracket is considered.
Theorem 3.2.1. Replicator vector fields are closed under the Jacobi-Lie bracket.
Proof. Suppose f1 and f2 are two fitness maps. The Jacobi-Lie bracket of the associ-

































































































f r2 (x)− f̄2(x)
)}
























































f r2 (x)− f̄2(x)
)}
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f r2 (x)− f̄2(x)
)}
Taking cue from the terms that contain summation over l which appear to be like

















































f r1 (x)− f̄1(x)
)
− f r1 (x)xr
(
f r2 (x)− f̄2(x)
)}]






f r1 (x)− f̄1(x)
)
− f r1 (x)xr
(

































= −f̄1(x)f̄2(x) + f̄2(x)f̄1(x) = 0.
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After exchanging the order of summation in the double summation over r and l in















































= f̂ i{1,2} (3.29)















f r2 (x)− f̄2(x)
)}
. Thus we




= f̂{1,2} and hence by (3.6), the commutation
of the Lie differentiation operators satisfy
[Xf1 , Xf2 ] = Xf{1,2} (3.30)
This suggests a bracket on fitness maps and precisely such a bracket is defined
in section 3.3. Equation (3.29) highlights an interesting property: the family of
replicator vector fields is closed under the Jacobi-Lie bracket, with the fitness f{1,2}
of the resultant vector field derived from fitnesses of the constituent vector fields. In
general, families of vector fields are not closed under bracketing. For example, it is
well known that Hamiltonian vector fields and divergence-free vector fields are closed
under the Jacobi-Lie bracket, while gradient vector fields are not. Theorem 3.2.1






Figure 3.1: Homomorphism structures in (a) Mechanics, and (b) Evolutionary games.
3.3 Lie algebra structure of fitness maps and the replicator
bracket
In this section, we consider families of fitness maps and show their algebraic
structure by defining a bracket operation. We will see the usefulness of these results
in determining controllability conditions on replicator systems with vector fields scaled
by controls in a later section.
Let A denote the commutative algebra of all fitness maps from ∆n−1 to Rn with
multiplication defined component-wise as follows for two fitness maps f and g:
(f · g)i = f igi
Definition 3.3.1. The replicator bracket {·, ·}R is defined as the map
{·, ·}R : A×A −→ A















i −Xgf i (3.31)
With this definition, it can be seen that in (3.29),
f{1,2} = {f1, f2}R (3.32)
so that the Jacobi-Lie bracket of the replicator vector fields takes the form
[f̂1, f̂2] = {f1, f2}R
∧
(3.33)








Observe that for fk, k = 1, 2 is a fitness map with components that are polynomials of
degree dfk > 0, k = 1, 2, then the bracketed fitness (3.34) has degree df1 +df2 + 1. We
will frequently alternate between the different expressions above, to simplify algebraic
computations.
Remark 3.3.1. Note that with this definition for the replicator bracket, [Xf1 , Xf2 ] =
X{f1,f2}R and the bracketed replicator dynamics (3.29) can be given as:
ẋi = xi({f1, f2}i (x)− {f1, f2}R(x)), i = 1, . . . , n. (3.35)
Theorem 3.3.1. The set A together with the replicator bracket {·, ·}R constitutes a
Lie algebra with an ideal I given by component-wise uniform fitness maps:
I =
{
fα = αe, α ∈ C∞(∆n−1)
}
(3.36)
where C∞(∆n−1) is the space of smooth real valued functions on the probability sim-
plex.
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Proof. To prove the result, we show that the replicator bracket satisfies the three
requisite axioms component-wise.
(i). Linearity. Consider a, b ∈ R. Then, for fitness maps fk, k = 1, 2 and g,
{af1 + bf2, g}iR (x)
= Xaf1+bf2g
i −Xg (af1 + bf2)i
= Xaf1g
i +Xbf2g
i − aXgf i1 − bXgf i2 (by (3.6))
= aXf1g
i + bXf2g
i − aXgf i1 − bXgf i2
= a {f1, g}iR + b {f2, g}
i
R (by regrouping terms)
(ii). Skew-symmetry. For fitness maps f and g,







= −{f, g}iR (x)
(iii). Jacobi identity. Let f, g, h denote fitness maps. We want to show that
{f, {g, h}R}
i
R (x) + {g, {h, f}R}
i
R (x) + {h, {f, g}R}
i
R (x) = 0











− [Xg, Xh] f i (by (3.30) and (3.32))
= XfXgh
i −XfXhgi −XgXhf i +XhXgf i
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Similarly, we get that:
{g, {h, f}R}
i
R (x) = XgXhf
i −XgXfhi −XhXfgi +XfXhgi,
{h, {f, g}R}
i
R (x) = XhXfg
i −XhXgf i −XfXghi +XgXfhi,
Adding up the three terms we get,
{f, {g, h}R}
i
R (x) + {g, {h, f}R}
i




i −XfXhgi −XgXhf i +XhXgf i +XgXhf i −XgXfhi −XhXfgi +XfXhgi
+XhXfg
i −XhXgf i −XfXghi +XgXfhi
= 0.
Hence, (A, {·, ·}R) is a Lie algebra. From the remark, it is clear that I is an abelian
sub-algebra of the Lie algebra (A, {·, ·}R) since for fα = α(x)e, α(x) ∈ C∞(∆n−1) and
g ∈ A,
{fα, g}iR = Xfαg
i −Xgf iα
= −Xgα(x) (because Xfα = 0, as fα ∈ I)
=⇒ {fα, g}R = −Xgα(x)e ∈ I (3.37)
This shows that the replicator bracket of a component-wise uniform fitness with an
element of the Lie algebra A produces another component-wise fitness map. Hence,
the set of all component-wise uniform fitness maps denoted by the set I is an ideal
of the Lie algebra. This concludes the proof.
Remark 3.3.2. We calculate the center C of A. Since elements of C commute with
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f̂ = 0 (3.38)








e = 0 (by (3.37))
For k = 1, . . . , n, α(x) = xk, this implies ĉ
k = 0. Therefore, elements of the center
are component-wise uniform fitness maps. That is, C ⊂ I and elements of C are
given by c = η(x)e, where η(x) ∈ C∞(∆n−1). Further for any f ∈ A, the bracket
calculation reduces to









e = 0. =⇒
∂η(x)
∂x
f̂ = 0 ∀f ∈ A =⇒
〈ĝ, f̂〉FRS = 0 ∀ f ∈ A (3.39)
where g is the fitness with components gi =
∂η(x)
∂xi
∀ i. Since (3.39) holds for all
fitness maps in A, this implies ĝ = 0 or equivalently that g is a component-wise










Therefore, any component-wise uniform fitness is an element of the center if it satis-




xk) + λ0 (3.41)
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where Ψ : R → R is a function, λ, λ0 ∈ R satisfy (3.40). However, on the simplex,
Ψ(
∑
k xk) = Ψ(1), a constant. Therefore, the candidate solutions (3.41) produce
elements of C which are of the form µe, where µ ∈ R.
Remark 3.3.3. The replicator bracket is not a derivation and hence, is not a Poisson
bracket. This can be seen from the following calculations for fitness maps f, g, h:
{f · g, h}iR = Xf ·gh

















6= f i {g, h}iR + g
i {f, h}iR
Consequently, (A, {·, ·}R) is not a Poisson bracket algebra. However, there are two
special cases for which such a relationship holds. When f i = α(x) ∀i = 1, · · · , n, we
get:





















































= α(x) {g, h}iR + g
i {f, h}iR (after adding giXfhi to RHS, ∵ Xf = 0.)
Furthermore, when h is a frequency independent fitness map, {f · g, h}iR = 0 =
{g, h}R + {f, h}R. Therefore, for these special cases, we have that:
{f · g, h}R = f {g, h}R + g {f, h}R (3.42)
Remark 3.3.4. Quotient Lie algebra of fitness maps. We showed earlier that the
set of all indifference (fitness) maps form an ideal in (A, {·, ·}R). Denote this I. Let
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f, g ∈ A. We define the relation ∼ as: f ∼ g ⇐⇒ ∃ η ∈ I such that f = g+η. It
can be easily verified that this is an equivalence relation. The commutative algebra A
quotiented by the equivalence relation ∼ is denoted A/ ∼ and the quotient replicator
bracket {·, ·}R can be defined in this space. For two fitness maps f, g ∈ A,
{[f ], [g]}R̃ = [{f, g}R] (3.43)
where [f ], [g] denote respectively, the equivalence class of fitness maps generated by
adding elements of I to f, g, under the equivalence relation ∼. That is, for a fitness
map f , elements of [f ] belong to the coset Sf = {f + η : η ∈ I}. The quotient algebra
A/ ∼ together with the quotient replicator bracket {·, ·}R̃ is a Lie algebra. That is,
(A/ ∼, {·, ·}R) inherits the Lie algebra structure of A. We investigate whether the
derivation property holds in the quotient Lie algebra.
Consider [f ], [g], [h], which are equivalence classes of fitness maps generated by
the fitness maps f, g, h respectively. Then,
{[f ][g], [h]}R̃ = [{(f + η1)(g + η2), (h+ η2)}R]
(where f + η1 ∈ [f ], g + η2 ∈ [g], η1, η2, η3 ∈ I.)
= [{fg + fη2 + η1g + η1η2, h}R] + [{fg + fη2 + η1g + η1η2, η3}R]
= [{fg, h}R + {fη2, h}R + {η1g, h}R + {η1η2, h}R]
+ [{fg, η3}R + {fη2, η3}R + {η1g, η3}R + {η1η2, η3}R]
= [{fg, h}R] + [{fη2, h}R] + [{η1g, h}R] + [{η1η2, h}R]
+ [{fg, η3}R] + [{fη2, η3}R] + [{η1g, η3}R] (∵ η1, η2, η3 ∈ I =⇒ [{η1η2, η3}R] = 0.)
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We observe that this expression does not equal [f ] {[g], [h]}R̃+[g] {[f ], [h]}R̃ in general
and hence, the quotient replicator bracket is not a derivation.
3.3.1 Examples
The behavior of solutions to the replicator dynamics are determined by the
fitness. Here, we compute the replicator brackets of frequently encountered fitness
maps and point out some properties of the replicator dynamics solutions wherever
possible.
3.3.1.1 Growth dynamics
Recall from section 3.1.3 that growth vector fields with scale-invariant growth
maps project to replicator vector fields on the simplex. We denote the replicator
vector field obtained by projecting the growth vector field F as XF as defined by the
projection operation:
Π∆n−1 : Rn+ −→ ∆n−1
F 7−→ XF (3.44)
and similarly for G 7→ XG and H 7→ XH .













where the components of growth rates f r and gr for each r are scale invariant, the
following holds:
Π∆n−1 ◦ [F,G] = [Π∆n−1 ◦ F,Πn−1∆ ◦G]
64
Proof. We have shown in earlier calculations that the Jacobi-Lie bracket of the growth
vector fields is given by







, hr = Fgr − Gf r is scale-invariant (proposition 3.1.3). Since
scale-invariant growth dynamics project to replicator vector field (see calculations
leading to (3.17)) we get:
Π∆n−1 (H) = X
i
H = xi(h
i − h̄) (3.46)
However, the right hand side equals
[Π∆n−1 ◦ F,Πn−1∆ ◦G] = [XF , XG]
= X{f,g} = XH (By (3.28))
since
X iF = xi(f








































Theorem 3.3.2 shows the commutativity between the projection of vector fields
on the positive orthant to the probability simplex, and the Jacobi-Lie bracketing
operation.
3.3.1.2 Revisiting CTFS processes
Let A = [aij] and B = [bij] be two such n× n stochastic matrices satisfying:
eTA = eTB = 0 (3.48)




, f iB =
(Bx)i
xi













































































([bi1 bi2 . . . bin]Ax− [ai1 ai2 . . . ain]Bx) =⇒
{fA, fB}R = Λ
−1(x)(BA− AB)x = Λ−1(x)[B,A]x (3.53)




, . . . , 1
xn
). Notice that substituting back in the replicator
equations, this takes the form of the generator equation obtained by taking the Lie
bracket of the generator equations defined by A and B matrices. That is, we have
shown that:






















= (BA− AB)x = [B,A]x = [Ax,Bx]. (3.54)
3.3.1.3 Frequency independent fitness maps
For two frequency independent fitness maps f = [f1 f2 . . . fn]
T and g =
[g1 g2 . . . gn]
T ,
{f, g}R = Xfg −Xgf = 0 =⇒ [Xf , Xg] = 0. (3.55)
Therefore, replicator vector fields with frequency independent fitness maps always
commute.
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3.3.1.4 Linear fitness maps







= B2Λ(x)(B1x− xTB1xe)−B1Λ(x)(B2x− xTB2xe)
= B2Λ(x)B1x− (xTB1x)B2x−B1Λ(x)B2x+ (xTB2x)B1x (3.56)
From this expression, we see that in general, the bracket of two linear fitness maps is
not linear. However, if B1 and B2 are diagonal, we get
{f, g}R = (x
TB2x)B1x− (xTB1x)B2x =⇒
[Xf , Xg] = (x
TB2x)Xf − (xTB1x)Xg (3.57)
3.3.1.5 Frequency independent and linear fitness maps
For f = a = [a1 a2 . . . an]
T ∈ Rn and g = Bx, B = [bij] ∈ Rn×n, we get:
{f, g}R = BΛ(x)(a− āe)
= BAx− āBx (3.58)





= BAkx− āBAk−1x (3.59)
This relationship is used in a later section to prove the sufficient conditions for estab-
lishing controllability of a replicator control system.
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3.3.1.6 Potential games
Consider two fitness maps f and g given respectively as the Euclidean gradients







∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (3.60)
Such dynamics, called potential games, are gradients with respect to a natural metric
on the probability simplex of the potential functions. We discuss such dynamics and
the Riemannian metric structure of the manifold in chapter 4. To understand whether
such games are closed under the Jacobi-Lie bracket, we consider the replicator bracket
of two such fitnesses component-wise by:












































This is, in general, not of the form hi =
∂V3
∂xi
for some potential function V3(x).
Thus, fitness maps that are given by gradients of potentials are not closed under the
replicator bracket.
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3.4 Replicator control systems and controllability





where the fitness map fk denotes a fitness map, and f̂k, the associated replicator
vector field, and uk(t) are time-dependent piece-wise continuous control inputs. We
term such systems as replicator control systems. Since the dynamics evolves on a
compact set, system (3.62) is complete. That is, the solutions of (3.62) are well
defined for all time. In our analysis, we restrict ourselves to m = 2, for any given
dimensionality of the simplex n− 1.
Definition 3.4.1 (Controllability). System (3.62) with m = 2 is said to be control-
lable if, for any initial condition x(0) = x0 ∈ int(∆n−1) and final condition x1 ∈ ∆n−1,
there exist controls uk(·), k = 1, 2 such that the solution to (3.62) connects them.
We note that this definition does not specify that duration it takes to achieve
this transfer, only that it is possible. Using the Chow-Rashevski theorem stated
below, we investigate sufficient conditions to be satisfied by the fitness maps for this
system to be controllable.
Theorem 3.4.1. (Chow-Rashevski Theorem, [46]) A system defined on a man-






is controllable if for all x ∈ M , there exist p linearly independent vector fields in the
Lie algebra generated by {Fi}mi=1 that span the tangent space TxM at x.
By Chow-Rashevski theorem, a dynamical system on the probability simplex
with the vector field defined by a linear combination of bracket-generating vector
fields scaled by controls is controllable.
In the following results on controllability, we specialize to replicator control
systems with constituent vector fields given by linear and a frequency independent
fitness maps scaled by controls. We use the implication of remark 3.3.1 that the Lie
brackets of replicator vector fields are determined by the replicator brackets of the
respective fitness maps. The following results can be compared with the accessibility
properties of the closely related Lotka Volterra systems, as explored in [47]. In [47],
the conditions for controllability are specified in terms of the Lie algebra generated
by linear and constant growth vector fields. Presently, we specify conditions for linear
and frequency independent fitness maps to constitute a controllable dynamics (3.62).
The following proposition specifies the conditions for linear independence of
replicator vector fields in terms of conditions on the fitness maps.
Proposition 3.4.1. Replicator vector fields defined by the set of fitness maps {hi}n−1i=1




cihi = µe =⇒ ci = 0 ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1 (3.64)
where µ ∈ R.
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to be linearly independent at each
interior point of the simplex, we need that
n−1∑
i=1














cihi = µe (By Corollary 3.6)
for some constant µ, since component-wise uniform fitness maps belong to the kernel
KerRep. This concludes the proof. Therefore, the condition for linear independence of
the replicator vector fields is that no non-trivial linear combination of the constituent
fitness maps make a component-wise uniform fitness map for every x in the interior
of the simplex, which is a stronger condition than linear independence of the fitness
maps.
Proposition 3.4.2. Let Λ(x) , diag(x1, x2, . . . , xn) and A = diag(a1, a2, . . . , an).
The fitness maps f1 = a = [a1 a2 . . . an]
T and f2 = Bx where B is an n× n matrix






= BAkx− (xTa)BAk−1x, k = 1, . . . , n (3.66)
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= BAx− (xTa)Bx (3.67)










= BAkx− (xTa)BAk−1x (3.68)




values of k, we produce a linear combination of two vector fields: one vector field
that is linearly dependent on BAk−1x
∧
, and another vector field BAkx
∧
, which is a
potentially new tangent direction. We consider conditions on the fitness maps of the





span the tangent space at each
x in the interior of the simplex.






with the fitness maps given by f1 = [a1 a2 . . . an], f2 = Bx where B is a non-singular
n × n matrix. Without loss of generality, one can assume that all ai > 0. Suppose
further that the ai are all distinct and B is non-singular. Then the system (3.82) is
controllable.
Proof. To apply theorem 3.4.1, we consider the Lie algebra of vector fields generated
by f̂1 and f̂2. However, due to the homomorphism property of section 3.3, we know
that the Jacobi-Lie bracket of replicator vector fields can be written in terms of the







We exploit this property and investigate conditions under which (3.82) is controllable
in terms of specifications on the Lie algebra generated by the fitness maps.




k−1x, k = 1, . . . , n
}
(3.71)
It can be seen due to proposition 3.4.2 that ∀ gk ∈ G̃, k = 1, . . . , n:
{f1, gk}R = BA






Therefore, by the homomorphism property (theorem 3.3.1), by successively bracketing
the vector field f̂1 with ĝk, for different values of k, we produce a linear combination of
two vector fields: one vector field that is linearly dependent on ĝk, and another vector
field described by the fitness BAkx, which is a potentially new tangent direction.
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We investigate conditions for the fitness maps in the set G̃, under repeated R−
bracketing, to produce replicator vector fields that span the tangent space at each x
in the interior of the simplex. We restrict the set of fitness maps to elements of G̃,
since higher powers of A can be represented by powers of A upto n− 1 due to Cayley
Hamilton theorem.
Let G ∈ Rn×n denote the matrix
G = [Bx BAx BA2x . . . BAn−1x] (3.73)
and Gk ∈ Rn×(n−1) denote the matrix with columns comprising all but the kth column
of fitness map BAk−1x in G, for k = 1, . . . , n. That is,
G1 = [BAx BA
2x . . . BAn−1x]
Gk = [Bx BAx . . . BA
k−2x BAkx . . . BAn−1x]
Gn = [Bx BAx . . . BA
n−2x] (3.74)
Let a = [a1 a2 . . . an]
T , ak = [ak1 a
k
2 . . . a
k
n]
T for all k = 1, . . . , n with a0 = e,
V ∈ Rn×n denote the Vandermonde matrix
V = [e a a2 . . . an−1] (3.75)
and let Vi ∈ Rn×(n−1) denote the matrix obtained by removing the ith column vector
ai−1 from V . Since the components of a are distinct and positive by assumption, V
and Vk, k = 1 . . . , n are all full rank, and the first n− 1 rows of each Vk form a basis
for Rn−1 (see appendix A for a discussion).
Letting ck = [ck1 ck2 . . . ckn−1]
T , recall by proposition 3.4.1 that if
Gkck = µke =⇒ cki = 0 ∀ i. (3.76)
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then the columns of Gk generate linearly independent replicator vector fields. Since
Gk = BΛ(x)Vk, Λ(x) is non-singular in the interior of the simplex and B is non-
singular by assumption,
BΛ(x)Vkck = µke =⇒
Vkck = µkΛ
−1(x)B−1e (3.77)
Let Ṽk denote the invertible matrix composed of the first n − 1 rows of Vk, as in
the appendix A discussion. Since the rows of Ṽk form a basis for Rn−1, there exist
matrices Pk which preserve the first n − 1 rows of Vk with its last row vector rk





Multiplying (3.77) by Pk on the left, we get:
PkVkck = µkPkΛ
−1(x)B−1e (3.79)
When µk = 0, the only solution for equations (3.79) is the trivial solution ck = 0
due to invertibility of Ṽk. For µk 6= 0, if rkΛ−1(x)B−1e = 0, one can invert Ṽk to
find a solution ck for which (3.79) holds. In particular, this solution is non-trivial
when x ∈ Sk = {y ∈ ∆n−1 : Λ−1(y)B−1e ∈ range(Vk)}. Therefore, when x ∈ Sk, the
fitness maps in Gk produce linearly dependent replicator vector fields. However, the
system of equations (3.79) is inconsistent and does not have a solution for any x in the
interior only if the last entry of PkΛ
−1(x)B−1e is non-zero. If rkΛ
−1(x)B−1e 6= 0 for
atleast one of the collections of fitnesses Gk, at each x, the hypothesis of proposition
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3.4.1 is satisfied. For this inconsistency to hold for atleast one k for every point x in
the simplex interior, this is equivalently








In the following calculations, we show that the null space of R denoted NR is trivial.
Suppose that the column vector v ∈ Rn satisfies Rv = 0. Since columns of V form a




l−1, dl ∈ R. Hence,
Rv = 0 =⇒ rkv = 0 ∀ k = 1, . . . , n
















Therefore, rkv = 0 ∀ k =⇒ dk = 0 ∀ k. (3.81)
The last statement is because rkVk = 0 by construction. Therefore, NR = {0}. From
the expression (3.80), we seek all interior points for which v = Λ−1(x)B−1e = 0. Since
Λ(x), B are non-singular, such a point x ∈ int(∆n−1) does not exist. Therefore, we
have shown that for each point in int(∆n−1), there exists a k such that 1 ≤ k ≤ n and
columns of Gk produce linearly independent replicator vector fields. That is, under
the given assumptions for the fitnesses, for each x ∈ int(∆n−1), there exist n − 1
fitness maps in G̃ that produce linearly independent replicator vector fields.
Theorem 3.4.2 provides a set of sufficient conditions on the fitness for replicator
control systems to be controllable. It is worth noting that these conditions are not
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affected by the dimensionality of the simplex. In [47], the accessibility of the closely
related controlled Lotka-Volterra system is considered, with conditions specified on
linear and constant logarithmic growth rates. Such dynamics in the absence of control
projects to replicator dynamics with linear fitness on the simplex [1].
We now give a theorem for the special case of B being a singular diagonal
matrix.





where the fitness maps given by
f1 = [a1 a2 . . . an] , f2 = Bx, B = diag(b1, b2, . . . , bn).
with bk = 0 for some k. This system is controllable if the n − 1 components of f1
other than ak are all distinct.
Proof. Let Λ(x) = diag(x1, x2, . . . , xn) and A = diag(a1, a2, . . . , an). By calculations





= BAkx− (xTf1)BAk−1x ∀k = 1, . . . , n. (3.83)





= BAjΛ(x)BAi − (xTBAix)BAjx−BAiΛ(x)BAj + (xTBAjx)BAix
= (xTBAjx)BAix− (xTBAix)BAjx (3.84)
The last expression is since diagonal matrices commute and so in the expression
before, the first and third terms cancel. By Cayley-Hamilton theorem, any powers of
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A higher than n can be written as a linear combination of I, A, . . . , An−1, and so, the




2x, . . . , BAn−1x
}
satisfy the following property: let hi, i = 1, ..., n + 1 be the elements of S. Then, for












form a family of involutive
















Hence, we restrict ourselves to the replicator vector fields generated by the elements
of S in verifying the Lie algebra rank condition of Chow’s theorem. First, we find
conditions under which {gi}n−1i=1 , where gi = BAi−1x constitute a set of fitness maps
whose replicator vector fields are linearly independent in the interior. We see that
any linear combination of the fitness maps in this set is component-wise uniform only
if all the components of the linear combination are zero. This is since the kth row of
BΛ(x)V is zero, since bk = 0. Let c denote the weights of the linear combination, as
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before.
BΛ(x)V c = µe =⇒

b1 0 0 0 0 . . . 0








0 . . . bk−1 0 0 . . . 0
0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0








0 0 0 0 . . . 0 bn

Λ(x)V c = 0 (3.87)
Equivalently, this can be written as:
B̃Λ̃(x)Ṽ c = 0 (3.88)
where B̃ and Λ̃ are the following diagonal matrices:
B̃ =

b1 0 0 0 0 . . . 0








0 . . . bk−1 0 0 . . . 0












x1 0 0 0 0 . . . 0








0 . . . xk−1 0 0 . . . 0



























... . . . . . .
1 ak−1 a
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... . . . . . .
1 an a
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The above is a homogeneous system of n−1 linear equations in n−1 unknowns. This
will have the trivial solution as the only solution only if det(B̃Λ̃(x)Ṽ ) is non-zero. By
assumption, B̃ is non-singular and Λ̃(x) is non-singular in the interior of the simplex.
Hence, this system is controllable if ai 6= aj ∀i, j 6= k. Therefore, (3.83) is controllable
if the components of f1, other than ak are distinct.
The theorems of controllability show that for a probability simplex of dimension
n−1, however large, it suffices to select two fitnesses that satisfy the conditions of these
theorems to guarantee the existence of controls to achieve a desired state transfer.
3.5 Sub-Riemannian geometry and optimal control
Satisfaction of Chow-Rashevski theorem guarantees that any pair of initial and
final states in the interior of the simplex has a path connecting them. This section
deals with finding optimal paths that minimize the cost arising from the path lengths.








Figure 3.2: A depiction of the probability simplex ∆2(left) and the spher-
ical simplex ∆S
2
(right). This spherical simplex is an octant of the unit
sphere S2.
use the Pontryagin’s maximum principle to find necessary conditions satisfied by the
optimal controls.
3.5.1 Isometry between the probability simplex and the spherical simplex






y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn) :
n∑
i=1
y2i = 1, 0 ≤ yi ≤ 1
}
(3.91)





portion of the unit sphere. A bijection T defined
as follows:
T : ∆n−1 → ∆Sn−1








defines an isometry between the probability simplex and spherical simplex. We show
this in calculations in this section. Denote y = T (x). Assuming that the fitness maps
are smooth guarantees this transformation to be a diffeomorphism since T is smooth
and has a smooth inverse given by xi = y
2
i ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The dynamics on the
spherical simplex is given by the push forward of the vector field on the probability
simplex. Denoting the push forward of T by T∗, we have that:
T∗ [Xf , Xg] = [T∗Xf , T∗Xg] := [Yf , Yg] (3.93)
where Yf and Yg refer to the vector fields on the spherical simplex. Therefore, if
Xf and Xg span the tangent space at each point under repeated bracketing, so do
Yf and Yg on the spherical simplex. From this, we can conclude that if a replicator
system on the probability simplex is controllable, so is its pushforward dynamics on







































j(y). If the fitness map has polynomial components of degree d
each, then the dynamics on the probability simplex is of dimension d + 2, whereas
the dynamics on the spherical simplex is of degree 2d+ 3.
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The simplex has a natural Riemannian metric, termed the Fisher-Rao-Shahshahani
metric, with metric tensor Gij = Λ
−1(x), defining an inner product on the tangent










i(y)− f̃(y))(g̃(y)i − g̃(y)) (3.95)
Suppose that ∆S
n−1
is equipped with the scaled Euclidean metric with tensorG∆Sn−1 =















i(y)− f̃(y))(g̃i(y)− g̃(y)) (3.96)
Comparing (3.95) and (3.96), we see that the map T is an isometry.
3.5.2 Transformation of fitness maps
The frequency independent fitness map given by f(x) = [a1 a2 . . . an] remains
invariant under the transformation T . On the spherical simplex, a linear fitness map
given by f(x) = Bx, where B is an n×n matrix transforms to f̃(y) = B[y21 y22 . . . y2n]T
and is quadratic in y. In fact, any frequency-dependent fitness map whose compo-
nents are polynomials in x of degree d on the probability simplex will be given by
polynomials in y of degree 2d on the spherical simplex.
Just as there is a homomorphism between the Lie algebra of fitness maps and
Lie algebra of replicator vector fields (figure 3.1), due to the isometry T there exists a
homomorphism between the Lie algebra of replicator vector fields on the probability
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simplex and those of the transformed vector fields on the spherical simplex. This
induces a bracket structure in the logarithmic growth factors
ẏi
yi
, which we calculate












































































Equation (3.100) defines a bracket structure for logarithmic growth rates on the spher-
ical simplex. If f, g are of degrees d1, d2 respectively, by (3.31), {f, g}R must be of
degree d1 + d2 + 1. This gives rise to a 2(d1 + d2 + 1) degree logarithmic growth rate
on the spherical simplex, as can be verified from (3.100).
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3.5.3 Optimal control problem formulation
For a replicator control system given as
ẋ = u1f̂ + u2ĝ (3.101)
where f̂ and ĝ are the replicator dynamics associated with fitness maps f, g respec-
tively, our goal is to find a control that transfers the state from an initial one x(0) = xA





where the norm is with respect to the Fisher-Rao-Shahshahani metric. This is the








where ||y||∆Sn−1 is the scaled-Euclidean norm on the spherical simplex, with appro-
priately transformed initial and final conditions given by y(0) = yA, y(1) = yB and
the pushforward dynamics on the spherical simplex given by:
ẏ = u1Yf + u2Yg (3.104)
where Yf = T∗Xf , Yg = T∗Xg. Since the transformation T is an isometry, the
geodesics are preserved under T . Let p denote the costate variable. The pre-
Hamiltonian can be defined on the cotangent bundle T ∗∆S
n−1
by using the Legendre
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transform as:
H(y, p, u) = 〈ẏ, p〉d − L
= 〈u1Yf + u2Yg, p〉d − 〈u1Yf + u2Yg, u1Yf + u2Yg〉∆Sn−1 (3.105)
where 〈 , 〉d denotes the duality pairing and 〈 , 〉∆Sn−1 , the inner product with respect
to the scaled Euclidean metric on spherical simplex. Assuming the vector fields Yf , Yg
to be bracket generating, we are in the sub-Riemannian setting, since these vector
fields span a two-dimensional subspace at each point on the simplex, while generating
the entire (n − 1) - dimensional tangent space under repeated bracketing, thereby
ensuring controllability. Expanding (3.105), we get:
H = u1〈Yf , p〉d + u2〈Yg, p〉d − u21〈Yf , Yf〉∆Sn−1 − u
2
2〈Yg, Yg〉∆Sn−1 + 2u1u2〈Yf , Yg〉∆Sn−1
(3.106)
By the Pontryagin Maximum Principle, if ũ(t) = [ũ1(t) ũ2(t)]
T is an optimal control
that transfers a prescribed initial condition y0 to a prescribed final condition y1 by
minimizing the Lagrangian, then, it must satisfy the following:
The Hamiltonian H is given by:
H = max
u(t)∈U











< 0 are the first and second order necessary









From (3.107), partial derivative of H with respect to the control input being zero
gives the following relationships for the controls: 〈Yf , Yf〉∆Sn−1 −〈Yf , Yg〉∆Sn−1





 〈Yf , p〉d
〈Yg, p〉d
 (3.109)




























j − f̃) + ũ2(g̃j − g̃)
]2})
(3.110)
Alternatively, transforming the dynamics on the spherical simplex as a linear combi-
nation of orthonormal vector fields scaled by new control variables vi, i = 1, 2, results










It is of interest to investigate solutions to this optimal control problem in future
work. This formulation is discussed in further detail in chapter 7, which considers
the application of controllable dynamics on the simplex to explain flocking behavior.
3.6 Conclusion and Future Work
Ever since its introduction in [21], replicator dynamics has played a major role
in both game theory and biology. In this work, we highlight its connections to some
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applications such as the Lotka-Volterra equations and the generator equation associ-
ated with a continuous time finite state (CTFS) process. We prove that every vector
field in the interior of the simplex can be thought of as a replicator dynamics de-
fined by a suitable fitness map. Furthermore, by proving that replicator vector fields
are closed under the Lie bracket, we have set the stage to explore questions on the
controllability of replicator systems. This naturally leads to the notion of a replica-
tor bracket, which is a Lie bracket in the space of fitness maps, which results in a
significant reduction of complexity of calculations involved in finding the Lie bracket
of replicator vector fields. Sufficient conditions of the Chow-Rashevski theorem for
controllability for drift-free replicator systems then boil down to equivalent conditions
on the fitness maps. We show examples of such drift-free replicator dynamics, which
are linear combinations of frequency-independent and linear fitness maps for which
controllability holds, and formulate the optimal control problem where the aim is to
find path length-minimizing controls that transfer the state from a prescribed initial
condition to a desired final condition. In essence, this work has explored role of ge-
ometric control theory in analyzing the properties of controlled replicator dynamics,
where the inputs appear multiplicatively. An interesting future direction is the role
of drift in determining accessibility, which has been considered for the closely related
Lotka-Volterra equations in [47], prompting a comparison.
89
Chapter 4
Feedback laws for controlled replicators
The factor that determines the evolution and the long term sustenance of types
in replicator dynamics is the fitness, which may or may not be dependent on the
frequencies of the types. In this chapter, we first specify some properties of the so-
lutions to replicator dynamics for specific fitness maps. After an introduction to the
Fisher-Rao-Shahshahani metric on the simplex which exposes the gradient nature of
certain types of dynamics seen in mathematical biology, we exploit the structure of
the replicator control system to specify state-dependent feedback laws to stabilize ar-
bitrary mixed strategies in the interior of the simplex. Feedback laws are designed by
using the Kullback-Leibler divergence as a Lyapunov function for the controlled repli-
cator dynamics. Further, we investigate the existence of periodic orbits by analyzing
the level sets of the Lyapunov function. Finally, we provide numerical simulations to
explore the effects of these feedback laws for dynamics on the 3 - simplex, and show
an example of a periodic orbit. In contrast to chapter 3, this chapter focuses on the
stability properties of evolutionary games.
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4.1 The geometry of the simplex
In many biological processes where selection equations model the dynamics of
genotypes or phenotypes, the fitness is linear in the frequencies, and the mean fitness
is non-decreasing. In the work of Svirezhev [50] in 1972, Shahshahani, Akin [30],
and others, the Riemannian manifold structure has been well established. Svirezhev
showed this through the isometry discussed in chapter 3. Viewed with the right
metric, which we term the Fisher-Rao-Shahshahani metric briefly introduced in the
last chapter, the selection equations with linear fitness is actually a gradient dynamics.
In this chapter, we exploit this structure to identify feedback laws for the controlled
evolutionary games that stabilize strategies in the interior of the simplex.
The simplex is a Riemannian manifold with boundary equipped with the Fisher-
Rao-Shahshahani (FRS) metric G = [gij], where gij = δij
1
xi
, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n well defined
in its interior. Let Tx∆
n−1 denote the tangent space to the simplex at x. This is
an n − 1 dimensional vector space with vectors whose components sum to zero. We








We refer the reader to [1] and references therein for a complete treatment of this topic.
For a calculation of the Levi-Civita connection for this metric, see Appendix B. We
briefly discuss special cases of fitness for which the solutions can be characterized,
below.
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4.1.1 Frequency independent fitness
Consider a fitness map given by f i = ai where ai ∈ R ∀i = 1, ..., n. Then, the
replicator dynamics are given by:
ẋi = xi (ai − ā)
where ā = xTa. The vector field obtained in this case is interpreted in [4] as the














xi(t) = δim. This shows that the state asymptotically
converges to that vertex on the simplex for which the associated pure strategy is of
maximum fitness, making all other population fractions zero, resulting in “survival
of the fittest”. It can be seen that if f is component-wise uniform, the solution for
all future time is equal to the initial condition. Therefore, for replicator dynamics
with frequency independent fitness, there is a unique globally asymptotically stable
equilibrium point determined by the values of the fitness components.
4.1.2 Linear fitness
Suppose that the linear fitness given by f(x) = Bx, where B ∈ Rn×n is a payoff







The ith component of the fitness f i(x) is the expected payoff that the type i re-
ceives when the ith type encounters others in the population with frequencies given
by x ∈ ∆n−1. The equilibria (also called rest points) for the associated replicator
dynamics are given by the vertices together with all the interior points that satisfy
f1 = f2 = . . . = fn, which correspond to interior Nash equilibria for the game matrix
B. For a replicator dynamics with linear fitness, either 1 or no interior equilibrium
points exist. The stability of such equlibria x̂ are investigated by using the Lyapunov
function V (x) = Πix
x̂i
i [1]. On higher dimensional simplex, the dynamics exhibits
more complicated behavior than asymptotic convergence to equilibria. For example,
when n ≥ 2 is even and B is skew-symmetric, periodic orbits have been shown to
exist [51, 52].
4.1.3 Potential games
For an evolutionary game to be a potential game, the fitness map must be the
gradient of the potential function Φ(x). That is,
f(x) = ∇Φ(x)
where ∇ denotes the usual Euclidean gradient. Additionally, it must also satisfy the

















the usual partial derivatives.
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The following theorem gives a sufficient condition for a replicator vector field to
be a gradient of a potential function V (x), with respect to the Shahshahani metric
in the interior of the simplex.
Theorem 4.1.1 ( [1, 53]). If the fitness map f(x) is the Euclidean gradient of a
potential function V (x), the replicator dynamics given by
ẋ = Xf (4.2)
is the gradient dynamics defined by the gradient of V (x) with respect to the Fisher-
Rao-Shahshahani metric on the simplex.
Proof. Consider the function
V : Rn+ −→ R
x 7−→ V (x) (4.3)
Let f be the fitness map defined as f i =
∂V
∂xi
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let φ denote the following
inclusion map from the simplex to the positive orthant:
φ : ∆n−1 −→ Rn+
x 7−→ x (4.4)
Our aim is to show that the replicator dynamics is a gradient dynamics. In order to
do this, for w ∈ Tx∆n−1, we need to show that:
d[V (φ(x))](w) = d[(V ◦ φ)(x)](w)


















wj = 0 ∀ w ∈ Tx(∆n−1). (4.5)
We evaluate the differential as follows:













Comparing the result with the one above, we see that the replicator dynamics is indeed
a gradient ascent dynamics on the simplex, with the gradient given with respect to
the FRS metric. In fact, this gradient on the simplex can be arrived at by projecting
the one on the positive orthant orthogonally onto the simplex, as shown in the case
of frequency independent fitness maps in [4].
From this theorem, we see that for the dynamics with frequency independent
fitness, V (x) = f̄ is a potential function, and for a linear fitness, V (x) = 1
2
f̄ is a
potential function. A quick calculation shows that for dynamics ẋ = f̂ which is the
gradient of the potential function V (x) = λf̄ , the rate of change of the mean fitness
along the solutions is given by
df̄
dt












i − f̄)2 ≥ 0 (4.7)
From (4.7), we see that the mean fitness is non-decreasing along the solutions, and
equal to the additive fitness variance. This is known as Fisher’s fundamental theorem
of natural selection [30].
4.2 Replicator Control Systems
Recall the replicator dynamics on ∆n−1:
ẋi = xi(f
i − f̄) ∀ i = 1, . . . , n
(4.8)
Suppose the fitness map f(x) = [f 1(x) f 2(x) . . . fn(x)]T is given by a linear combi-
nation of fitness maps f1(x) and f2(x) scaled by control signals u1 and u2:
f(x) = u1f1(x) + u2f2(x) (4.9)
with the dynamics (4.8) given as:
ẋ = u1f̂1(x) + u2f̂2(x) (4.10)
Definition 4.2.1 (Entropy of a mixed strategy). The entropy associated with




xi log xi (4.11)
where log xi = loge xi.
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The entropy function is the negative of the average fitness ḡ(x) associated with








= xi (log xi +H(x)) (4.12)
with the unique internal equilibrium point given by the solution to log x1 = log x2 =




It must be noted that the fitness map g(x) and hence the dynamics (4.12) are well
defined only in the interior of the simplex.
Let the vertex set on the simplex be denoted as:
SV =
{
x ∈ ∆n−1 : ∃ k such that xk = 1, xl = 0, ∀ l 6= k
}
(4.13)
We know that H(x) > 0 ∀ x ∈ ∆n−1 \ SV , H(x) = 0 ⇐⇒ x ∈ SV . The derivative
































f i − f̄
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Suppose gi(x) = log xi as defined earlier, we see that ḡ(x) =
n∑
j=1
























= −〈f̂ , ĝ〉FRS(x). (4.15)
It is evident from these calculations that
∇FRSH(x) = −ĝ (4.16)
Thus, the dynamics ẋ = −ĝ is the gradient dynamics corresponding to the potential
function V (x) = H(x). It is noted in [30] that the derivative of the entropy along
the replicator dynamics can be interpreted as the covariance of the random variables
F and G whose discrete sample space comprises components of the fitness maps f, g
respectively. That is,
P (F = f i(x)|x = x̂) = x̂i ∀ i = 1, . . . , n.
P (G = gi(x)|x = x̂) = x̂i ∀ i = 1, . . . , n. (4.17)





xTMx,∇FRSH(x)〉FRS = −cov(g, F ) (4.18)
where∇FRS is the FRS gradient, cov refers to the covariance and the fitness gi = log xi
is interpreted as a random variable with distribution x, and F as a fitness with values
in the vector Mx with distribution x. We use these observations to state the following
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theorem which enables viewing the controlled replicator dynamics as a dissipative
system.










Defining the outputs yk = 〈f̂k, ĝ〉FRS, k = 1, . . . ,m, (4.19) is a dissipative system.












From (4.20), we see that a natural output for (4.19) is given by yk = 〈f̂k, ĝ〉FRS so
that for input u = [u1 u2 . . . um]




H(x) = −uTy (4.21)
Therefore, from (4.21), we get that (4.19) is dissipative with storage function given
by the entropy H(x) and the supply rate w(u(t), y(t)) = −uTy.
While the notion of passivity for evolutionary games has been explored in [54],
there are two key differences between this work and our analysis: (i) the set of
input and output variables presented here is restricted to and are a natural conse-
quence of the formulation of the replicator control system and (ii) does not involve
an “extended” system comprising derivatives of input and output variables as in the
reference.
Proposition 4.2.2. Let x∗ be a desired mixed strategy in the interior of the simplex.
Then, ∀ x ∈ int(∆n−1), x∗ − x is a replicator vector field with fitness map h(x) =









i − xi) = 0 so that x∗ − x ∈ Tx∆n−1.
Then, we can use theorem 3.1.1 to write this dynamics in the simplex interior as:









































The dynamics obtained from this fitness map, ẋ = x∗ − x called migration
dynamics [50] has interesting properties. Clearly it is simplex preserving, since the
components of the vector field sum to zero, and whenever xi = 0, ẋi = x
∗
i > 0. In
addition, the linearity of the dynamics helps us to easily see that x∗ is a globally
exponentially stable equilibrium point for this dynamics. The following proposition
showcases an additional property of this dynamics.
Proposition 4.2.3. The replicator vector field ĥ corresponding to the fitness map
h(x) with components hi(x) =
x∗i
xi
, i = 1, . . . , n is the Fisher-Rao-Shahshahani gra-








Proof. To find the gradient of the Kullback-Leibler divergence function on the sim-
plex, we first compute its gradient in the positive orthant for which x = (x1, . . . , xn)
is a local coordinate and then project it onto the simplex. Let ∇FRS refer to the
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gradient with respect to the FRS metric on the positive orthant and ∇FRS refer to
the FRS gradient on the simplex. We know using the Riesz representation theorem
that the differential of DKL(x
∗||x) evaluated at a tangent vector w = [w1 . . . wn]T
whose components sum to zero is given as:



























and G = [gij] is the Fisher-Rao-Shahshanani metric evaluated
at x. To project the gradient (4.23) onto the simplex, we remove the component of
(4.23) normal to the simplex. Since the unit normal to the simplex at a point is the
point itself, that is, x,















∇FRSDiKL = −(x∗i − xi) = −ĥi(x) (4.24)
This concludes the proof.
4.3 Feedback laws for stabilization
We use the results from earlier sections to design feedback laws that stabilize a
desired mixed strategy x∗ ∈ int(∆n−1). While these statements assert the stability
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of x∗, the necessary conditions from [55] for the existence of asymptotically stabi-
lizing controls for drift-free, smooth dynamics precludes us from making stronger
statements.
The results presented in this section can be compared with the notion of a
stable game presented in [56]. The consequence of the stabilizing feedback laws for a
replicator control system for which the KL divergence is a Lyapunov function is that
the closed loop replicator dynamics satisfies criteria for a stable game.
Lemma 4.3.1. Consider the replicator control system ẋ =
∑
k uk(x)f̂k(x),k = 1, . . . ,m,
m < n − 1, where the controls uk(x) are dependent on the state on the simplex. Let
E denote the equilibria for this system and U = {x ∈ ∆n−1 : uk(x) = 0 ∀k}. Then,
U ⊆ E.
Proof. Let x∗ ∈ U . Then, uk(x∗) = 0 ∀k. This implies that
∑
k uk(x)f̂k = 0 =⇒
ẋ = 0. The conclusion follows.






where fk, k = 1, 2 are fitness maps and uk, k = 1, 2 are control signals given by the
feedback law:
uk = −yk = −〈f̂k, ĝ(x)〉FRS (4.26)
with yk denoting the output variables defined earlier and g
i(x) = log xi, the logarithmic
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fitness map. Then, the centroid given by x∗ =
1
n
e is a stable equilibrium point for
(4.25).
Proof. The entropy defined in (4.11) is a non-negative, bounded, concave function and




the control law (4.31) in the derivative of the entropy, we get:
dH
dt
= y21 + y
2
2 (4.27)
Choosing the Lyapunov function as V (x) = log n−H(x), we see that V (x) is positive
definite, with V (x) = 0 ⇐⇒ x = x∗, and







which is negative semi-definite. This immediately implies the stability of x∗.








its significance for replicator dynamics with linear fitness is highlighted by the follow-
ing proposition.





with cj > 0 transforms the replicator equation (2.7) into the replicator equation with
matrix (aijc
−1




The following result provides stabilizing feedback laws that ensure that the KL
divergence is a Lyapunov function for the closed-loop dynamics.
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where fk, k = 1, 2 are fitness maps and uk, k = 1, 2 are control signals given by the
feedback law:
uk = 〈x∗ − x, f̂k(x)〉FRS (4.31)
for some x∗ ∈ int(∆n−1). Then, x∗ is a stable equilibrium point for the dynamics.











which is non-negative on int(∆n−1), convex in its arguments and equal to zero if and






































(x∗i − xi) f i2
]
= −u21 − u22 (Substituting u1 and u2)
≤ 0 ∀ x ∈ int(∆n−1). (4.33)
Since the derivative of the Lyapunov function is negative semi-definite in int(∆n−1),
x∗ is a stable equilibrium point for this dynamics.
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Changing the order of the arguments in the KL divergence, one can state a
similar result for V (x) = DKL(x||x∗) with the control laws given by
uk(x) = −〈∇FRSV (x), f̂k〉FRS, k = 1, 2 (4.34)
It should be noted that the role of the Kullback-Leibler divergence as a Lyapunov
function has been used to determine whether the equilibrium x̂ of a replicator dynamic
is an evolutionarily stable state in [1]. Further, in [57], for an arbitrary constant state
q ∈ int(∆n−1) and p(t) which is given by a replicator dynamics, this information
theoretic measure is used to define a dominant mixed strategy. For more on the
geometry of the simplex, see [58].
An illustrative example. Consider a replicator control system with m = 2,
n = 3 so that x ∈ ∆2 and x∗ = 1
3
e. Suppose that f1 = a = [a1 a2 a3]
T with distinct
components and f2 = x. Then,
M = {x : u1 = 0, u2 = 0}
The constraint u1 = 0 ⇐⇒ aT (x − x∗) = 0, and its solutions in the simplex are
points on the intersection of the plane aTy = aTx∗ and the probability simplex ∆n−1,
where y ∈ Rn is a variable. Similarly solutions to u2 = 0 are points on the curve
given by the intersection of the sphere ||y − 0.5x∗||2 = 0.5||x∗||2 and the probability
simplex. Note that for the present choice of fitness f2 and x
∗, the sphere of radius
0.5||x∗||2 centered at x
∗
2
intersects the probability simplex at exactly one point, x∗.
Hence x∗ is the only point in the simplex interior such that the controls from (4.31)
u1 = u2 = 0 and the replicator control system is asymptotically stable with region
of attraction int(∆n−1). Changing x∗ to anything other than the centroid produces
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a curve corresponding to u2 = 0 on the simplex. Therefore, the intersection of a
plane through the probability simplex intersects the solution set of u2 = 0 at possibly
more than one point which are isolated, of which x∗ is one. Hence, in this case, x∗ is
locally asymptotically stable. This example is a special case satisfying the necessary
conditions of [55].
For general replicator dynamics on higher dimensional simplex, an asymptot-
ically stabilizing control law exists if and only if the number of controls m equals
the dimensionality of the simplex n − 1. However, we do not consider such systems
since in higher dimensions, controllability and optimal control theory provide suffi-
cient conditions to enable transfer of the state using only two controls, regardless of
the dimensionality of the simplex.





where fk, k = 1, . . . ,m are fitness maps, with the feedback laws given by uk = 〈∇FRS||x∗−
x||2FRS, f̂k〉FRS, i = 1, . . . ,m. Then, x∗ is a stable equilibrium point for the dynamics.
Proof. It is evident from the form of the controls that V (x) = ||x∗ − x||2FRS is a
Lyapunov function for (4.35). The gradient of V (x) in the simplex ∇FRSV can be















































With the specified control laws, along the trajectories of 4.35, the derivative of the
Lyapunov function is given by:
dV (x)
dt








For the stabilization theorems stated here, it is worth noting that due to LaSalle’s
invariance principle, the solution to the replicator control system converges to the
largest invariant subset of the set of all points in the simplex interior where the
derivative of the Lyapunov function is zero.
4.3.1 Periodic orbits in the simplex
In nature, migration of species occurs in response to changes in weather patterns.
On smaller time scales, many ecological species adapt their behavior in synchroniza-
tion with the circadian rhythm. Although weather patterns or the day night cycle
are not exactly periodic, they give rise to behavior that persists after approximately
the same period of time passes. Irrespective of species behaviors on these longer
time scales, there are everyday tasks that happen regularly such as foraging for food.
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However, focusing on food for a certain period of time still does not affect the goals
which are seemingly periodic with much larger time scales. In other words, the long
term strategies are not extinguished by short term change in strategy leading to a
coexistence of decisions over different timescales. This leads us to investigate periodic
orbits of the controlled replicator dynamic in the simplex in the following sections.
The existence of periodic orbits for replicator dynamics has been of interest in
its applications to the evolution of concentrations of chemical species [51]. For the
four species evolution on ∆3, it has been shown that when the fitness is given by
f = Sx where S is a 4 × 4 skew symmetric matrix with two eigen values at zero,
there are two independently conserved quantities and the solutions evolve on a one-
dimensional periodic orbit. Here, we explore the existence of such orbits in the level
sets of the Lyapunov function.
Theorem 4.3.4 (J. Moser, [59]). Consider the dynamical system
ż = f(z) (4.38)
where z = (z1, . . . , zm) with ze = 0 the equilibrium solution. If f ∈ C ′, G ∈ C ′′ is an
integral of (4.38) with a positive definite Hessian at ze, then for sufficiently small ε,
any integral surface G(z) = G(0) + ε2 contains at least one periodic solution of (4.38)
whose periods are close to that of the linear system:
ż = Cz, C = fz(0). (4.39)
Theorem 4.3.4 immediately suggests a corollary relevant to replicator control
systems.
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Corollary 4.3.1 (Corollary to theorem 4.3.4). Consider the replicator control system
ẋ = u1f̂1 + u2f̂2 (4.40)
where f1 = a = [a1 . . . an] is a frequency independent fitness and f2 = Bx is a linear
fitness map such that (4.40) is controllable. Then there exists atleast one periodic
solution of (4.40) with the feedback laws given by:
u1 = −〈x∗ − x, f̂2〉FRS = −(x∗ − x)Tf2
u2 = 〈x∗ − x, f̂1〉FRS = (x∗ − x)Tf1 (4.41)
A similar conclusion can be made about the the replicator control system with
the feedback laws given by:
u1 = −〈∇FRS||x∗ − x||2FRS, f̂2〉FRS
u2 = 〈∇FRS||x∗ − x||2FRS, f̂1〉FRS (4.42)
It is a straightforward calculation to see that in both cases, substituting the
values of u1 and u2 yields the derivative of the Lyapunov function
d
dt
DKL = 0. This
implies that Πix
x∗i
i = c, where c is a constant determined by the initial condition for the
dynamics. Therefore, the trajectories of the dynamics evolve on a two dimensional
level set of the Lyapunov function. Further, the Hessian of the KL divergence is
the FRS metric tensor evaluated at x∗ and equals diag( 1
x∗1
, . . . , 1
x∗n
) which is positive










positive definite in the simplex interior. Therefore, due to Moser’s theorem, there
exists atleast periodic orbit for the dynamics on the level set of the Lyapunov function.
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4.4 Simulation Results
We illustrate the use of feedback laws designed in earlier sections using simula-
tions for replicator dynamics on ∆3 given by linear combination of replicator vector
fields with consituent fitness as follows: frequency dependent fitness f1 = [1 2 3 4]
T
and linear fitness f2 = Bx, with B = diag(−1, 1, 1, 1). In our numerical simulations,
we use the midpoint rule to simulate the replicator control system [60].
4.4.1 Stabilization to a desired mixed strategy
In figure 4.1, we show the asymptotic convergence of the probabilities to the
centroid of the simplex, x∗ = [0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25]T using the entropy maximization
feedback law of theorem. Alternatively, in figure 4.2 and figure 4.3, the Kullback-
Leibler divergence based feedback law is used to stabilize to the centroid and an arbi-
trary final mixed strategy of [0.2 0.5 0.1 0.2]T with initial condition [0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4]T .
The KL divergence measure between the desired x∗ and the state x is plotted in
these figures. It should be noted that since our feedback laws only guarantee stability
and not asymptotic stability, the slope of the divergence is non-positive and the KL
divergence function itself may converge to a non-zero value.
4.4.2 A periodic orbit
Using the skew control laws for the replicator control system, we show the
existence of a periodic orbit for a particular choice of initial condition. Linearizing
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|x=x∗ = −f j2 ,
∂u2
∂xj
= −f j1 (4.44)
For the choice of fitness in the previous section, as expected, there are two eigen values
of the linearization at zero and a pair of complex conjugate eigen values: ±0.1531i.
The plot of the orbit and the controls u1, u2 are in figure 4.4. Defining f3 = Bx
∗ and
identifying the variable u3 as
u3 = 〈x∗ − x, f̂3〉FRS (4.45)
we see that
∇FRSu1 = −f̂2 + f̂3
∇FRSu2 = f̂1
∇FRSu3 = −f̂3 − f̂2 (4.46)
so that the vector fields vi, i = 1, 2, 3 defined by
v1 = x
∗ − x
v2 = u1f̂1 + u2f̂2








form an orthogonal basis at each point in the simplex. This is similar to orthogonal
vectors identified in non linear selection-recombination dynamics in [37]. The plot of
u1, u2, u3 also depicted in the figure shows a loop in the three dimensional space.
4.5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we used the geometry of the simplex along with the information
geometric measures to identify feedback laws that guarantee the stabilization of the
dynamics about a mixed strategy. Numerical simulations depict the conclusions of
these theorems, and suggest the existence of periodic solutions to controlled replicator
dynamics which are known to exist due to the theorem of Moser. A desired mixed
strategy x∗ may be specified in response to a change in high level goal or environmental
influence. In this and the last chapter, we have not specified how to choose such a
strategy, which may be of interest in future work. In addition, suppose that the fitness
is available but subject to noise in perception, this leads one to consider stochastic
replicator dynamics. The properties such as controllability, and permanence, which













































Figure 4.1: Stabilization to the centroid using the entropy maximization feedback law













































Figure 4.2: Stabilization using KL-Divergence based feedback law to desire mixed
strategy given by (a). the centroid (b). [0.2 0.5 0.1 0.2]T . Initial condition is













































Figure 4.3: Stabilization using KL-Divergence based feedback law to desire mixed
strategy given by (a). the centroid (b). [0.2 0.5 0.1 0.2]T . Initial condition is
[0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4]T .
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(a) Evolution of probabilities









(b) Controls u1, u2








(c) Controls u1, u2
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(d) Coordinates (u1, u2, u3)
Figure 4.4: Simulation results for an initial condition on the level set of the Lyapunov






Optimality of replicator dynamics
In this chapter1, we investigate a variational problem on the probability sim-
plex where the path cost is dependent on two terms reminiscent of kinetic and po-
tential energy in mechanics. Extending an earlier result due to Svirezhev [50], we
show that the replicator dynamics with general frequency-dependent fitness satis-
fies the Euler-Lagrange equations associated with this cost functional making it a
candidate extremal for the minimization problem under consideration. Due to the
time-translation symmetry of the Lagrangian, we find a conserved quantity and show
that the replicator dynamics lives on its zero level sets. Using Legendre transform, we
define the Hamiltonian function and the associated Hamiltonian dynamics in terms
of the state and momentum variables. We analyze its solutions on the level sets of
the Hamiltonian on the phase space of the one-dimensional simplex and prove the
existence of periodic orbits under suitable assumptions.
1A significant portion of this chapter is verbatim from [61].
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5.1 Introduction
The question central to this work is the following: what do the natural selection
equations or replicator dynamics optimize? Two principles answering this question are
well known. Fisher’s fundamental theorem of natural selection states that the mean
fitness of a population of finite number of types each with a fitness linearly dependent
on the population proportions increases along the solutions of the selection equations.
This can be shown by computing the gradient of the mean fitness using the natural
Riemannian metric of the simplex, namely the Fisher-Rao-Shahshahani metric, to
yield the appropriate selection equations (see [30] for example, for a discussion on the
gradient computation). While this statement is also true when the fitness is frequency
independent as shown in [4], it is not true for a general nonlinear fitness. Kimura’s
maximum principle states that the increase in mean fitness is highest along solutions
to the selection equations, compared to other simplex-preserving dynamics.
As reported in subsequent works such as [62–64], in his 1972 work, Svirezhev [50]
showed that a cost functional given as the sum of the geodesic path length and the
variance of a linear fitness integrated over a small enough time duration is minimized
by the replicator dynamics. This theorem was stated within the context of population
genetics (discussed in detail in [29]), which explains the choice of a linear fitness in
the variance term. This theorem also finds mention in the work by Schoemaker [65]
in a broader discussion of optimality as a heuristic, particularly in the commentary
by James F. Crow.
We formulate the minimization problem in section 5.2, show that Svirezhev’s
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result holds true for a general fitness and lay the groundwork for the Hamiltonian
viewpoint to follow. In section 5.3, the time-invariance of the Lagrangian for the
problem posed by Svirezhev allows us to define a Hamiltonian system with a con-
served quantity, namely the Hamiltonian function in terms of state and momentum
variables, with the replicator dynamics living in the zero level sets of the Hamilto-
nian function. We state a theorem on the existence of periodic orbits as solutions to
Hamilton’s equations. These results are stated for dynamics on the phase space of the
1− dimensional simplex in section 5.3 and illustrated through a numerical example
in section 5.4, with concluding remarks in section 5.5.
5.2 Problem formulation















The cost comprises a velocity dependent term T (x, ẋ) and a position dependent term
V (x) defined as:













= −||f̂ ||2FRS (5.2)
interpreted respectively to be analogues of kinetic and potential energy in mechanics.
Note that the potential energy term is given by the norm-squared with respect to the
FRS metric of the distinguished replicator vector field associated with the fitness f .
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The Lagrangian of this problem is given by L = T − V . Svirezhev [29] showed that
the aforementioned cost functional with the linear fitness map given by f(x) = Wx,
W = [wij], 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n is minimized for trajectories in the simplex determined by
natural selection, assuming that t1 − t0 is small enough. The locality of this result
should be noted here. Stating a similar result for longer time intervals would require
analysis using conjugate point theory, beyond Legendre’s second order condition, as
used by Svirezhev. In an effort to generalize this claim, we prove that for a general
fitness f(x) which may be frequency independent or non-linearly dependent on the
frequencies, the associated replicator dynamics satisfies the Euler-Lagrange equations.
Svirezhev [29] showed that the cost functional (5.1) is minimized for trajectories
in the simplex determined by natural selection, assuming that t1− t0 is small enough.
Interpreting a type in the setting of population genetics to refer to an allele consti-
tuting a genotype, we summarize three kinds of processes that govern the abundance
of the alleles:
(i) Selection: Suppose that wij denotes the constant fitness of a genotype com-
prising a pair of alleles i and j in a single population of n alleles. Assuming
random mating of the types, the deterministic dynamics of selection is exactly
(2.4) with fitness f(x) = Wx, W = [wij], 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n satisfying W = W T .
(ii) Mutation: Allowing for mutations of the types and denoting εij to be the mu-
tation rate from type j to i, with εij ≥ 0,
∑
i εij = 1, the mutation equations in
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εijxj − xi (5.3)
(iii) Migration: Migration equations model the effect of an inflow of genotypes from a
large migrant population whose frequencies qi of types i = 1, . . . , n are constant:
ẋi = qi − xi (5.4)
Writing down the solution to the linear equations (5.4) leads one to observe that
x = q is a globally exponentially stable equilibrium point for this dynamics.
The migration dynamics is a negative gradient of the Kullback-Leibler diver-





. Additionally, when the mutation parame-
ters in (5.3) satisfy
εij =

εi, i 6= j




k εk, (5.3) is a variant of the migration equations with xi =
εi
ε
, i = 1, . . . , n
being the globally exponentially stable equilibrium and hence under these conditions,
(5.3) is also a gradient dynamics. We refer the reader to [1] and references therein
for a complete treatment of this topic. Although mutation and migration equations
are not readily of the form of replicator dynamics, both can be rewritten to obtain a
suitable fitness for which (2.4) holds in the interior of the simplex [45].
Theorem 5.2.1. Let x ∈ ∆n−1. The replicator dynamics defined by the smooth
fitness f(x) = [f 1(x) . . . fn(x)]T :
ẋi = xi
(
f i − f̄
)
i = 1, . . . , n (5.6)
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satisfies the Euler-Lagrange equations associated with extremizing the following cost














Proof. We have an extremization problem with the holonomic simplex constraint.

























































































































Differentiating the replicator equations,
ẋi = xi
(

























































Comparing (5.11) and (5.13), we see that the replicator equations (5.6) satisfy the







. We note that due to the
point-wise simplex constraint, the Lagrange multiplier is dependent on the state.
We note the fact that such a principle holds is special. This is since, in general
the dynamics ẋ = Φ(x) on a manifold M equipped with a Riemannian metric induced








Another special case, apart from replicator dynamics, is for linear dynamics ẋ =
Φ(x) = Ax evolving on M = Rn equipped with the standard Euclidean metric, we
see that such a principle holds if A is symmetric. See [45] for details of this calculation.
5.2.1 Conserved quantity
The Lagrangian L on the simplex is time-invariant. Hence, there is a conserved
quantity E which we calculate below. Let L(x1, . . . , xn−1, ẋ1, . . . , ẋn−1) denote the
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Lagrangian L given in the local coordinates for the simplex x1, . . . , xn−1 with the
understanding that xn = 1−x1− . . .−xn and ẋn = −ẋ1− . . .− ẋn−1. This eliminates





























If ẋi = xi
(
f i − f̄
)






f i − f̄
)2 − x2i (f i − f̄)2
xi
= 0. (5.17)
Thus, the replicator dynamics lives in the zero level sets of the conserved quantity.
The converse statement is not necessarily true. This can be seen by interpreting the
conserved quantity in terms of the FRS inner product of the tangent vectors ẋ and




, both of whose components necessarily sum
to zero in the simplex. That is,
E = 〈ẋ, ẋ〉FRS − 〈v, v〉FRS = 0
∴ E = 0, x ∈ ∆n−1 =⇒ ||ẋ||FRS = ||v||FRS (5.18)
which does not imply ẋ = v.
5.2.2 The Hamiltonian function
For an equivalent representation of the Euler-Lagrange equations in the co-
tangent bundle T ∗(∆n−1), Following the standard route, we define the momentum
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, 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1 (5.19)
or equivalently
p = 2G̃(x1, . . . , xn)ẋ,where










Note that G̃(x) is the Fisher-Rao-Shahshahani metric expressed in local coordinates
for the simplex. This leads us to define the Hamiltonian function H(x, p) due to
the Legendre transform. Although this requires G̃(x1, . . . , xn−1) to be invertible in
the interior of ∆n−1, we are assured of this due to the fact that the metric in local




, . . . , 1
xn
)
is invertible in int(∆n−1). Suppressing the arguments of G̃, we get the Hamiltonian:
H(x1, . . . , xn−1, p) =
1
2




pT G̃−1p+ V (x1, . . . , xn−1) (5.21)
where p = [p1 p2 . . . pn−1]
T . Let y = [x1 . . . xn−1]











= g(y, p)− ∂V (y)
∂y
(5.22)







p, i = 1, . . . , n− 1.
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We observe that in this dynamics, the state equation contains terms linear in p,
whereas the momentum equation comprises terms that are quadratic in p. Therefore,
gi(y, p) = gi(y,−p). This suggests investigating periodic orbits in level sets of H
using Birkhoff’s theorem. We define the notion of involutivity and F− reversibility
of vector fields under a map F : M →M , following [66].
Definition 5.2.1 (Involution). A diffeomorphism F : M → M from a manifold
M to itself is said to be an involution if F 6= idM , the identity diffeomorphism, and
F 2 = idM , i.e. F (F (m)) = m,∀ m ∈M .
Definition 5.2.2 (F - reversibility). A vector field X defined over a manifold M
is said to be F−reversible, if there exists an involution F such that: F∗(X) = X;
i.e. F maps orbits of X to orbits of X, reversing the time parametrization. Here
(F∗(X))(m) = (DF )F−1(m)X(F
−1(m)) ∀ m ∈ M is the push-forward of X(m). We
call F the reverser of X.
Theorem 5.2.2 (G. D. Birkhoff [67]). Let X be a F−reversible vector field on M
and ΣF the fixed-point set of the reverser F . If an orbit of X through a point of ΣF
intersects ΣF in another point, then it is periodic.
We refer to [66] for a proof of Birkhoff’s theorem. The reverser F in our problem
is defined in the proposition below.
Proposition 5.2.1. The vector field defined by the Hamiltonian dynamics (5.22) is
F−reversible, with the map F given by F (y, p) = (y,−p).
Proof. Let the Hamiltonian vector field in (5.22) be denoted XH . We note that F is
an involution since F 2(y, p) = F (y,−p) = (y, p). We calculate the pushforward of F
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as follows:

















g(y, p)− ∂V (y)
∂y

= −XH(y, p) (5.23)
where O, I are respectively n− 1 dimensional zero and identity matrices. We are now
ready to state the theorem on the existence of periodic orbits for the Hamiltonian
dynamics (5.22) in the special case n = 2 corresponding to the 1− dimensional
simplex.
Theorem 5.2.3. Consider the Hamiltonian system defined on
M =
{
(y, p) : y = [x1 . . . xn−1] , x ∈ int(∆n−1), p ∈ Rn−1
}
(5.24)
and a frequency dependent fitness f(x) ∈ Rn such that the Hamiltonian function is
given as
H(y, p) = T (y, p) + V (y) (5.25)
where the kinetic energy term is T (y, p) =
1
4
pT G̃−1(y)p and the potential energy













equations given by (5.22). For the case n = 2, the level sets of H are 1− dimensional
in phase space. Assuming that for a fixed c the level set has one connected component,
then for c < 0, the trajectory of this dynamics is a periodic orbit if the nonlinear
equation V (y) = c has two distinct solutions for y ∈ int(∆1).
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Proof. Consider the map F : M → M such that F (y, p) = (y,−p). By proposition
5.2.1, the Hamiltonian vector field is reversible with F as the reverser. Next, we note
that the fixed point set of the map
ΣF =
{
(y, p) : y = [x1 . . . xn−1] , x ∈ int(∆n−1), p = 0
}
(5.26)
To find the intersections of orbits in H(t) ≡ c 6= 0, with ΣF , we substitute p = 0 in
the Hamiltonian to get V (y) = c. In the case n = 2, the connectivity assumption
means that a level set is an orbit. If the equation V (y) = c has two distinct roots in
int(∆1), the orbits in the level sets of the Hamiltonian intersect ΣF twice. It follows
from Birkhoff’s theorem that such orbits are periodic.
5.3 The Hamiltonian dynamics for n = 2
We specialize to the case when n = 2. The 1-dimensional simplex has local
coordinate x1. Consider the Lagrangian for a linear fitness f = Ax, where A = [aij],







































In simplifying these calculations, we have used the following relationships: x1
(
f 1 − f̄
)2
=
x1 (1− x1)2 (f 1 − f 2)2 and (1− x1)
(
f 2 − f̄
)2












which can be inverted in int (∆1) to obtain ẋ1 in terms of x1, p1. The Hamiltonian





































+ (1− 2x1) (ax1 + b)2
+ 2ax1 (1− x1) (ax1 + b) (5.30)
where a = a11 − a21 − a12 + a22, b = a12 − a22. The trajectories in the simplex
corresponding to the zero level set of the Hamiltonian are given by the replicator
dynamics (5.6), upto a time scale change. This can be verified by setting H = 0 and












5.3.1 Non-zero level sets of the Hamiltonian
Suppose p(0) is such that H(x1, p1) ≡ c 6= 0, a = a11 − a21 − a12 + a22 and
b = a12 − a22. Then, the momentum variable can be given explicitly in terms of the
state x1 as follows:
p1 = ±2
√
x1(1− x1) [(a+ b)x1 + b (1− x1)]2 + c
x1 (1− x1)
(5.32)
where c = H(0). For this case, we show the existence of periodic orbits in the state-
momentum variable space in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3.1. Consider the Hamiltonian system defined on
M = {(x1, p1) : x1 ∈ (0, 1) , p1 ∈ R} (5.33)































where x = [x1 1− x1]T . Then, the trajectories of this dynamics in the non-zero level
sets of the Hamiltonian function consist of periodic orbits if the polynomial
[−a2]z4 + [a2 − 2ab]z3 + [−b2 + 2ab]z2 + [b2]z + c = 0 (5.36)
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with a = a11 − a21 + a12 − a22, b = a12 − a22, c = H(0) has two distinct roots in
int(∆1).
Proof. Consider the map F : M → M defined in proposition 5.2.1. We have shown
that the Hamiltonian vector field is F−reversible. The fixed point set ΣF of the map
F is the set of all points in M satisfying p1 = 0. To apply Birkhoff’s theorem, we
investigate the number of intersections of trajectories in the level set H(t) ≡ c with
ΣF by solving for x1 such that p1 = 0. Setting p1 = 0 in (5.32) is equivalently
x1 (1− x1) [ax1 + b]2 + c = 0 (5.37)
Simplifying (5.37), we see that Birkhoff’s condition is equivalent to the following
equation having two distinct roots in the interior of the simplex:
[−a2]z4 + [a2 − 2ab]z3 + [−b2 + 2ab]z2 + [b2]z + c = 0 (5.38)
with a = a11− a21 + a12− a22, b = a22− a12, c = H(0). This concludes the proof.
There may exist trajectories for the Hamiltonian dynamics other than periodic
orbits. The equilibria for this dynamics are
ẋ∗1 = 0 =⇒ x∗1 = 0, 1 or p∗1 = 0.




















. However, since the Hamilto-
nian is well defined only in the interior of the simplex, we ignore these and consider
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p∗1 = 0. When p
∗
1 = 0, x
∗
1 are given by solutions in int(∆
n−1) to (5.39). Note that in
this case, the polynomial equation becomes
(ax1 + b) [(1− 2x∗1) (ax1 + b) + 2ax∗1 (1− x∗1)] = 0. (5.40)
First, observe that this is a cubic polynomial. Therefore, there are at most three
equilibria for the Hamiltonian dynamics on the x1 axis. Further, we can see that if
x∗1 = 0 is an interior equilibrium point for the replicator dynamics, then, (x
∗
1, 0) is
an equilibrium point for the Hamiltonian dynamics. From (5.34), we get that the
Hamiltonian takes the value of zero at equilibria on the x1 axis and at all other points
on the x1 axis, it takes a negative value. Keeping these facts in mind, we consider
numerical simulations associated with several game dynamics in the following section.
5.4 Simulation results
We illustrate the result of the previous section using familiar examples of game
matrices. The numerical simulations of the Hamiltonian system are performed using
the mid-point rule [60]. We further simplify the analysis by using the invariance of the
difference of fitness components from the average to the addition of a component-wise
uniform vector. Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 depict the simulations of the Hamiltonian and




x1(0)(1− x1(0)) [(a+ b)x1(0) + b (1− x1(0))]2 + c
x1 (1− x1(0))
(5.41)
results in H = 0 and recovers the replicator dynamics, as expected.
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Figure 5.1: Prisoner’s dilemma. (a). Simulation of the replicator and Hamiltonian
dynamics for the initialization of x1(0) and p1(0) uniformly chosen in (0, 1). x1 is in
blue, x2 in red. x1 and hence x2 = 1 − x1 are periodic. (b). Evolution of the
state, co-state and the Hamiltonian. x1, p1 are periodic solutions. The Hamiltonian
is conserved upto an error of the order of 10−5. Step size, ∆t = 10−4.





































































Figure 5.2: Coordination game. (a). Simulation of the replicator and Hamiltonian
dynamics for the initialization of x1(0) and p1(0) uniformly chosen in (0, 1). x1 is
in blue, x2 in red. x1 and hence x2 = 1 − x1 are periodic. (b). Evolution of the
state, co-state and the Hamiltonian. x1, p1 are periodic solutions. The Hamiltonian
is conserved upto an error of the order of 10−5. Step size, ∆t = 10−4.
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Figure 5.3: Matching pennies. (a). Simulation of the replicator and Hamiltonian
dynamics for the initialization of x1(0) and p1(0) uniformly chosen in (0, 1). x1 is
in blue, x2 in red. x1 and hence x2 = 1 − x1 are periodic. (b). Evolution of the
state, co-state and the Hamiltonian. x1, p1 are periodic solutions. The Hamiltonian
is conserved upto an error of the order of 10−5. Step size, ∆t = 10−4.
Let Ci denote the 2 × 2 matrix whose ith column elements are one and others
zero. The linear fitness generated by matrices A = [aij], 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 2, and Ã =
(A− a21C1 − a12C2) satisfy
Ax− xTAx = Ãx− xT Ãx (5.42)
Therefore, it is sufficient to analyze the Hamiltonian dynamics for the fitness defined





In correspondence with the parameters a, b defined earlier, we get a = 1+ξ and b = ξ
and the fourth degree polynomial equation (5.38) becomes




z3 + (2ξ + 1) z2 + z + c = 0 (5.44)
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Figure 5.4: Phase portraits for (a) Prisoner’s dilemma, (b) Coordination game, and (c)
Matching pennies game, and (d) Values of the Hamiltonian functions for trajectories
with initial conditions on the x1 axis. Black curve corresponds to Prisoner’s dilemma,
green curve to coordination game, and red to matching pennies.
5.4.1 Prisoner’s dilemma
Following [24], we consider the symmetric game of prisoner’s dilemma with the





In this game, the player has the choice of two strategies: to cooperate or defect.
Based on the payoff matrix, we can see that the replicator dynamics with fitness
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f = Ax has no interior equilibrium point. However, the Hamiltonian dynamics has a
unique equilibrium point on the x1 axis, about which periodic solutions are observed
in numerical simulations.
Let Ci denote the 2×2 matrix with ith column entries all equal to 1. Transform-












with ξ = −1
3
. There are two roots of (5.37) at 0.9733 and 0.0934 satisfying the con-
ditions of the theorem 5.3.1. The simulation results for the set of initial conditions
yields H(0) = −0.4050, resulting in periodic orbits in the phase space of the Hamilto-
nian system. A comparison is shown against the evolution of the probability x1 in the
case of replicator dynamics in figure 5.1. Figure 5.4(a) shows the phase portrait for








We consider the fitness f = Dx = Ax for a coordination game [24] with ξ = 2
so that the payoff matrix is given by




For the replicator dynamics with linear fitness given by this game matrix, there is





, 0) is an equilibrium point for the
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Hamiltonian system. However, there are two more equilibria on the x1 axis, and the
phase portrait in figure 5.4 exhibits interesting behavior, discussed below.
The simulated trajectories of the Hamiltonian dynamics for a random initial
condition for x1(0) and the p1(0) chosen according to (5.32) so that c = 0 is depicted
in Figure 5.2. As expected, the trajectories of x1 from the Hamiltonian dynam-
ics coincide with the replicator dynamics and H(t) ≡ 0. Simulations for random
initialization of p1(0) fixes the non-zero value of the Hamiltonian, c = −0.2575 (pre-
cision upto an order of 10−5) in our calculations. For ξ = 2, the equation (5.44) has
two roots real roots in the interval (0, 1) taking values 0.9832 and 0.1459 and two
imaginary roots. Hence, the Hamiltonian vector field is F− reversible with the map
F (x1, p1) = (x1,−p1), and has two distinct intersections with the fixed point set ΣF .
Thus, the conditions of Theorem 5.3.1 are satisfied, resulting in periodic behavior
depicted in Figure 5.2. Figure 5.4 shows an interesting phase portrait for this exam-
ple. There are three interior equilibria for the Hamiltonian dynamics on the x1 axis.
One of these at x1 =
1
3
corresponds to the point at which the fitness components are
equal. The Hamiltonian function takes the value zero at this point. Factoring out the
difference of the fitness components ax1 + b from the cubic equation (5.39), we obtain
the remaining two equilibria, about which the shown periodic orbits are centered.
138
5.4.3 Matching pennies






We can immediately see that x∗1 = 0.5 is an equilibrium point for the replicator
dynamics. However, for the Hamiltonian dynamics, we observe that there are three
equilibrium points on the x1 axis, and the phase portrait is similar to that of the
coordination game.
The results are shown in figure 5.3, with the Hamiltonian dynamics comprising
periodic solutions, as in the other examples. However, for a = 4 and b = −2, there are
four roots of the polynomial equation (5.44) which are given by 0.9738, 0.6597, 0.3403,
0.0262, which differs from the hypothesis of theorem 5.3.1. However, simulating the
Hamiltonian dynamics, we observe the following. There are three equilibria for the
Hamiltonian dynamics on the x1 axis. One of these corresponds to (0.5, 0) as expected,
from the factor ax1+b = 0. There are periodic solutions observed about the remaining
two equilibria on the x1 axis, just as for the earlier example.
Figure 5.4 also depicts the Hamiltonian function for points on the x1 axis. We
know that for points on the x1 axis that are not equilibria for the Hamiltonian system,
H < 0. For prisoner’s dilemma example, there is only one equilibrium point in the
simplex interior at which the Hamiltonian takes a minimum value. When there are
three equilibria on the x1 axis as in the case of coordination game and the matching
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pennies game, two local minima for the Hamiltonian are observed.
5.5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we have considered a variational problem on the probability sim-
plex due to Svirezhev. We addressed it from a Hamiltonian point of view, and ex-
ploited time-translation symmetry of the Lagrangian to write down an associated
conserved quantity. We appealed to Birkhoff’s theorem to investigate existence of pe-
riodic orbits as solutions to the Hamiltonian dynamics in a special case. We extended
Svirezhev’s result to general fitness maps and showed that solutions to the replicator
dynamics satisfy the Euler-Lagrange equations and hence are extremals of the vari-
ational problem. We have presented an illustrative example (arising from a matrix
game) on a one-dimensional simplex through numerical simulations. We plan to treat
questions of conjugate points for the variational problem in future work. Further, a
natural extension of this work is to consider higher dimensional replicator dynamics
and investigate candidate extremals. It is of interest to investigate the candidate
extremals of the Svirezhev Lagrangian with fitness scaled by controls, and explore its






Motion camouflage in the presence of sen-
sory noise and delay
The third part of the thesis concerns interactions of autonomous agents with the
physical environment, corresponding to the lower layer of the cognitive hierarchy. An
agent implements on a fast time scale, feedback laws determined by mixed strategies
in the middle layer (evolving replicator dynamics) of the hierarchy. The feedback laws
for autonomous agents may be classical pursuit, motion camouflage, constant bearing,
boundary tracking and cyclic pursuit strategies. In this setting, a mixed strategy can
be realized by choosing a convex combination of the individual feedback laws, with
the convex combination given by the state on the simplex. This is motivated by
examples in nature as well as some experiments performed on testbeds, and is briefly
discussed in the following section.
The main focus of this chapter1 is to consider the effects of sensory inaccu-
racy and feedback delays in the implementation of motion camouflage feedback law
1A significant portion of this chapter is verbatim from [68].
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by a pursuer attempting to capture a passive evader. This highlights challenges in
implementing combination feedback laws with similar constraints.
6.1 Strategies
In an effort to model the evolution of behaviors of autonomous agents, strate-
gies may have different interpretations depending on the goals. In nature, a migrating
bird may need to forage for food, avoid predators on a daily basis, and still accom-
plish migration across continents on a seasonal basis. Other bird species and insects
respond to the day-night cycle to use the stars to navigate or use vision adapted to
the dark to hunt for food. In these examples, strategies may be behaviors that enable
accomplishment of a goal in a manner synchronized with time on different time scales.
Therefore, strategies broadly refer to such behaviors that get the job done.
In dyadic pursuit, it may refer to motion strategies specified by a geometric
constraint imposed by the choice of the feedback law employed by the pursuer, such
as in the examples in figure 1.3. A pursuer may execute a feedback law that approx-
imately satisfies this constraint. Here, the pursuer reaches an epsilon neighborhood
of a constraint manifold in finite time or asymptotically. In the example illustrating
the leader-based achievement of a circling equilibrium by a collective [69], a strategy
referred to the convex combination determining the weighting of two feedback laws.
In the context of pursuit-evasion games [70] in missile guidance, it may refer to a
randomization in the choice of actions which is a Nash equilibrium strategy for the
underlying zero sum game played by the pursuer and the evader. Some models at-
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tempt to capture the empirical probability associated with repeated occurrences of
events [71]. In our present work, it is of interest to investigate strategies for distributed
sensor platforms.
Choosing the combination of feedback laws for the agent is akin to choosing
strategies informed by past experience, and can be updated based on changes in the
reward obtained in real time. In other words, by choosing a combination feedback
law, the agent is able to relatively prioritize strategies based on the reward obtained
through its interaction with the environment. In this way, the evolution of such a com-
bination models an attention mechanism. For an example, consider a recent work [69]
in which an agent of a finite sized collective identified as the leader implements a feed-
back law that uses the information about a beacon and an immediate neighbor, while
other agents use the constant bearing feedback law with respect to their neighbor.
By splitting its attention in this manner, the leader is able to bring the entire col-
lective to a circling equilibrium about the beacon. For the leader, this amounts to
weighting the feedback laws with respect to two agents using a convex combination
that achieves the desired goal. These weights can be interpreted as probabilities or
frequencies that sum to unity, and the feedback laws as a finite pool of strategies that
govern the attentional mechanism for the leader. With this interpretation as motiva-
tion, we formulate a mathematical model for cognitive control by explicitly varying
the probabilities associated with each strategy as a function of time. It should be
noted that in this example, the weights of the convext combination remained fixed.
Another example is the Topological Velocity Alignment (TVA) from [72, 73]
which explores the effect of each agent aligning their velocity with that of a neigh-
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borhood average. Here again, the average velocity is computed using equal weights
(which are not modulated with time) for the neighbor’s velocities. The TVA feed-
back law is shown to eventually bring a collective to a rectilinear motion in the same
direction, allowing for splitting into groups in the presence of an adversarial agent
by incorporating a local collision avoidance maneuver. These examples suggest the
interpretation of the convex combination as enabling an agent to allocate differen-
tial attention to other conspecifics in the vicinity. While a natural extension is to
allow for time-varying weights through evolution of the state on the simplex, it is not
immediately clear what manifestation in the physical space will be produced by an
arbitrary convex combination of feedback laws, especially since the geometric con-
straints defining them depend nonlinearly on the state. We defer further discussion
on this and focus on some implementational challenges in the physical world. We
note that in other applications, the choice of feedback law in the lower layer of the
cognitive hierarchy may be influenced by a decision rule that translates the strategy
choice in the middle layer.
Even when a single feedback law needs to be implemented, as opposed to a
combination one, the physical constraints of the agents may impose severe limitations
on their efficacy in achieving desired behavior. In this chapter, we discuss some
limitations associated with implementing a pure strategy feedback law. In biological
and engineering systems, implementing a control decision incurs costs in terms of
energy expended, with the speed of decision making inhibited by the duration for
which an agent may need to observe the external stimulus in order to have reasonably
accurate evnironmental information to act upon. For example, a pursuer may need
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to determine how much the accuracy of sensory information can be leveraged for
the ability to act quickly on a rapidly maneuvering target. In the following work
based on [68], we discuss the feasibility of motion camouflage in the two agent planar
pursuit problem in which the pursuer implements a feedback strategy employing
delayed sensory information subject to noise, whose variance is inversely proportional
to the delay. This variance-delay modeling assumption is intended to capture the
trade-off between the speed of computation and accuracy of information available to
the pursuer. However, in this work, we limit ourselves to fixed variance and a range
of delays.
6.2 Motion camouflage pursuit
Motion camouflage [74–76] is a pursuit strategy which leads to eventual paral-
lelization (i.e., vanishing motion parallax) of the baseline vector joining the evader
and pursuer. The steering control of the pursuer is governed by a feedback law pro-
portional to the magnitude of the optic flow, defined as the relative velocity of the
pursuer with respect to the evader, in the direction transverse to the baseline. For
constant pursuer and evader speeds, and high enough feedback gain, the state of mo-
tion camouflage can be achieved using such a biologically plausible feedback law [74].
In [77, 78], the pursuer implements the steering control by using delayed optic flow
information. The delay was attributed to sensory motor processing such as in the
case of echolocating bats [79]. The effect of the delay on the deviation from motion
camouflage and a feasible set of values for the feedback gain that ensured achievement
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Figure 6.1: The pursuer - evader configuration.
of motion camouflage was studied as a function of the delay. In [80], the authors con-
sidered the problem of achievement of motion camouflage in the mean, in finite time,
in the presence of sensory noise and that of a stochastically steering evader. Here,
we are interested in the setting in which the pursuer implements a steering control
law subject to a noise, whose variance is inversely proportional to the delay incurred
by the pursuer between sensing the optic flow and incorporating it in its steering
control, thereby capturing the trade-off between the pursuer’s speed and accuracy.
We fix notation as in [74].
6.2.1 Model of pursuer and evader’s motion
The planar motion of the pursuer (denoted by ‘p’) and evader (denoted by ‘e’)
are modeled as in (6.1), where ν is the speed of the evader and ν < 1, xp and yp are
unit vectors in the natural Frenet frame [81] for the pursuer, xe and ye are respectively
the unit vectors in the Frenet frame for the evader, rp and re respectively denote the
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Pursuee
Pursuer𝑟" 0 𝑟$ 0
Γ =	-1
Figure 6.2: Baseline parallelization when Γ = −1, corresponding to de-
creasing baseline length.
position vectors for the pursuer and evader.
ṙp = xp ṙe = νxe
ẋp = ypup ẋe = νyeue
ẏp = −xpup ẏe = −νxeue (6.1)
6.2.2 Characterization of the pursuit and feedback law
The optic flow vector w is defined as the relative velocity of the pursuer with
respect to the evader in the direction transverse to the baseline vector r = rp − re.
Denoting by x⊥, the anticlockwise rotation of the vector x by π
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The signed magnitude of the optic flow w is given as:




The pursuer-evader system is said to be in a state of motion camouflage without








was derived for the achievement of motion camouflage, where µ > 0 is a large enough
feedback gain value [74].
6.2.3 The cost (or contrast) function
The cost function Γ is defined as the ratio of the rate of change of the magnitude














The condition for the pursuer-evader system, that the optic flow must be zero to be
in a state of motion camouflage with decreasing baseline length is equivalent to the





6.3 Towards finite time accessibility of motion camouflage
The main goal of this work is to ascertain conditions for the existence of a gain
µ that will drive in the mean, the contrast Γ in finite time to −1 + ε for ε > 0, for
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Figure 6.3: Relative configuration of pursuer and evader resulting in Γ = −1.
a set of modeling assumptions on delay and noise in the feedback path. Here, we
specify the form of delayed and noisy feedback law implemented by the pursuer, that
is of concern to us. The main focus of this section is the derivation of stochastic
differential inequalities satisfied by the cost function and the optic flow. We then use
these to state a result of finite time accessibility in section 6.5.2.
6.3.1 Stochastic Differential Equation for Γ
The delayed and noisy version of the optic flow sensed by the pursuer can be
given by modifying (6.4) as:
up(t) = µw̃(t) (6.7)
where w̃(t) , w(t−τ)+w(t−τ)n(t), n(t) ∼ N (0, k
τ




, τ denotes the delay and k > 0 is a constant. The noise term
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is assumed to be independent of the other process variables. Thus, if we assume that







(ν − (yp · ye))uedt
− w(t)
|ṙ|3
(1− ν(yp · ye))updt (6.8)
6.3.2 Deriving bound for E[Γ]
In order to compute an estimate of the value of the contrast function in the
mean, we find T > 0 given the magnitude of initial separation |r(0)| > r0 > 0 such
that ∀ t ∈ [0, T ), |r| ≥ r0 > 0, where r0 is a constant. Since −1 ≤ Γ ≤ 1 and
1− ν ≤ |ṙ| ≤ 1 + ν, we have:






we have |r| > r0 ∀ t ∈ [0, T ). Using the above facts with (6.8), we get that ∀ t
∈ [0, T ):











Substituting for w̃(t), taking expectations on both sides and using the fact that the
noise term nt is independent of the other process variables, we get:
d
dt
E[Γ] ≤ 1 + ν
r0













Assume that the first and second moments of the evader’s steering control are bounded,
i.e., ∃ umax > 0 such that |E[ue]| ≤ umax and E[u2e] ≤ u2max. Using Cauchy-









E[Γ] ≤ 1 + ν
r0












Since w2(t) = |ṙ|2(1− Γ2(t)), we have:
d
dt
E[Γ] ≤ 1 + ν
r0












Before we proceed further, consider the optic flow w defined in (6.7) . Using Ito rule




































































Since E[w(t)w(t− τ)] = E[w(t− τ)E[w(t)|w(t− τ)]], we have from (6.16) that:
E[w(t)w(t− τ)] ≥ E[w2(t− τ)]− c1E[w(t− τ)] (6.17)












Now, consider the RHS of (6.14). Let f(w, ν, τ) =
1− νyp · ye
|ṙ|3
w(t)w(t− τ). If
the pointwise constraint that w(t)w(t− τ) > 0 is satisfied, we have the following:
f(w, ν, τ) ≥ (1− ν)
(1 + ν)3
w(t)w(t− τ) (6.18)
Similarly, if w(t)w(t− τ) < 0:
f(w, ν, τ) ≥ (1 + ν)
(1− ν)3
w(t)w(t− τ) (6.19)
so that, ∀ t > 0,∃ g(ν) > 0 such that
f(w, ν, τ) ≥ g(ν)w(t)w(t− τ) (6.20)
Using the above lower bound on f(w, ν, τ), we get that:
− µE


















umax, equation (6.14) can be written as:
d
dt
E[Γ] ≤ c0E[1− Γ2]− µg(ν)E[w2(t− τ)]
+ µg(ν)c1E[w(t− τ)] + c2E[
√
1− Γ2]
Substituting for w(t− τ) in terms of Γ(t− τ), we get:
d
dt
E[Γ] ≤ c0E[1− Γ2(t)] + c2
√
E[1− Γ2(t)]
+ µg(ν)c1(1 + ν)
√
E[1− Γ2(t− τ)]
− µg(ν)(1− ν)2E[1− Γ2(t− τ)] (6.23)
Hence, we do not have a guarantee that the cost function will decrease, in the mean.
To circumvent this, letting ψ = 1− Γ2 and writing down the derivative of its expec-













































µg(ν)(1− ν)2ε− c0(ε+ γτ)− c2
√
ε+ γτ



































chosen by appropriately choosing µ > 0 such that β > η where η > 0 is a positive




To have β > η > 0, where η is a positive constant, we need:































6.4 Existence of feasible feedback gain µ
We note that there exists a feedback gain value satisfying (6.27), called a feasible
gain, if it satisfies the following inequality:
µg(ν)
(



















We denote the right hand side of (6.28) as R(µ, τ, ε, ν). Note that R can be written
as:




















, it is affine in µ
and c0 and c2 are independent of the gain and delay, the plot of R(µ, τ, ε, ν) with
respect to the gain is a straight line of positive slope and positive y - intercept.
Thus, in the region of interest where µ > 0, the graph of R vs µ corresponds to a
straight line of positive slope above the µ - axis. Similarly, denoting the left hand












is affine in µ. Moreover, due to
the negative sign of the second degree term, we see that this is a downward-facing
parabola, a concave function of µ.
6.4.1 Discussion
The dependence of the existence of the feedback gain on the values of delay,
deviation from motion camouflage and evader speed are summarized here.
(i) For the required condition that L > R+η to hold, L(µ, τ, ε, ν) > 0 is a necessary
condition. Using this in (6.17), which can be interpreted as the stochastic analog
of the mean value theorem on the optic flow, we can infer that if there is a
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(a) ε = 0.05









(b) ε = 0.1







(c) ε = 0.15












(d) ε = 0.2









(e) ε = 0.25








(f) ε = 0.3












(g) ε = 0.35











(h) ε = 0.4










(i) ε = 0.45









(j) ε = 0.5
Figure 6.4: L(µ, τ, ε, ν) (red) and R(µ, τ, ε, ν) (blue) as functions of feed-
back gain µ ∈ (0, 20) depicted in the x-axis, and delay τ ∈ [0.001, 0.01]
with increments of 0.001, for ν = 0.3 and
k
τ
= 0.25. Darker red and blue
shades correspond to lower values of delay. For ε ≤ 0.15, the plots of L
and R do not intersect for any values of delay and gain in the given range.
For higher values of ε, they do intersect for lower values of delay. For all ε
and µ in the given range, there are no feedback gains guaranteeing (6.28)
for τ ≥ 0.003.
feedback gain that satisfies (6.28), the following holds:
E[w(t)w(t− τ)] ≥ E[w2(t− τ)]− c1E[w(t− τ)]
>
(
(1− ν)2 − (1 + ν)c1√
ε
)
ε > 0 (6.30)




(ii) For τ = 0, (6.28) takes the following form:













However, we do not explore this case further since for the no-delay case, the
form of the optic flow in (6.7) is subject to noise of infinite variance which
renders this case meaningless.
(iii) From remarks (i) and (ii), we can surmise that for any ε and ν, for small enough
τ , the constraint in (6.28) will be satisfied. This is explored in Figure 6.4. From
Figure 6.4(a)-(b), we see that for small values of ε, the plots of L(µ, τ, ε, ν) and
R(µ, τ, ε, ν) do not intersect for any value of delay in the chosen range. From
Figure 6.4(c)-(j), we observe that for smaller values of τ , the plots intersect and
there exists a range for the feedback gain in which constraint (6.28) is satisfied
for small enough η > 0. This range of the feedback gain depending on ε and τ ,
denoted by Rτε is seen to satisfy the following relationships:




if ε1 < ε2
For τ ≥ 0.003, there is no feedback gain in the range µ ∈ (0, 20) satisfying
(6.28) for all ε. There may exist feedback gains larger than 20 that satisfy
the required constraint. Since higher values of feedback gain result in more
aggressive steering, the only restriction to increasing the range for the feedback
gain is accounting for physical restrictions on the pursuer’s ability to steer, and
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(10).
(iv) The existence of solutions to the feedback gain guaranteeing (6.28) also depends
on the relative speed of the evader with respect to the pursuer. For ε ∈ [0.05, 0.5]
and µ ∈ (0, 20), for the constraint (6.28) to be satisfied, the value of a corre-
sponding delay is decreased significantly. A summary of the order of delay for
which the constraint is satisfied is given in the table below:
Table 6.1: Order of the delay as a function of evader speed.
ν Order of delay τ
0.1 10−2
0.2 5 × 10−3
0.3 1 × 10−3
0.4 5 × 10−4
0.5 5 × 10−5
0.6 10−5
(v) From table 6.1 and figure 6.4, we see that the delay for which the existence
of a feasible feedback gain guarantee the existence of a feasible feedback gain
decreases with increasing evader speeds. However in a biological setting, the
delay incurred by the pursuer due to cognitive processing cannot be arbitrarily
small. In fact, it will be atleast as high as the sensory motor processing delay
[79].
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6.5 Statement of the result
6.5.1 Finite time ε-accessibility of motion camouflage
Motion camouflage is defined to be ε-accessible in the mean in finite time if for
a given ε > 0, ∃ t1 in (0, T ) such that E[1− Γ2(t1)] ≤ ε.
6.5.2 Finite time achievement of motion camouflage
Theorem 6.5.1. Given the pursuer-evader system (6.1) with stochastic steering con-
trols ue and up respectively such that the following hold:
(i) the speed of the pursuer and evader are respectively are 1 and ν < 1,
(ii) the first and second moments of ue are bounded i.e., ∃ umax > 0 such that
|E[ue]| ≤ umax and E[u2e] ≤ u2max,
(iii) the initial separation is such that |r(t)| > 0 and initial deviation from motion
camouflage satisfies E[1− Γ2(t)] > ε, where ε > 0 ∀ t ∈ [0, τ ],
(iv) the optic flow sensed by the pursuer is subject to noise whose variance is in-
versely proportional to τ and is modeled by (6.7).
Then, motion camouflage is ε - accessible in the mean in finite time if there exists a
feedback gain µ > 0 satisfying (6.28), where η > 0 is a constant.
Proof. The idea behind the proof is similar to that of Proposition 3.3 in [74]
and Proposition 1 in [80]. We first choose |r(0)| > r0 and pick a feedback gain µ
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(c) Noisy optic flow, w̃(t)
X













(d) Trajectory of the pursuer
and evader
Time












(e) Contrast function, Γ(t)
Time











(f) Noisy optic flow, w̃(t)




The pursuer’s and evader’s initial positions are (0,0) and (5,5) respectively. (a)-(c)
corresponds to ν = 0.3, τ = 0.002 and (d)-(f) corresponds to ν = 0.8, τ = 0.2, with
the evader steering held constant at ue = 0.25. The pursuer’s motion is in blue, the
evader’s in red and the baseline joining them in green.





η2 > 0 (6.33)
then, ∃ t1 ∈ (0, T ) such that E[1− Γ2(t1)] ≤ ε.
6.6 Simulation Results
We present the simulation results corresponding to four scenarios in this section
with the same value of feedback gain, µ = 10. For ν = 0.3, we see from figure 6.4
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(f) Noisy optic flow, w̃(t)




The pursuer’s and evader’s initial positions are (0,0) and (5,5) respectively. (a)-(c)
corresponds to ν = 0.3, τ = 0.002 and (d)-(f) corresponds to ν = 0.8, τ = 0.2 for
sinusoidal evader steering of amplitude 0.25. In (a) the motion of the evader is shown
in higher resolution. The pursuer’s motion is in blue, the evader’s in red and the
baseline joining them in green.
that this value satisfies (6.28) for values of ε above 0.3. Figure 6.5 (a-c) shows the
evolution of the trajectories of the pursuer and evader, the contrast function and the
noisy optic flow for a constant evader curvature of ue = 0.25 using a feedback gain
µ = 10 satisfying (6.28) whereas figure 6.5 (d-f) shows the same for a higher value of
delay and the same value of gain not satisfying this condition. Similarly the pursuer-
evader system for a sinusoidal steering input of amplitude 0.25 with feedback gain
satisfying (6.28) is shown in figure 6.6 (a-c) whereas with a higher value of delay and
gain not satisfying this condition in 6.6 (d-f).
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In both figures, it can be observed that the optic flow is noisier for higher value
of τ . Although
k
τ
= 0.25 in all four scenarios, the inverse proportionality of the noise
variance with respect to the delay along with delayed and hence inaccurate optic flow
information results in the optic flow being more noisy in these two cases. It should be
noted that since noise in (6.7) is proportional w(t− τ), if the value of the optic flow
is close to zero, so is the noise. Unless there is a perturbation of the evader’s motion
such as when it performs a stochastic run and tumble motion [80, 82], there is no
reason to expect the value of the contrast function to change drastically or suddenly.
In this case, the changing evader curvature might contribute to deviation from motion
camouflage.
For values of the gain satisfying the constraint, the contrast function appears
to be monotonically decreasing and hence the pursuer-evader system reaches the
state of motion camouflage in finite time, as predicted by the theory. For higher
evader speeds, for the same gain and the aforementioned values of delay, there may
not exist feedback gains satisfying the constraint, as seen from table 6.1. In such
cases, the contrast function is not monotonically decreasing and hence, the pursuer-
evader system is not guaranteed to achieve motion camouflage in finite time. This is
reflected in 6.5 (e) and especially in 6.6 (e), where the deviations from Γ = −1 are
more prominent. Despite the fluctuations, since Γ is negative for a prolonged duration
of time, the baseline length decreases with time, although not monotonically.
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6.7 Conclusions
In this chapter concerning micro dynamics at the lowest level of the cognitive
hierarchy, we considered some interpretations of the notion of a mixed strategy im-
plemented in a real world setting for the pursuit problem. Towards characterizing
the sensory-motor feedback of biological organisms with natural constraints of noise
in sensing and feedback delays, which also have parallels in the communication and
control of physical systems, the efficacy of a candidate pure strategy feedback law
was studied. A modified stochastic version of the motion camouflage problem in the
presence of noise and delay was formulated and achievement of motion camouflage in
this setting was investigated. The effect of the delay on the finite-time achievement
of motion camouflage was discussed in terms of constraints on the feedback gain and
the existence of feasible feedback gains was analyzed. As expected, the constraints
impede, but do not inhibit, the ability of the pursuer to maintain a relative config-
uration with respect to the evader. This analysis can be extended to study optimal
stopping times, when the pursuer may need to forgo the pursuit of the evader based
on an appropriate cost criterion, persuading a change in goal triggered by updated in-
formation. A possible extension of the analysis of the variance-delay relationship may
give rise to a rich variety of many agent pursuit problems such as with one pursuer,
multiple evaders or one evader and multiple pursuers with optimality considerations.
In general, we note that both the meaning and method of implementation of a
strategy will depend on the specific context, and decision rules as to pick the feedback
law corresponding to the highest probability may offer pragmatic alternatives to con-
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vex combination feedback laws. We leave further explorations of the mixed strategy
feedback laws for future work.
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Part IV
Application to data smoothing
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Chapter 7
A cognitive description of flocking
This chapter1 discusses a data smoothing application of the optimal control
problems outlined in chapter 3 and 5. We address the following fundamental ques-
tion: given a set of temporally ordered points on the simplex, how can we identify
a dynamics that explains it? Thanks to the universality of replicator dynamics, this
problem boils down to one of identifying a fitness that is dependent on state and
possibly time in order to explain the trace. In this chapter, we consider a trace on
the simplex that represents relative energy allocations of starling flocks. This chapter
represents joint work with Udit Halder.
7.1 Introduction
Flocking of birds is an impressive instance of collective behavior in nature.
Flocking enables the collective to forage for food effectively and avoid capture by
predators. Starling flocks, in particular, have been observed to produce complex
contortions and wave-like motions that allow them to escape as well as actively drive
1A significant portion of this chapter is verbatim from a draft [83].
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away a predatory falcon. Therefore, it is of immense ongoing interest to understand
how such collective behavior is produced.
Past analysis of collective behavior has suggested principles such as the ten-
dency of members of the flock to align their velocities with a neighborhood average,
presumably due to limitations in the sensory processing capabilities dictating the at-
tention mechanism of the birds, or to copy their neighbours’ actions (allelomimesis)
(see [84–86] and references in [87]). By modeling agents in a collective as self steering
particles with constant speed, with curvature serving as a control variable, one can
formulate an optimal control problem that seeks to understand these phenomena,
with the cost penalizing both pairwise mismatch between the controls of the agents
and the control magnitudes, such as in [87]. Recently, continuum models for collective
behavior have been explored in [88].
In contrast with these methods, we adopt a different approach to modeling col-
lective phenomena. Instead of probing the microscopic behavior of individual mem-
bers of the flock that result in complex collective behavior, motivated by [89], we
adopt the viewpoint that the flock is a single cognitive entity with the ability to
exhibit different ‘modes’ of behavior. These modes or strategies are specified to be
the allocation of kinetic energy components towards motions of the flock as viewed
by an external observer such as shape and volume changes, and rotations, among
others. Their temporal variations as observed in starling flock data is captured by
an underlying controlled evolutionary game which models competitions between the
strategies, and identifying the optimal control signals. We interpret the optimal cost
as a measure of cognitive complexity of an event.
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7.2 Flocking Data
Starling murmurations have been observed to produce spectacular displays of
collective motion in many parts of the world. While such behavior offers some herd
immunity to attacks by falcons, the agility of flocks in their response to such attacks
is remarkable. In an effort to understand flock-scale behaviors observed in European
starlings, we use sampled observations of each bird’s trajectory collected by by Dr.
Andrea Cavagna and collaborators from the Collective Behaviour in Biological Sys-
tems (COBBS) group at the Institute for Complex Systems (ISC-CNR), University
of Rome “La Sapienza”. By capturing snapshots of the flocks by stereo imaging
from multiple cameras, and using an algorithm based in combinatorial optimization
to solve the correspondence problem, the flight data of each individual bird for the
entire duration of eight flocking events is made available. See [86] for more details
about this process. Table 7.1 lists the details about the events.
7.3 Data Smoothing
Given a time-indexed sequence of sampled observations on a manifold, gen-
erative models provide a meaningful way of capturing them through the use of an
underlying dynamical system complete with control inputs having useful interpre-
tations. The control inputs are determined by solving an optimal control problem,
where the cost function consists of a fitness term that penalizes mismatch between
the generated trajectory and sampled data, and a smoothing term weighted by a
parameter λ that affects the smoothness of the generated trajectory. In the context
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Flocking Flock Size Duration Data Capture Rate
Event (n) (seconds) (frames/second)
2011 02 08 ACQ3 175 5.4875 80
2011 11 24 ACQ1 123 1.8176 170
2011 11 25 ACQ1 46 5.6118 170
2011 12 01 ACQ3 485 2.3471 170
2011 12 07 ACQ1 104 3.8824 170
2011 12 14 ACQ4 122 4.1588 170
2011 12 15 ACQ1 380 5.7353 170
2011 12 20 ACQ2 194 1.7588 170
Table 7.1: Details of captured flocking events
of flocking trajectories, such models have helped explain observed data, as well as
provide a way of generating trajectories of the self steering particles by supplying the
speed and curvature inputs as a function of time. We discuss two generative models
that have been proposed to solve this problem.
7.3.1 A linear generative model
A first approach to solving the data smoothing problem, presented in [90], is
to formulate an optimal control problem to minimize the jerk path integral, with
intermediary state costs determining the fit error. Suppose that {ri}Ni=0 denote the
positions of the birds at each sampling time, with ri ∈ R3. In order to recover a
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trajectory fit r(t) : [t0, tN ]→ R3, one can use the jerk-driven linear generative model,
ṙ(t) = v(t)
v̇(t) = a(t)
ȧ(t) = u(t) (7.1)
where v(t), a(t),u(t) denote the velocity, acceleration and jerk (input) of the trajec-








where the minimization is over initial conditions r(t0),v(t0), a(t0) and the input u(t).







9,y(t) = x(t) ∈ R3
we obtain the linear state equations
ẋ(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t)











 , C = [I3 0 0] (7.3)
where I3 is the three dimensional identity matrix. Therefore, the problem of mini-
mizing Jl subject to (7.3) is a linear, quadratic optimal control problem which can be
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solved by a completion of squares of terms in the cost by invoking a path indepen-
dence lemma, or by applying the Pontryagin Maximum Principle as shown in [90].
This approach has been used to smooth the starling flock data for all the events listed
in table 7.1.
In the following section, we present a general result on the Pontyagin Maximum
Principle based approach for data smoothing on the Euclidean space Rn. This general
theorem is applied in solving the data smoothing problem when the sampled points
are from the simplex ∆n−1, without additional regard to the Riemannian manifold
structure.






denote the sampled data. For a generative model given
by the dynamics ẋ = f(x, u) on Rn, with the control u ∈ Rm, the optimal control














subject to: ẋ = f(x, u),
(7.4)
where parameter λ > 0 is a regularization parameter, and Fi’s are suitably defined
fit errors that measure the mismatch between the reconstructed trajectories and
sampled data at the sampling times. Using Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle, the
optimal control values can be calculated as a function of the state and a co-state
variable. The following result from [91] states this precisely.
Theorem 7.3.1. (PMP for data smoothing [91] ) Let u∗(·) be an optimal control
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input for (7.36), and let x∗(·) denote the corresponding state trajectory. Then there




(t, x∗, p, u∗)
ṗ = −∂H
∂x
(t, x∗, p, u∗)
(7.5)
during t ∈ (ti, ti+1), i = 0, 1, ..., N − 1, and the Hamiltonian is given as
H(t, x∗, p, u∗) = max
v∈Rm
H(t, x∗, p, v), (7.6)
for t ∈ [t0, tN ] \ {t0, t1, ..., tN}, where the pre-Hamiltonian is defined as H(t, x, p, u) =
〈p, f(x, u)〉 − λ
2
‖u‖2. Moreover, jump discontinuities of the costate variable can be
written as
p(t−0 ) = 0,
p(t+i )− p(t−i ) =
∂Fi(x(ti))
∂x(ti)
, i = 0, 1, ..., N,
p(t+N) = 0.
(7.7)
The piece-wise continuous nature of the co-state trajectory due to jump condi-
tions arising from mismatch between the sampled data points and the reconstructed
state must be noted here. The initial condition x(t0) is identified by using the terminal
condition for the co-state, while the optimal value of λ is typically obtained through
leave-one-out or ordinary cross validation. The reconstructed trajectory is then ob-
tained as the projection onto the state space of the solution of Hamilton’s equations
derived from the (maximised pre-) Hamiltonian. We refer the reader to [72] for a
detailed treatment of these problems.
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7.4 Energy Modes
Avian flocks display a variety of flight behaviors that may be characterized
as collective strategies such as steady directed translation of center of mass (which
we denote by com), coherent rotation about center of mass (rot), change of form
(ens), internal re-shuffling of relative positions (dem), rapid expansion or contraction
of volume (vol) etc. A flocking event may display all of the mentioned strategies to
varying degrees as governed by the time-dependent allocation of kinetic energy to each
strategy. We take the viewpoint presented in [89] and study the fractions of the total
kinetic energy of a flock allocated to several ‘kinematic modes’ – rigid translations,
rigid rotations, inertia tensor transformations, expansion and compression, in order
to describe collective behavior. By doing so, we treat the flock as a single entity with
several strategies of energy allocations available to it. Below is a brief discussion on
the resolution of kinetic energy into components, from [89,92].
Suppose that the positions of the birds in a flock are denoted by {r1, r2, ..., rn},







with the assumption that the birds are of equal mass, normalized to unity. The




(ri − rcom) (ri − rcom)T . (7.9)









We can define the position and velocity vector with respect to the center of mass, i.e.










We thus have the splitting, E = Ecom +Erel. As presented in [89], instantaneous rel-
ative energy allocations can be expressed on a probability simplex (∆5) by exploiting
the fibre bundle structures of the flock’s total configuration space to split the total
kinetic energy using (i) ensemble fibration or (ii) shape fibration.
(i) Ensemble Fibration: We note that the ensemble inertia tensor K (7.9) is a
symmetric positive definite matrix. Hence its eigendecomposition can be written
as, K = QΛQT, with Λ = diag(λ1, λ2, λ3), where λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ λ3 > 0. Define,







































so that, Eens.res = Eend.def−Evol. We may also calculate Edem = Erel−Eens.rot−





































JT I−1c J, (7.16)
The shape residual energy is given by Eshp.res = Erel − Erot − Eend.def, which


















While we can split the kinetic energy in 5 different modes such as in (7.14)
and (7.17), many flocking events show a predominant allocation of nearly constant
energy of rigid translation (Ecom). We exclude this component from the total E in
our analysis, and consider the allocation of the remaining energy Erel to obtain a
time dependent trace of each event on a lower dimensional simplex. In particular,
we capture the trace generated by the following decomposition of Erel using ensemble




















where Erel = E−Ecom, and Eens = Erel−Edem = Eens.rot +Evol +Eens.res. Similarly, a



















where Eshp = Erel − Erot = Eshp.res + Evol + Eens.res.
In this way, moment-to-moment decisions made by individuals in a flock, taking
account of the decisions of their neighbors, contribute to flock-scale strategies as
captured by such time dependent traces on the probability simplex. Treating the
strategy prevalence as being given by the respective energy fractions, we resort to a
generative evolutionary game dynamics to model the competition between the flock-
scale strategies.
7.5 Generative model on the simplex and the data-smoothing
problem
Controlled evolutionary games offer a natural model for capturing the underly-
ing dynamics that generates traces representing time-dependent mixed strategies on
a simplex. Consider the system on ∆n−1,
ẋ = u1f̂1 + u2f̂2 (7.22)
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where f1 = a = [a1, . . . , an]
T and f2 = Bx are fitness maps in the formulation
of the controllability theorem in chapter 3, satisfying the requisite conditions for
controllability. We propose that such a system is a candidate generative model for
explaining traces for two reasons: first, due to controllability, there exist control
signals ui(t) that achieve a desired state transfer from any initial to final condition on
the simplex, and secondly, such a system allows us to model the competition between
the strategies for a cognitive agent offering interpretability. When u2 = 0 and u1 = 1
identically, the behavior of (7.22) is to converge to a pure strategy. For this reason,
f̂1 can be identified as dynamics due to a bias contributed by the ordering of the
frequency independent fitness components learned via game against nature. On the
other hand, when u1 = 0 and u2 = 1 identically, the evolution of the strategies is
influenced by the game matrix B which reflects a comparative assessment of the pure
strategies when pitted against each other. Therefore, (7.22) is interpreted to be a
system capable of producing any desired mixed strategy decision, by controlling the
influence of pre-existing cognitive biases and learned information or experience, with
the controls as driving forces.
A class of optimal control problems to find the sub-Riemannian geodesics have
been formulated in chapter 3. As its extension to solve the data smoothing problem,
we consider the controls ui, i = 1, 2 that minimize the following cost J :







where the regularization term is given by the norm squared of the velocity of a solution
curve, and Fi(x(ti)) are fit-errors measuring the deviation of the solution from the
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sampled data at times ti. We can use Gram-Schmidt orthonormalization process to
write (7.22) as









, where h is the vector




which are well defined in the interior of the simplex due to controllability of (7.22).
Note that if (7.22) is controllable, so is (7.24). By substituting (7.25) back into (7.24)












For (7.24), the problem (7.23) becomes one of minimizing









For the standard optimal control problem with fixed end points, in the absence of
considerations of fit-errors, the cost Jf (xt0 , v1, v2) and Lagrangian L are simply










The pre-Hamiltonian is given by
H(x, p, v1, v2) = p
T (v1ĝ1 + v2ĝ2)− L
= pT ĝ1v1 + p
T ĝ2v2 − (v21 + v22) (7.29)
We obtain the Hamiltonian by maximising (7.29). Using the standard route of Pon-
tryagin Maximum Principle, we can write closed-form solutions for vi, i = 1, 2, ob-








, i = 1, 2








Alternatively, one can formulate the optimal control problem to find solutions
to (7.22) to minimize the control effort given by the natural cost






Note that the Lagrangian for this problem is independent of the metric on the simplex,
unlike in (7.23). For this problem as well, one can write down the solution for the
optimal controls using the first order necessary conditions coming from Pontryagin
Maximum Principle. In the following section, we consider this formulation which
penalizes control effort along with a specified fit-error criterion to address the data
smoothing problem on a lower dimensional simplex.
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7.5.1 Application to the flocking problem
In this work, as a first step, we consider the resolution of the component of
kinetic energy Erel into two modes. Since we are interested in describing the evo-
lution of two flock strategies as in eqs. (7.18) and (7.19) for ensemble fibration and
eqs. (7.20) and (7.21) for shape fibration, we capture the trace of flocking events via a
generative model on the ∆1. Due the unit dimensionality of the simplex, we consider
an evolutionary game model equipped with a single multiplicative control, in order
to describe the strategy evolution. The choice of replicator dynamics is influenced by
its universality in describing simplex-preserving dynamics, and by virtue of being an
extremal for a variational problem [50,61], both presented in earlier chapters.
With the inclusion of a control variable, we consider a different variational
problem that aims to perform data smoothing using regularization as in [91]. To see
this, let x = [x1 x2]
T ∈ ∆2 where xi, i = 1, 2 denote the prevalence of strategies i (to
be specified) on the simplex with the natural constraint x1 + x2 = 1. xi = 1, i = 1, 2
correspond to allocation of Erel entirely to one of the two pure strategies. We consider
the following model on the 1-simplex:
ẋi(t) = xi(t)(f
i(x)− f̄(x)), i = 1, 2 (7.32)
where the fitness f i(x) = Ax and f̄ = x11f (x) +x2f
2(x) . Here, A = [aij] ∈ R2 defines
a payoff matrix with aij denoting the payoff of the i
th strategy against jth strategy.
In the case that the payoffs do not depend on the strategy j of against which it is
matched up, the columns of A are identical. Since addition of the same term to
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each component of the fitness keeps the dynamics (7.32) unchanged, by subtracting
a21 and a12 from the first and second column elements of A respectively, we get the
equivalent payoff matrix
Ã =
 a11 − a21 0
0 a22 − a12
 (7.33)
We introduce a control input ũ that scales the fitness, and choose the parameters of






Due to the simplex constraint, (7.32) is completely described using x = x1:
ẋ(t) = u(t)x(t)(1− x(t)) (7.35)
with x = 0, 1 corresponding to the pure strategies 2 and 1 respectively. This dynamics
results in asymptotic convergence to the pure strategy x = 1 in the absence of control,
that is, when u(t) ≡ 1. However, the time-varying control variable u serves to model
changing preferences for the flock strategies by appropriate changes in its sign and
magnitude. Such a temporal modulation of the fitness ensures feasibility of capturing
arbitrary traces in the interior of the simplex.
Given the set of data points {xd0, xd1, ..., xdN} with each xdk ∈ (0, 1), k = 0, 1, ..., N ,














subject to: ẋ = ux(1− x),
(7.36)
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where the fit errors Fi’s are given by the Kullback-Leibler divergence measure of
mismatch between the data and the state,
Fi(x
d












, i = 0, 1, ..., N. (7.37)
We can directly appeal to Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle (PMP) and theorem
(7.3.1) to write necessary conditions for optimality. We can write the pre-Hamiltonian
as,
H(x, p, u) = upx(1− x)− λ
2
u2. (7.38)
The Hamiltonian maximization condition (7.6) yields an optimal control in each time





with Hamiltonian given by,
H(x, p) = 1
2λ
p2x2(1− x)2. (7.40)









The jump conditions for p (7.7) can be written as,
p(t−0 ) = 0,
p(t+i )− p(t−i ) =
x(ti)− xdi
x(ti)(1− x(ti))




Remark 7.5.1. Note that the optimal control is piecewise constant since du
dt
= 0 for
each of these time intervals t ∈ (ti, ti+1), i = 0, 1, ..., N − 1.
Therefore, denoting denoted xk = x(tk), k = 0, 1, ..., N , any optimal control





uk − uk−1 =
1
λ
(xk − xdk), k = 1, 2, ..., N
uN = 0.
(7.43)
Piecewise constancy of the control input allows us to write the solution to the state
equation (7.35) explicitly. Suppose the sampling time of the trace is uniform, i.e.





1 + xk (euk∆t − 1)
, k = 0, 1, ..., N − 1. (7.44)
By iteration, we can in turn write every xk as a function of x0 and u0, u1, ..., uk−1,
xk = xk(x0) =
x0e
(u0+u1+···+uk−1)∆t
1 + x0 (e(u0+u1+···+uk−1)∆t − 1)
, k = 1, 2, ..., N. (7.45)
The endpoint condition (uN = 0) can then be written as,
x0 + x1 + · · ·+ xN = xd0 + xd1 + · · ·+ xdN , (7.46)
where the left hand side of (7.46) is a function of x0. Solving the optimal control
problem (7.36) thus boils down to solving (7.46) for x0 ∈ (0, 1).
Remark 7.5.2. The value of the regularization parameter λ is usually chosen through
cross validation technique. We do not employ any such techniques here. The value
184
of λ is chosen such that the root finding algorithm for solving (7.46) converges for all
events. For λ = 0.2, the roots were found with reasonably good accuracy with value
of the function at the root being of the order of 1× 10−5 or lower for all events. For
lower λ however, the problem becomes stiffer and left hand side of (7.46) demonstrates
‘effective discontinuity’ in x0. This poses serious problem in solving (7.46). As a
future step, cross validation could be employed to arrive at a good value of λ in the
range where (7.46) can be solved.
Remark 7.5.3. A concern with not performing cross validation to obtain the parame-
ter λ is overfitting to noise. Since the data smoothing problem on the simplex is based
on smoothed trajectories of birds in the physical space, it can be safely assumed that
the influence of whatever noise was present in the original snapshot data may have
already been minimized in the initial smoothing process. Therefore, not performing
cross validation for the data smoothing on the simplex may not be as restricting as
one might expect.
7.6 Data fitting results and the cognitive cost
We solve the optimal control problem (7.36) for all the flocking events, using
both shape and ensemble fibring. The value of the regularization weight λ is taken
to be 0.2 and 100 data samples at regular time intervals are taken for all events.
Given the data vector, we solve equation (7.46) for x0 ∈ (0, 1). In Table 7.2, we
report time averaged Hamiltonian integrals and time averaged total costs for all the
different games that we consider eqs. (7.18) to (7.21).
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(a) Time Averaged Hamiltonian Integral


















(b) Time Averaged Total Cost
Figure 7.1: Time averaged Hamiltonian and total costs for all the splits of Erel.
With the understanding that flocks act in a way that minimizes the cognitive
burden on individual birds, we interpret the time averaged Hamiltonian integrals as
cognitive costs of the events. From Table 7.2 and figure 7.1, we note that the cognitive
cost associated with the ensemble fibring (ENS-I) closely follows the that of (SHP-I),
while the costs of other two games seem to follow similar trends.
7.7 Discussion
Figures figs. 7.2 to 7.9 show the results of the data smoothing using our genera-
tive model on the 1-simplex, along with the control signal u for each of the 8 flocking
events. The plots show the strategies x1 in each of the fibring as (a) democratic and
(b) rotational strategies. From these, it can be seen that the trajectory fits offer rea-
sonable fidelity with respect to the observed snapshots for the chosen regularization








(seconds) (ENS-I) (SHP-I) (ENS-II) (SHP-II) (ENS-I) (SHP-I) (ENS-II) (SHP-II)
5.4875 0.1232 0.1263 0.0976 0.1077 0.1981 0.1975 0.1454 0.1499
1.8176 0.1432 0.1018 0.2210 0.1760 0.2227 0.1619 0.3769 0.3118
5.6118 0.2735 0.2392 0.0613 0.1073 0.4595 0.4092 0.1557 0.2495
2.3471 0.1021 0.1270 0.0107 0.0190 0.2440 0.2702 0.0594 0.0610
3.8824 0.0779 0.2699 0.1587 0.1383 0.0896 0.3692 0.3001 0.3041
4.1588 0.1809 0.1634 0.0846 0.1105 0.2799 0.2706 0.2063 0.2090
5.7353 0.0804 0.1293 0.0576 0.0619 0.1127 0.2079 0.1087 0.1221
1.7588 0.4569 0.4069 0.0731 0.1090 0.8037 0.8361 0.2074 0.3810
Table 7.2: Cognitive costs for all the considered partitions of Erel producing a trace
on ∆1.
is limited change in this allocation. This suggests that this strategy is fleeting in its
use, with the energy allocation being dominated by shape changes, for most of the
time. On the other hand, the democratic strategy has higher allocations of Erel and
has more pronounced changes in the energy allocation.
These observations are reflected in the optimal control signals as well. For those
events with more pronounced strategy changes, in terms of of the rate of change of
energy allocations in the positive or negative directions, the control effort is higher in
magnitude. This suggests what one might expect: more the change in the strategy
dictating the energy allocations, higher the cognitive effort. The use of the Hamilto-
nian as a cognitive cost reflects this heuristic. Further interpretation of these results
is ongoing work.
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Although the results presented in this work are obtained by using the Kullback-
Leibler divergence measure as the fit error criterion, we can consider other measures.
For example, using the ideas from chapter 3, we can use the isometry T : ∆n−1 →
∆S
n−1
to calculate the geodesic distance between a data-point x∗ and a running point
on the curve x explicitly as follows. Let y = T (x) and y∗ = T (x∗). Then, the geodesic
distance between the respective points can be calculated as follows [30],
d∆n−1(x, x








Another way of constructing the fit error is the norm-squared of the gradient of the
Kullback-Leibler divergence, given by
||∇FRSDKL(x∗||x)||2FRS = ||x∗ − x||2FRS (7.48)
which is equal to zero if and only if x = x∗. The change in fit-errors affects calculations
in the preceding sections in the appropriate jump condition for the costate variables.
It is ongoing work to consider numerical simulations based on these criteria.
7.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we considered a data smoothing problem arising from the con-
text of flocking events and solved it by finding a controlled evolutionary game that
explains an optimal allocation of the relative kinetic energy into several behaviors.
By doing so, we identify a cognitive cost that measures the control energy expended
in producing the flocking strategy changes on the simplex that best fits the observed
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trace. While we considered a two-strategy game to study these events, solving the
same problem by increasing the components of the kinetic energy resolutions produc-
ing traces on a higher dimensional simplex is of ongoing interest.
We note that traces on the simplex may arise from other contexts as well. For
example, recall the problem from physics where the goal is to model the Markovian
transition probabilities between several molecular conformations. Recently, it is of
computational interest to understand the influence of surrounding environment in
affecting these conformational changes [93–95]. In this sense, no matter the number
of such configurations, such observed traces may be modeled by a controllable system
on the simplex. Although the manifestation of the pair of controls for such a system
need to be carefully chosen, they offer interesting avenues for further research. The
extremals of the optimal control problems where the control Lagrangians are of the








































































Figure 7.2: Event 1, λ = 0.2, Number of samples = 100, (b)-(c) x = Edem
Erel
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Figure 7.3: Event 2, λ = 0.2, Number of samples = 100, (b)-(c) x = Edem
Erel
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Figure 7.4: Event 3, λ = 0.2, Number of samples = 100, (b)-(c) x = Edem
Erel
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Figure 7.5: Event 4, λ = 0.2, Number of samples = 100, (b)-(c) x = Edem
Erel
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Figure 7.6: Event 5, λ = 0.2, Number of samples = 100, (b)-(c) x = Edem
Erel
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Figure 7.7: Event 6, λ = 0.2, Number of samples = 100, (b)-(c) x = Edem
Erel
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Figure 7.8: Event 7, λ = 0.2, Number of samples = 100, (b)-(c) x = Edem
Erel
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Figure 7.9: Event 8, λ = 0.2, Number of samples = 100, (b)-(c) x = Edem
Erel
,




Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Summary of contributions
In this thesis, we have developed a three-layer cognitive hierarchy inspired from
neuroscience to model the decision-making by a cognitive agent. In chapter 3, we
have considered controlled replicator dynamics (2.4) as a model of a decision-making
system which dynamically evolves its strategies in the face of evidence given by the
fitness maps, with the controls modeling the influence of the environment stimuli
that culminate in changing the preferences for strategies. We have shown that any
vector field on the probability simplex can be viewed as a replicator dynamics in the
interior of the simplex. Furthermore, we have proved the closure of the replicator
dynamics under the Lie bracket which naturally leads to Lie algebraic structures in
the space of fitness maps. We have illustrated the implications of these results in
establishing controllability properties of replicator control systems whose dynamics
comprise linear combinations of replicator vector fields, each characterized by its own
fitness. A crucial result is that for arbitrarily large dimensional simplex, it suffices
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to consider only a pair of fitness maps satisfying conditions of theorems in chapter
3 to guarantee controllability. A natural extension of these results is to consider
the optimal control problem which is formulated in this chapter but is dealt with in
chapter 7 in the application to describing starling flocking behavior. This was followed
by a discussion of the geometry of the simplex, the gradient nature of certain simplex-
preserving dynamics and a set of feedback laws to stabilize a desired mixed strategy
or potentially result in periodic orbits that naturally arise out of such control systems
in chapter 4.
In chapter 5, we considered an optimizing property of replicator dynamics, first
observed for certain gradient dynamics on the simplex from population genetics by
Yuri M. Svirezhev. We stated the generality of this principle when the potential
energy like term in the Svirezhev Lagrangian is described by smooth fitness, and
considered a Hamiltonian formulation for the problem. In future work, it is of interest
to consider the extremals of Svirezhev Lagrangians with the fitness map dependent
on controls.
In chapter 6, after a brief discussion on the implementation of different strategies
for an autonomous agent, we discussed the problem of achieving capture of evader
by a pursuer using the motion camouflage pursuit strategy subject to inaccuracies
in sensory information modeled as noise, and delays. We have shown constraints on
the existence of feasible feedback gains that guarantee the achievement of motion
camouflage (parallelization of the baseline) in finite time.
In chapter 7, we applied the replicator control system as a generative model to
describe the trace on a 1-simplex produced by flock-scale kinematic modes of swarm-
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ing starling flocks. We formulated a data smoothing problem to explain the observed
traces given by the fractional (relative) kinetic energy allocations on the simplex, and
solved this problem on the 1-simplex. The use of the controlled replicator dynamics in
this setting does not explicitly capture the timescale differences as explained for the
cognitive hierarchy. As explained in chapter 1, we suggest that the hierarchy models
the cognitive mechanism but is not restricted in its use. Used as a generative model
in the flocking context, it allows the flexibility to capture strategy changes through
piece-wise constant controls, without explicit incorporation of the varying timescales.
We note that the role of the control signals in our formulation is two-fold:
first, to capture the long term assimilation of experience into changing preferences
for the available strategies, and second, to implement a change in the cognitive goal,
whether self-initiated or dictated by a possibly adverse environment. Both optimal
control theory and the feedback laws shed light on achieving a desired mixed-strategy,
assuming that it is known. However, choosing such a strategy may itself be an
application-specific task which is not a current focus. In case of a data smoothing
application as in chapter 7, the traces calculated from observations of the collective
provide such specifications. In the following section, we describe some opportunities
for future research by suitably extending material developed in the earlier chapters.
200
8.2 Avenues for future research
Determining fitness from data
In the simulations of chapters 4, 5, and 7, it was assumed that the fitness maps
are known. However in earlier work [4], the fitness was obtained through games waged
against nature by individuals of a population. That is, each pursuer’s payoff was
computed by using the time required to capture an evader unaware of the pursuer’s
presence in Monte Carlo simulations. In this case, taking the limit of the payoffs over
multiple evader motions, multiple independent experiments and multiple stages of the
game allowed averaging using the weak law of large numbers to compute frequency
independent fitness of each strategy that explains the stochastic trajectories observed
in simulations. Such payoffs can be considered as a biasing fitness since (i) in reality,
an evader might not always be ignorant and unreactive to the presence of the pursuer,
and (ii) a frequency independent fitness always results in the asymptotic convergence
of the strategy to that pure strategy for which the fitness is the maximum. Assuming
that the pursuer-evader pair are engaged in a symmetric game, equipped with the
same number of strategies, a linear fitness that accounts for the time dependent
relative prevalence of all the pure strategies can be constructed as follows.
Suppose that the two agents use a pure strategy pair (i, j) : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. Then,
their payoff respectively are aij to the i player and aji to the j player due to the
symmetric nature of the game. Therefore, in a single population of players all of
whose payoffs are given by A = [aij], assuming that the probability of encountering
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the jth pure strategy is given by xj, we end up with a linear fitness f = Ax which can
be interpreted as having been learned through past rivalries between the strategies.
When the game is not assumed to be symmetric, another example discussed in the
next section arises.
Controllability in bi-matrix games
A very interesting extension of the replicator dynamics defined by underlying
symmetric games is one where the underlying game is assumed to be asymmetric.
That is, suppose that in the pursuit-evasion game, the pursuer has n strategies while
the evader has m. Suppose that the payoff to each player when the two agents use
a pure strategy pair (i, j) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m is aij and bij (elements of payoff
matrices A and B) respectively, and let x ∈ ∆n−1 and y ∈ ∆m−1 denote their cognitive
decisions represented by mixed strategies. Then, the replicator dynamics that reflects














where ck, k = 1, 2 are frequency independent fitness maps that can be thought of
as learned from games against nature, when the adversaries are unresponsive to the
presence of the agent and ul, l = 1, . . . , 4 can be thought of as the modulation by
each agent of the fitness maps to produce a desired mixed strategy. The constraints
on the fitness maps that ensure controllability remain to be investigated. It is worth
noting that the Hamiltonian aspect of such dynamics have been discussed in [96].
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Replicators on graphs
In discussions so far, the state on the simplex x has been interpreted to repre-
sent a cognitive decision of an autonomous agent, with no reference to the number
of agents in the collective. While different interpretations of a mixed strategy exist,
work by [97] suggests an alternative interpretation.
Consider a regular graph with n total nodes. Suppose that each node in the
graph is connected to k others and each node is represented by a vertex in ∆n−1.
Traditionally, Markovian problems on graphs leading to a replicator dynamics formu-
lation in a limiting case address the question of when a mutant node will overtake the
entire population. The dynamics in this case is defined by the different rules followed
by the nodes to update their strategies. We present here, through the control frame-
work established earlier, a solution to achieving a desired state for the collective in
∆n−1.
In this work, we are interested in imitation updating discussed in [98]. Each
node in the network updates his or her strategy by imitating the neighbour’s strategy
with probability proportional to the fitness of their strategy. In this setting, it was
shown that the replicator equation is given by:
ẋ = f̂ + ĝ (8.2)
where the fitness maps are given by f = Ax, where A = [aij] and g = Bx, where
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B = [bij] is a skew symmetric matrix dependent on A such that
bij =
(k + 3)aii + 3aij − 3aji − (k + 3)ajj
(k + 3)(k − 2)
(8.3)
We can easily extend this into a control system by scaling the fitness with controls.
Further, assuming aij = ai ∀ j leads to f = a, a frequency independent fitness
map, while g is still linear. The controllability of this system can be investigated.
The feedback laws from chapter 3 can be used to investigate stabilization about any
arbitrary desired state.
Modeling neuronal activity
A potential application of graphical modeling in this work is neuronal activ-
ity, with the probabilities xi determining the activity level of an i
th unit, allowing
incorporation of spatial information such as connectivity with and influence of other
neuronal units represented by an underlying graph. Different sensing methodologies
such as EEG, FMRI, MEG and diffusion tensor imaging give rise to data about the
brain activity at different spatio-temporal resolutions. However in recent attempts to
capture the structural and functional connectivity of the brain, linear time invariant,
discrete time dynamics have been proposed [99,100]:




where A is a symmetric adjacency matrix and the inputs uk represent the influence
of different brain regions on the state x. Although there are experiments suggesting
the suitability of this model for large scale neuronal modeling the brain, it has its
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deficiencies. For instance, the dynamics is assumed to be linear and time-invariant
with the state update at time t + 1 for an ith unit considered to be independent of
its electrical activity at time t. The controls are meant to include the effects of other
brain regions in influencing the activity of the one in consideration, but do not offer
a natural way to account for connectivity and plasticity. For example, the notion of
general controllability considers the smallest eigen value of the controllability matrix
of system (8.4) after getting matrices A, Bk from diffusion tensor imaging data. In
this spirit, the replicator dynamics on graphs presented here may offer an alternate
approach to model and understand the functioning of the brain.
Stochastic replicators
In chapter 4, feedback laws for the deterministic replicator dynamics were in-
vestigated to asymptotically achieve a desired mixed strategy and were shown to
produce periodic orbits in the simplex in a restricted setting. However, decision
making whether biological or in engineering is affected by stochasticity arising from
randomness in the driving external stimuli or internal perception of payoffs. Hence,
it is of interest to consider the efficacy of the feedback laws in the presence of noise
as well as their effect on controllability and permanence. Some earlier work such
as [101–103] also discusses permanence of stochastic replicator dynamics.
In [68], speed-accuracy tradeoffs in sensory motor processing were considered.
Consider a pursuer trying to capture a target whose motion is stochastic. Apart from
the mechanical delays considered in the earlier work, suppose that the pursuer has to
tradeoff the cognitive effort and accuracy of the decision against the time required to
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act on the stimulus. This can be thought of as a cognitive speed-accuracy tradeoff
where the delays are due to the cognitive effort required to arrive at a decision, which
may be modeled by the stochastic dynamics.
Sensor platforms and matched filters
An aim of this thesis was to transpire the developed theoretical framework
into applications for distributed sensing. Finding meaningful and tractable ways to
describe sensor selection or control for use in a robot collective requires specifying the
analogous notion of strategies for sensor platforms. We suggest the use of matched
filters for this purpose [104,105].
Some goals for cognitive sensor selection includes the following:
• For the replicator control system, one way of implementing the feedforward
mechanism that is analogous of the red arrow in Uexküll’s abstraction is equiv-
alent to u1, u2 being determined through sensory data. One criterion to define
the controls might be to evolve towards a mixed strategy that maximizes the
signal to noise ratio of sensor.
• As suggested in the bi-matrix game setting, considering an estimate of an adver-
sarial agent’s decision to determine the fitness may capture a conflict between
the agents’ competing objectives.
• Interpreting the mixed strategy as a way to modulate attention over discrete
number of intervals that quantize the range of a sensor is a potential applica-
tion. In this case, an oscillatory state x implies periodically shifting attention
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mimicking the movement of a dragonfly’s head, independent of its body. Al-
ternatively attention can describe resultant baseline (line of sight) or relative
velocity vector about which an agent implements a feedback law.
In the presence of multiple sensors, strategy evolution using information theoretic
measures may be used towards achieving sensor fusion. Similar to using the entropy
as a measure that is maximized or driven to zero, an alternative heuristic is given
by “maximum caliber” [106], with the use of variational principles to justify the
optimizing nature of certain probability distributions in statistical mechanics.
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Appendix A: Non-singularity of Vandermonde minors
Recall that Vk, k = 1, . . . , n is the n× (n− 1) matrix obtained by removing the
kth column of V . That is, for a = [a1 . . . an]
T and ak , [ak1 . . . a
k
n]
T , with a0 = e,
we have
V1 = [a a
2 . . . an−1]
Vk = [e a a
2 . . . ak−2 ak . . . an−1], k = 2, . . . , n− 1
Vn = [e a . . . a
n−2]
Let Ṽk denote the n−1×n−1 matrix obtained by removing the last row of Vk. That
is, for ã = [a1 a2 . . . an−1]
T , and ãk , [ak1 . . . a
k
n−1]
T and ẽ = a0 we have
Ṽ1 = [ã ã
2 . . . ãn−1]
Vk = [ẽ ã ã
2 . . . ãk−2 ãk . . . ãn−1], k = 2, . . . , n− 1
Vn = [ẽ ã . . . ã
n−2]
Let Ṽ denote the following Vandermonde matrix:
Ṽ = [ẽ ã . . . ãn−2] (A.1)
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If ai’s are distinct and positive, both V and Ṽ are non-singular. The absolute values
of determinants of Ṽk satisfy the following identity:
|det(Ṽk)| = |det(Ṽ )|sλk(a1, . . . , an−1) (A.2)
where sλk is a Schur polynomial [107] of shape λk = (λ1k, λ2k, . . . , λ(n−1)k) satisfying
λj1 = 1 ∀j = 1, . . . , n− 1
λjk = 0 ∀j < n− k, λjk = 1 ∀j ≥ n− k, k = 2, . . . , n− 2
λj(n−1) = 0 ∀j = 1, . . . , n− 1 (A.3)
Further the Schur polynomials sλk(a1, . . . , an−1) can be written as the sum of mono-
mials obtained from semi-standard Young tableaux of shape λk defined by ai, i =
1, . . . , n − 1. Therefore, sλk(a1, . . . , an−1) > 0 ∀ k. This along with (A.2) and the
assumptions on ai guarantee non-singularity of Ṽk.
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Appendix B: The Fisher-Rao-Shahshahani metric and the Levi-Civita
connection on the simplex
We find the Levi-Civita connection on the simplex ∆n−1 from the Levi-Civita
connection on the positive orthant as follows: since the inclusion map
ι : ∆n−1 → Rn+
p→ p
is an embedding, the tangent space at p to the positive orthant can be written as the
direct sum:







refers to the one dimensional normal space. This implies the fol-
lowing relationship between the tangent bundles associated with the positive orthant
and its submanifold, the simplex.







Thus, there exists an orthogonal projection between the respective tangent spaces
denoted by Π:
Πp : TpRn+ → Tp∆n−1
z → z − 〈z, n〉n
where n is the unit normal to the simplex and the inner product 〈z, n〉 is with respect
to the Fisher-Rao-Shahshahani metric.
Let ∇ denote the connection on the simplex and ∇̄, the connection on the positive
orthant. For a point p and two vector fields X and Y on the simplex,





where X̄ and Ȳ are extensions of X and Y respectively to vector fields on the positive
orthant. Since ∆n−1 is an embedded submanifold of Rn+, we identify the extensions X̄
and Ȳ at p with X and Y themselves with respect to local coordinates (p1, p2, · · · , pn)
for the positive orthant.
Let X = X i
∂
∂pi
and Y = Y j
∂
∂pj
be two replicator vector fields on the simplex with
X i = pi(f
i − f̄) and Y j = pj(gj − ḡ) for payoff maps f and g with components f i
and gj. The Levi-Civita connection for two vector fields is then given by:































































where Γkij are the Christoffel symbols associated with the Fisher-Rao-Shahshahani
metric. We compute each term separately as follows.

































































































































































































































































































The above is clearly the sum of two replicator fields, each correponding to payoff
map components
(
f i − f̄
)






respectively. Since replicator vec-
tor fields are closed under addition, we denote this sum as a replicator vector field
corresponding to payoff components hi ,
(
f i − f̄
)







For evaluating the second term, we find the Christoffel symbols associated with the



































if i = j = m
0 otherwise
(B.9)
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as defined before. Next, we project the
vector field ∇̄XY orthogonally from the tangent space to the orthant to the tangent
space to the simplex. Due to calculations in Wei, Justh and Krishnaprasad (PRS
2009), we know that the unit normal to the simplex at a point p is given by p itself
since, for a vector w ∈ Tp∆n−1 with
∑
i



























, its orthogonal projection onto
the positive orthant Πp(∇̄XY ) is:























































and so the connection on the simplex is given as,










































































We can alternatively arrive at the projection above by simply substracting from ∇̄XY ,
the normal component of the terms that did not correspond to replicator dynamics.
This is because, replicator vector fields are preserved under the projection and since
this operation is linear. Note that the vector field obtained by the connection ∇XY
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[101] M. Benäım, J. Hofbauer, and W. H. Sandholm, “Robust permanence and imper-
manence for stochastic replicator dynamics,” Journal of Biological Dynamics,
vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 180–195, 2008.
223
[102] D. Foster and P. Young, “Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics,” Theoretical
population biology, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 219–232, 1990.
[103] D. Fudenberg and C. Harris, “Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks,”
Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 420–441, 1992.
[104] E. J. Warrant, “Sensory matched filters,” Current Biology, vol. 26, no. 20,
pp. R976–R980, 2016.
[105] R. Wehner, “‘Matched filters’ - neural models of the external world,” Journal
of comparative physiology A, vol. 161, no. 4, pp. 511–531, 1987.
[106] P. D. Dixit, J. Wagoner, C. Weistuch, S. Pressé, K. Ghosh, and K. A. Dill,
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Mathématique, vol. 58, no. 1, pp. 147–163, 2012.
224
